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Introduction: Civil society 
and transitional justice in 
Asia and the Pacific
Lia Kent, Joanne Wallis and Claire Cronin
Over the last two decades, civil society in Asia and the Pacific has played 
an integral role in debates about transitional justice mechanisms for 
populations who have experienced violent conflicts or oppressive political 
regimes. As in other parts of the world, civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and actors have advocated for the establishment of criminal trials and 
truth commissions, monitored their operations once established, and 
pushed for take-up of their recommendations (Brahm 2007). CSOs 
have also been instrumental in developing community-based responses 
to address the legacies of mass violence (Hovil and Okello 2011). Many 
‘local’ (national and grassroots) CSOs actively engage with regional and 
global transitional justice networks to support their work (Boesenecker 
and Vinjamuri 2011).
Despite these critical roles, there has been surprisingly little examination 
of the breadth and diversity of civil society transitional justice activity 
across Asia and the Pacific. This collection addresses this gap through 
an empirically grounded analysis of this activity in four Asian states—
Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Cambodia and Myanmar—and three Pacific 
contexts—Bougainville (an autonomous region of Papua New Guinea), 
Solomon Islands and Fiji. It builds upon the rich discussions that took 
place during an interdisciplinary workshop on the theme of ‘Civil Society 
and Transitional Justice in Asia and the Pacific’ held at The Australian 
Nationanl University in September 2016, which brought together leading 
and emerging international and Australian scholars working in the field 
of transitional justice. Workshop discussions ranged across numerous 
themes, including the roles of faith-based organisations vis-à-vis secular 
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CSOs in transitional justice; the extent to which gender concerns shape 
civil society transitional justice efforts; the relationships (and tensions) 
between CSOs and the state; the influence of donor agendas on CSOs; 
and the significance of civil society–led transitional justice initiatives 
(including local reconciliation, art, memorialisation and community 
media initiatives).
Picking up on these themes, the chapters in this collection provide a nuanced 
picture of the heterogeneity of civil society in Asia and the Pacific. This picture 
challenges many assumptions about the nature of civil society and its role in 
transitional justice found in the literature. It illustrates that CSOs can have 
different – and sometimes competing – priorities, resources and approaches 
to transitional justice, and that their work may be underpinned by diverse 
understandings of what constitutes ‘justice’. The aim of the collection is 
not to provide a comprehensive picture of civil society transitional justice 
activity in Asia and the Pacific (or to define its parameters); rather, it is to 
shed light on its diversity and on the factors that both enable and constrain 
certain forms of civil society activity in specific contexts.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter we grapple with the slippery 
concept of ‘civil society’. We consider how the concept of civil society 
has evolved and its emerging prominence in the discourse and practice 
of transitional justice. We then highlight two key blind spots that are 
apparent in the current portrayal of civil society in the transitional justice 
literature: first, the tendency to view civil society as a homogenous and 
secular entity, which overlooks the diversity of civil society actors and the 
significance of institutions grounded in other forms of association, such as 
kin, ethnicity and faith; and second, the tendency to celebrate civil society 
as an unqualified good, which downplays the dynamics of power that 
shape and constrain it. Finally, we provide an overview of the chapters 
that comprise this collection.
‘Civil society’: An evolving concept
Civil society is a nebulous, slippery and ill-defined concept (Jeffrey 2013, 
107). It is a concept that can potentially be applied to a bewildering range 
of non-state actors, including but not limited to: non-governmental 
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organisations;1 associations; church and faith-based groups; trade unions; 
sporting associations; youth groups; and issue-focused organisations. 
It can also be applied to actors with varying values, issues of concern, 
motivating philosophies, financial means and degrees of political, religious 
and/or ideological motivation. Nonetheless, in the contemporary period, 
civil society tends to operate as a kind of ‘floating signifier’ that carries 
connotations of ‘civility and virtue’ (Shepherd 2015, 893) and is perceived 
as operating in the interstices of the state and society.
To help contextualise current understandings of civil society it is useful 
to examine the historical origins of the concept, which are often said to 
lie in the late Enlightenment period, with the emergence of the ‘secular 
state’ (Jeffery, Kent and Wallis 2017, 381). The seventeenth-century 
philosophers Hobbes and Grotius emphasised the need for a ‘civil’ well-
ordered society, and for Locke, ‘civil’ society was indistinguishable from 
the ideal ‘civilised’ state, which was set in contrast to primitive and savage 
societies. A shift occurred in the eighteenth century, when the term ‘civil 
society’ became popularised as a way of referring to a sphere of life that was 
distinctly separate from the state and from religious society (Jeffery, Kent 
and Wallis 2017, 382). Civil society came to be understood as a means 
of guarding individual rights against the overuse of power by the state 
(Glasius, Lewis and Seckinelgin 2004). Voluntary associations were seen 
to be essential in keeping in check the power of centralised institutions 
and protecting pluralism (Edwards 2004, 7).
The concept of civil society experienced a resurgence in the 1980s 
with the  end of the Cold War and the collapse of socialism. Political 
parties and  the mass media increasingly invoked the concept of civil 
society to refer to all forms of voluntary association that had previously 
been controlled by the state – from sports clubs to national groups 
(Hann 1996, 45). The concept came to signify ‘utopian conditions, of 
democratic participation and tolerance, the antithesis of totalitarianism’ 
(Hann  1996,  45). The so-called ‘third wave’ of transitions from 
authoritarian rule to democracy that took place in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America gave further force to these ideas (Huntington 1993; Jeffery, 
Kent and Wallis 2017, 382). The civil societies emerging in these regions 
1  The terms ‘non-governmental organisation’ (NGO) and ‘civil society organisation’ (CSO) are 
often used interchangeably. However, as the chapters in this collection demonstrate, civil society is 
a broad concept, while NGOs generally work within an international development or human rights 
framework. Therefore, we view NGOs as constituting one element of a broader CSO base. 
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at that time have been ‘credited with effective resistance to authoritarian 
regimes, democratizing society from below while pressuring authoritarians 
for change’ (Foley and Edwards 1996, 38).
Many of the main protagonists of these civil society movements 
became key players in the debates that began to take place in the field 
of transitional justice that similarly emerged in the 1980s. In particular, 
these actors ‘brought with them a set of agendas that emphasized, among 
other priorities, the pursuit of formal state-led responses to human 
rights violations’ (Jeffery, Kent and Wallis 2017, 382). These agendas 
significantly influenced emerging understandings of ‘transitional justice’ 
and the roles of civil society in furthering a transitional justice agenda. The 
idea of transitional justice came to be equated with legal responses to past 
violence, including legal accountability for perpetrators of human rights 
violations, and with legal-institutional reforms that sought to entrench 
this approach. Civil society came to be conceived as supportive of this 
agenda, and separate from the state (Jeffery, Kent and Wallis 2017, 383).
While the relationship between transitional justice and civil society was 
forged in the 1980s, it has continued to evolve as the field of transitional 
justice has itself evolved. The concerns of transitional justice scholars 
and practitioners have expanded to encompass not only transitions from 
authoritarian rule to democracy but also transitions from conflict to peace 
(Jeffery and Kim 2014, 5). Since the 1990s, transitional justice mechanisms 
have been increasingly prescribed as part of the United Nations ‘tool-kit’ for 
successful post-conflict peacebuilding (Kent 2012, 5; Subotic 2009, 21). 
And while transitional justice continues to be underpinned by an emphasis 
on prosecutions, the field has broadened to encompass a much wider 
range of mechanisms, including truth commissions, institutional reform, 
vetting processes, customary reconciliation processes, memorialisation, 
and history curriculum reform. These developments have taken place 
alongside a growing interest in ‘localising’ transitional justice, in other 
words, adapting transitional justice to meet the context-specific needs of 
different post-conflict societies (Shaw and Waldorf 2010, 4).
These shifts have fostered a renewed interest in civil society actors and 
have generated new assumptions about what civil society can accomplish. 
While civil society continues to be understood as secular, as operating 
in a sphere that is separate from the state and as supportive of global 
accountability norms, it is also viewed as the repository of ‘local knowledge’ 
and as critical to fostering public debate about, and ensuring the public 
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ownership of, transitional justice processes and norms (Kritz 2009, 18; 
Brahm 2007; Shaw and Waldorf 2010). In the context of peacebuilding 
and state-building interventions, civil society is often invoked to suggest 
ideas of ‘autonomy, population participation and democratic validation’ 
(Jeffrey 2013, 113). It is thought to ‘carry the best hopes for a genuine 
democratic counterweight to the power-brokers, economic, exploiters 
and warlords’ (Pouligny 2005, 496). These assumptions tend to be taken-
for-granted rather than critically examined (Subotic 2012, 112; Hovil and 
Okello 2011).
Transitional justice and civil society: 
Rethinking secular assumptions
Prevailing accounts of civil society in the transitional justice literature tend 
to treat civil society as a ‘unified, homogenous and secular entity’ (Jeffery, 
Kent and Wallis 2017, 379). It is assumed that civil society operates in 
a sphere that is both separate to, and complementary of, the state and 
that CSOs are uniformly in favour of ‘global accountability norms’ that 
stress the importance of criminal accountability for perpetrators of mass 
atrocities (Jeffery, Kent and Wallis 2017, 379; Boesnecker and Vinjamuri 
2011, 346). These assumptions, which are partly a reflection of the 
evolution of conceptions of civil society in ‘the West’ (Jeffery, Kent and 
Wallis 2017, 380; Boesnecker and Vinjamuri 2011), have led scholars 
and practitioners working in or on post-conflict societies to assume the 
existence of structures that are representative of ‘the form that civil society 
has taken in modern western societies’ (Pouligny 2005, 498).
This assumption has led to a significant blind spot in the transitional 
justice literature. Specifically, it has meant that the diversity of civil society 
actors and civil society practice has been overlooked, as have the historical 
and political contexts that have shaped the development of civil society in 
specific places (Jeffery, Kent and Wallis 2017, 388; see also Lewis 2002). 
For instance, current conceptions of civil society tend to overlook the 
degree to which institutions based on other forms of association, like kin, 
ethnicity or local ‘tradition’, may be significant in many societies (Lewis 
2002). The importance of ‘custom’ in shaping local value systems in 
relation to transitional justice is highlighted in several chapters in this 
collection, in particular those focused on Timor-Leste and the Pacific 
Islands. For instance, Damian Grenfell’s and Lia Kent’s chapters draw out 
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the significance of customary rituals and practices relating to the recovery 
and reburial of the dead in Timor-Leste. Joanne Wallis’s and Volker Boege’s 
chapters highlight the role of local sociopolitical practices in fostering 
reconciliation in Bougainville. These chapters underscore the continuing 
relevance of kinship networks, ties and governance structures, which they 
say retain ‘a primary function in the organisation of social and political 
life’ in these societies (Jeffery, Kent and Wallis 2017). They demonstrate, 
too, that in contexts where populations are largely rural-based, reliant 
on subsistence agriculture and have limited access to state services, these 
structures and ties play a critical role in ensuring the long-term survival 
of local communities. In some cases, customary actors or institutions may 
enjoy more legitimacy than ‘elite’ CSOs based in capital cities.
The tendency to conceive of civil society as a homogenous and secular 
entity has also led to a neglect of faith-based actors and organisations 
and of  religious practices and rituals, which, in many societies, may 
be considered key in addressing the legacies of violent pasts. This is 
beginning to change (Inazu 2009; Abe 2004; Shore and Kline 2006; 
Brown 2004; Beu and Nokise 2009; Rožič 2014), and scholars such 
as Philpott have highlighted the significance of faith-based actors in 
promoting and spreading a  paradigm of transitional justice based on 
the concept of ‘reconciliation’. Philpott suggests that, unlike secular 
human rights organisations, faith-based actors tend to ground their 
work in faith doctrines rather than human rights discourses, emphasising 
‘apology, forgiveness, empathic acknowledgement of suffering and the 
transformation of enmity between both groups and individuals’ (Philpott 
2007, 97). Philpott (2009, 183) also argues that religious actors and 
organisations can influence the character of broader transitional justice 
processes by ‘shaping the content of a society’s political discourse – 
for instance, by injecting the language of reconciliation, apology and 
forgiveness into the media and political debate’.
With a similar focus on the contributions of faith-based actors to 
reconciliation, Kollontai (2013) and Brown (2004) emphasise religious 
actors’ willingness and ability to work across religious and ethnic 
boundaries. Kollontai documents the work of the Jewish aid organisation 
La Benevolencia in Bosnia-Herzegovina, showing how, in an environment 
where religion had become synonymous with questions of ethnic identity, 
this organisation came to be thought of as representing neutrality and 
impartiality. Brown (2004) emphasises how the Melanesian Brothers in 
the Solomon Islands were regarded as neutral during the ethnic tensions 
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that took place from 1998 to 2003. This was a context in which both 
sides of the conflict were Christian and religion did not play a significant 
role in fuelling animosities. Here, widespread beliefs in the mana 
(spiritual powers) of the Brothers meant that they were both respected 
and feared, and able to pass between both sides of the conflict, praying 
with militants and providing humanitarian relief and shelter.
Religious actors’ willingness to enter dangerous environments, and their 
ability to negotiate between different sides of a conflict, can also place them 
in a unique position to provide humanitarian aid. For instance, Bouta 
et al.’s 2005 desk study, which analyses the role of 27 Christian, Muslim 
and multi-faith organisations working in peacebuilding, concludes that 
the unique strength of faith-based organisations lies in their ability and 
willingness to work both across religious boundaries and with secular 
actors. Their ‘moral and spiritual authority’ (Bouta, Kadayifci-Orelland 
and Abu-Nimer 2005, 8) is widely respected vis-à-vis the government, 
and they have stronger historical links to their communities than secular 
CSOs and the state (Shannahan and Payne 2016). This provides them with 
a unique niche to mobilise both the local community and international 
networks based on their affiliations.
This collection contributes to this emerging body of work by exploring the 
significance of faith-based organisations and approaches to transitional 
justice in Asia and the Pacific. A key theme that emerges from the chapters 
focusing on the Pacific Islands is that faith-based, primarily Christian, 
organisations have been among the most actively engaged CSOs on 
questions of transitional justice. These organisations have promoted 
globalised justice ideologies and institutions while simultaneously 
embracing more locally pertinent discourses of justice grounded in 
biblical theology. These themes are evident in Volker Boege’s chapter, 
which identifies the influential role of church groups in facilitating 
reconciliation in Bougainville; David Oakeshott’s chapter, which focuses 
on a Marist Brothers initiative in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands 
that sought to ‘vernacularise’ the child rights discourse to facilitate 
peacebuilding; and Claire Cronin’s chapter, which highlights the role of 
the Solomon Islands Christian Association in promoting the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.
As these chapters and several others in this collection underscore, 
the distinction between ‘global’ and ‘local’ approaches to transitional 
justice is not always clear-cut: ‘indigenous’ and ‘faith-based’ actors and 
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organisations may be influenced by global discourses (including liberal 
human rights discourse) and may attempt to ‘vernacularise’ or translate 
these discourses in ways that are locally resonant. As the chapters on the 
Pacific Islands highlight, however, these attempts are not always seamless. 
A key theme raised in both Cronin’s and Oakeshott’s chapters is that 
CSOs in the Pacific Islands have faced difficulties in their advocacy for 
formal transitional justice mechanisms because these mechanisms are 
grounded in liberal, individualistic understandings of human rights 
that are perceived as incompatible with local value systems grounded in 
Christianity and kastom.
Nonetheless, local CSOs may be successful in promoting creative 
responses that navigate between, and sometimes transform, international 
human rights norms and local value systems. Ken Setiawan’s chapter, 
which examines how Indonesian civil society actors have made use of 
online platforms to promote the remembrance of stories about the 1965 
anti-communist violence, illustrates the creative potential of civil society 
responses. Sperfeldt and Oeung also point to this creativity by examining 
the ways in which local CSOs in Cambodia have provided advocacy and 
outreach in a context where the political will of the state is lacking. In 
her analysis of another Cambodian CSO, the Bophana Centre, Rachel 
Hughes examines how it engages communities in public events and film 
screenings. She suggests that the creative arts–based programs organised 
by the Bophana Centre, which emphasise ‘shared creative labour’ that is 
‘cultural, material and relational’, have reshaped the nature and scope of 
the outreach activities organised by the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Court of Cambodia (ECCC).
Rethinking the dynamics of power: Donors 
and national political elites
A second blind spot in dominant accounts of civil society in the 
transitional  justice literature relates to the eclipsing of power dynamics 
(including those between actors in the Global North and local CSOs in 
the South, and those between local CSOs and domestic political elites). 
This blind spot is partly due to the depiction of transitional justice as 
an arena of ‘technical expertise’ that involves the implementation of 
a  ‘standard menu’ of offerings that includes trials, truth commissions, 
reparations initiatives and security sector reform (Nesiah 2016; Subotic 
2012, 119–120) in diverse post-conflict contexts.
9
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Writing against this depoliticised depiction, critical transitional justice 
scholars have argued that states in the Global North, donors and 
international NGOs can have a significant influence on the priorities and 
activities of ‘local’ civil society in conflict-affected societies. These power 
differentials, which can play out through decision-making about funding, 
as well as the exchange of technical expertise and capacity building 
(e.g.  see Nesiah 2016; Pigou 2011), have become more pronounced as 
the field of transitional justice has become associated with externally 
sponsored state-building and peacebuilding programs. In such contexts, 
it is particularly likely that ‘powerful countries of the global North’ will 
play a role in ‘advocating for a transitional justice mechanism in the global 
South’ (Nesiah 2016, 14) and that states will be ‘expected, encouraged and 
even coerced’ to adopt such mechanisms (Subotic 2009, 5). As this can 
lead to legitimacy issues (Nesiah 2016, 14), the encouragement of civil 
society transitional justice activity may be viewed as a way to help counter 
these issues. Further exacerbating the power differentials is the increasing 
professionalisation of the transitional justice field, which is reflected in the 
mounting donor pressures upon local and international to demonstrate 
the effectiveness and impact of their work (Subotic 2012, 119).
The influence of donors on the activities and practices undertaken by 
local CSOs has been noted by Vasuki Nesiah (2016, 44), who argues 
that donors tend to gravitate towards, and fund, ‘elite’ civil society actors 
who are often of a secular orientation, and speak in ‘an internationalised 
language of transitional justice’ rather than those who ‘may advance 
justice agendas and priorities that do not translate into that language 
because of indigenous (or other alternative) epistemologies’. Similarly, 
Piers Pigou (2011) observes how differences between elite CSOs who 
speak the international vernacular (and can tailor funding proposals to 
fit with donors’ priorities and concerns) and grassroots, rural or more 
radical groups, can become more pronounced during times of transition. 
A lack of international funding may lead to some civil society groups 
becoming marginalised and sidelined by urban elites who claim to 
speak on their behalf. The funding of certain kinds of activities may, by 
creating incentives for CSOs to focus on certain issues, also detract from 
creative, community-based approaches to addressing the legacies of past 
violence, and marginalise ‘local knowledges’ (Nesiah 2016, 29; Subotic 
2012, 121). It may also lead to a depoliticisation of civil society activities, 
as certain issues are prioritised (for instance, prosecutions) and others are 
left untouched (for instance, structural injustices that may be legacies 
of colonialism) (Nesiah 2016).
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Many of these themes are explored in this collection. For instance, 
Sperfeldt and Oeung observe that while some Cambodian CSOs have 
benefited from the funding available for community outreach associated 
with the ECCC, other groups (including the nascent victims’ association 
Ksen Ksan) have ‘struggled to find a foothold in Cambodia’s competitive 
society’. Wallis similarly notes that the international CSOs working in 
Bougainville have tended to ‘engage with and fund elite, Bougainvillean 
CSOs that speak in an internationalised language of transitional justice 
and human rights’. Writing of the Timor-Leste context, Kent suggests 
that, while the alliances forged between local CSOs in Timor-Leste and 
international human rights NGOs have helped to augment the voice and 
impact of the former group, these links have not always been an advantage 
in a domestic political context. Local CSOs have been accused by domestic 
political elites of pushing a ‘foreign’ agenda that is of little relevance to the 
lives and priorities of ordinary people.
Further to the issue of power dynamics, several chapters in the collection 
highlight the ways in which civil society advocacy for transitional justice 
can become entangled with, and limited by, the political agendas of 
national political elites. Like the power dynamics between international 
actors and local CSOs, the conflicting political agendas that are at 
play in the process of ‘dealing with the past’ in specific contexts may 
be obscured by the professionalisation and institutionalisation of the 
transitional justice field, and its depiction as an apolitical and technical 
set of ‘tools’ (Nesiah 2016, 32). The diverse political stakes that are at 
play, and the concrete political struggles in which transitional justice 
debates and mechanisms are embedded are, however, very apparent to 
the contributors to this collection. In Timor-Leste, Kent describes how 
narratives of victimhood and suffering are downplayed by political 
elites who favour more ‘heroic “imaginings”’ of the Timor-Leste nation. 
Grenfell builds on this observation to describe how the Timor-Leste 
Government has used transitional justice ‘framed in national terms’ to 
reinforce the state. Grenfell’s chapter offers caution about the dangers of 
CSOs being co-opted into transitional justice mechanisms that are part 
of state-building projects that might not be legitimate, or that might 
be exclusionary. The degree to which the transitional justice advocacy 
of civil society actors can become frustrated by the agendas of national 
political elites is also evident in Setiawan’s chapter on Indonesia and 
Catherine Renshaw’s chapter on Myanmar. Setiawan suggests that there 
has been a ‘lack of political will to address past human rights violations’ 
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because many of the elites who were part of the repressive New Order 
regime remain influential. Setiawan observes that, while CSOs have 
advocated for transitional justice mechanisms, there is ‘reluctance or even 
antipathy’ among many Indonesians towards these mechanisms, perhaps 
demonstrating the difficulty of pursuing transitional justice in contexts 
where a so-called ‘transition’ to democracy has only partially occurred. 
In Myanmar, Renshaw describes how both the military and the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) have prioritised stability over strong 
accountability mechanisms, in part because, as in Indonesia, the military 
retains significant political power.
The challenge of pursuing transitional justice in contexts where previous 
elites remain influential is also evident in Wallis’s and Boege’s chapters on 
Bougainville, where elites have favoured customary reconciliation coupled 
with amnesties and pardons for human rights abuses, which has, according 
to Wallis, ‘contributed to the emergence of a culture of impunity’. As in 
Indonesia, Wallis finds that ‘proposals to establish a  formal transitional 
justice mechanism have largely failed to gain traction among ordinary 
Bougainvilleans’, perhaps again because of the difficulty of pursuing 
transitional justice in contexts where the political transition is ongoing 
or its outcome uncertain. In contrast, Sperfeldt and Oeung’s chapter 
on Cambodia highlights how extensive transitional justice mechanisms, 
including an international criminal court, can be pursued in contexts 
where there has been a clear political transition, previous elites have been 
removed and where there is substantial international support.
Nonetheless, it is also important not to overestimate the power of 
states to shape transitional justice agendas. In the context of the Pacific 
Islands, for instance, Wallis argues that it is necessary to question ‘liberal 
assumptions regarding the relevance and legitimacy of states as actors 
capable of facilitating or complying with formal transitional justice 
mechanisms’. As Wallis points out, these assumptions simply do not 
hold up in the Pacific Islands, where ‘states themselves are only shallowly 
rooted in society and many people do not have a strong understanding 
of themselves as citizens of a state’. Similar observations are made by 
Oakeshott in respect of Solomon Islands, where he notes that churches 
have ‘historically performed governance functions that a classical 
Weberian understanding of the state (as distinct from civil society) 
would view as state prerogatives’, including ‘governance in the absence of 
functioning states’.
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Chapter overview
As the preceding discussion of blind spots suggests, rather than working 
with a pre-existing (Western, liberal) understanding of what civil society 
looks like or celebrating civil society as an unqualified good, it is necessary 
for transitional justice scholars to engage with what Mamdani refers to 
as ‘actually existing civil society’ (1996, 19). This means paying more 
attention to the historical and political contexts that have shaped the 
development of civil society in specific places (Jeffery, Kent and Wallis 
2017, 388; see also Lewis 2002). It means attending to the ways in which 
local organisations define their moral and political agenda and critically 
engage with (or choose to disengage from) the ‘inescapably normative’ 
modern Western model of civil society prescribed and funded by 
international donors. It also requires widening the lens of what constitutes 
civil society to consider indigenous governance structures, which may 
help to challenge and problematise Western-centric norms (Hann 1996). 
At the same time, it requires sensitivity to the globalisation of ideas about 
civil society and transitional justice, and to the dynamics of power that 
imbue the relationships between donors, CSOs and national political 
elites. Responding to Mamdani’s call for more attention to ‘actually 
existing’ civil society, the chapters in this collection engage in place-based 
analyses, exploring individual case studies that elucidate the diversity of 
civil society engagement with transitional justice processes across Asia and 
the Pacific.
Part 1: Timor-Leste and Indonesia
The first three chapters focus on Timor-Leste and Indonesia. Chapter 1, 
by Lia Kent, considers the limitations of the normative, liberal model of 
transitional justice endorsed by civil society in Timor-Leste. Kent instead 
advocates a broader approach based on a recognition of ‘everyday practices’. 
Kent describes, for example, the importance of honouring the dead in 
Timorese adat (custom) and how ‘the dead remain a very real presence 
in the lives of the living’. As such, for many who lost loved ones during 
the Indonesian occupation, locating the bodies of family members and 
affording them proper funeral rights is a pressing need. Despite this, Kent 
finds that these activities often occur ‘with little or no connection to the 
work of CSO activists, including the victims’ association’. Instead, much 
of this activity is undertaken by families and kinship groups with little 
external support, although some support is provided by faith-based actors. 
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Based on this analysis, Kent draws attention to potential shortcomings of 
the ‘victim-centred’ discourse promoted by Timorese CSOs. She argues 
that engaging with alternative subjectivities that are grounded in kinship 
structures may prove more useful in meeting the needs and priorities of 
East Timorese.
Chapter 2, by Damian Grenfell, documents how civil society actors in 
Timor-Leste have limited the effectiveness of both formal transitional 
justice initiatives and locally engaged forms of reconciliation and 
reparations by framing their efforts in terms of a ‘national imaginary’ 
closely linked to resistance to Indonesian occupation. Importantly, 
Grenfell defines civil society as ‘forms of social collaboration grounded 
in a public virtue that do not challenge the state’s claim to the monopoly 
over the legitimate use of violence within a given territory’. Grenfell 
argues that the nationalism that has shaped the transitional justice efforts 
has undermined their ability to respond to victims, as it has prioritised 
‘veterans over civilian survivors’ and made a ‘clear delineation in terms of 
gender’. As CSOs have reinforced a state-centric approach to transitional 
justice, this has also meant that cultural practices, particularly with regards 
to the burial of the dead, have been overlooked.
Chapter 3, by Ken Setiawan, considers the role of digital platforms in 
providing spaces for storytelling that challenge official narratives about 
past violence in Indonesia. Setiawan conceptualises civil society broadly 
to include these online spaces that fly under the radar of state control. She 
draws on Hirsch’s (2008) theory of postmemory to describe how stories 
published through digital platforms can serve to connect those who did 
not directly experience violence with previous generations who did. In 
addition, such stories have an affiliative, horizontal effect, connecting 
people to contemporaries who lack a filial link to past violence. In the 
context of the Indonesian transitional justice process, which Setiawan 
describes as ‘at best as “delayed” … at worst as “failed”’, such stories 
‘generate factual knowledge about what has happened, to whom and 
who is responsible’. Importantly, these stories can also function as ‘voices 
against silence, interpretation against incomprehension, empathy against 
indifference and remembrance against forgetting’.
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Part 2: Cambodia and Myanmar
The next three chapters consider Cambodia and Myanmar. Chapter 4, 
by Christoph Sperfeldt and Jeudy Oeung, provides an in-depth case study 
of the evolution of civil society support to the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Court of Cambodia from 2003 through to the present to demonstrate 
the many ways in which civil society can provide advocacy and outreach 
where government processes lack political will, and support and 
assistance where they lack resources. The authors document how CSOs 
took responsibility for advocating for increased victim participation in 
the process (phase one), to assisting victims in participating in the court 
(phases two and three), to assisting with collective reparations including 
remembrance and memorialisation, rehabilitation, documentation and 
education (phase four). While they argue that CSOs performed a valuable 
role, Sperfeldt and Oeung conclude that a more formalised, structured 
relationship would have streamlined the process to better meet the needs 
of victims.
Chapter 5, by Rachel Hughes, explores the work of Cambodian CSO 
the Bophana Centre. Bophana ‘does not participate straightforwardly in 
the discursive field of “transitional justice”’, as it eschews the normative 
approaches of humanitarian and human rights–focused initiatives. 
Instead, it focuses on educating the community, engaging them in active 
memory-work through film production and public screenings, organising 
conferences and providing the public with free access to its audiovisual 
archive. Bophana also works closely with the state-run Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal, providing its Public Affairs Section with resources and technical 
support to run ‘Study Tour Memory Nights’. Hughes problematises 
the Centre’s collaboration with the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, noting 
that concepts such as ‘civil society’ and ‘transitional justice’ can become 
‘rationales for the continued existence and salience’ of CSOs, as while 
they are ‘largely discursive’ they are also ‘economically consequential’.
Chapter 6, by Catherine Renshaw, examines the transition to democracy 
in  Myanmar. Renshaw finds that ‘there has been little justice’ in this 
transition because it has occurred as the result of ‘indigenous top-down 
change’ and consequently the military, which would fear the consequences 
of a formal transitional justice process, particularly criminal trials, retains 
significant political power. The National League for Democracy, which 
was the most significant advocate of the transition, also prioritises stability 
over strong accountability mechanisms. In any event, many Burmese 
conceive justice broadly to include not only criminal accountability, 
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but also broader political and economic reform. Such reform is unlikely 
to occur as long as the military and NLD are focused on maintaining 
the status quo. Burmese from Myanmar’s ethnic states are also involved 
in ongoing conflict with the national government, highlighting that 
a transition to peace remains only aspirational for many Burmese. In this 
context, Renshaw argues that CSOs are ‘critical actors in recording 
and articulating authentic expressions of what justice requires; and 
beginning the long process of recalibrating the political morality of post-
transition society’.
Part 3: The Pacific Islands
The final four chapters focus on the Pacific Islands. In Chapter 7, 
Joanne Wallis examines the role played by reconciliation practices in 
social reconstruction after Bougainville’s 1989 to 1997 conflict. Wallis 
juxtaposes reconciliation ‘grounded in local sociopolitical practices’ that 
is favoured by grassroots civil society, with the liberal, human rights–
based mechanisms (namely, criminal trials and truth commissions) 
advocated by ‘elite’ CSOs. Wallis concludes that local sociopolitical 
reconciliation practices have helped to establish ‘an environment in which 
Bougainvilleans have been able to negotiate and agree to the design of 
[effective governance] institutions, and in which they have been able to 
peacefully work through them to govern Bougainville’. However, she 
concludes that outcomes with respect to justice have been more mixed, 
as the pragmatic decision by Bougainvillean elites to favour reconciliation 
over a formal transitional justice mechanism has contributed to the 
emergence of a culture of impunity.
Chapter 8, by Volker Boege, also focuses on the role of reconciliation 
in peacebuilding in Bougainville, but takes a different approach by 
examining the ways in which reconciliation is practised. He observes that, 
while reconciliations are usually presented as the ‘traditional’ Bougainville 
approach to peacebuilding and (restorative) justice, today a broad spectrum 
of types of ‘reconciliations’ can be found, in different contexts and at 
different levels. However, he notes that there is growing concern about 
reconciliations losing their true ‘traditional’ meaning, becoming shallowly 
tokenistic and commercialised, and thus less effective and legitimate. 
He  concludes by exploring the current state of reconciliations on 
Bougainville and their significance as an indigenous means of ‘transitional 
justice’, not least in the absence of more conventional transitional justice 
mechanisms such as a truth and reconciliation commission.
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In Chapter 9, David Oakeshott considers the role that church organisations 
can play in post-conflict education systems, which Cole (2007) has 
claimed ‘can function as the second phase’ in transitional justice after 
official institutions such as truth commissions and trials. Based on a case 
study of the Child Rights Network – an initiative of the Marist Brothers 
of Melanesia – in two Catholic Church–run boarding schools in Mabiri 
(Bougainville) and Tenaru (Solomon Islands), Oakeshott analyses how 
human (specifically, child’s) rights discourse can be vernacularised to 
facilitate peacebuilding. While Oakeshott finds that the child’s rights 
discourse has been successfully interwoven with Marist teaching in the 
two schools to encourage students to see themselves as possessing rights 
equal to their teachers, and to shift teachers’ emphasis from punishment 
to pastoral care, he concludes that it did little to change teachers’ and 
students’ attitudes to the authority structures that contributed to conflict 
in Solomon Islands and Bougainville. More broadly, Oakeshott cautions 
that, by stepping in to fill the void left by the state in the provision of 
education in a transitional environment, civil society (in this case, the 
church) may undermine one of the key goals of the transitional justice 
project – to build trust between the state and its citizens over the 
longer term.
Chapter 10, by Claire Cronin, looks at the role of faith-based organisation 
SICA (the Solomon Islands Christian Association) in promoting the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in post-conflict Solomon 
Islands. Cronin argues that SICA was influenced by the perceived success 
of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which had 
interwoven Christian theological notions with internationally normative 
transitional justice discourses. Following the South African Commission, 
SICA believed that the TRC would provide a way for victims to 
talk about their experiences of suffering during the tensions, and be 
perceived as a morally legitimate institution, both by the international 
community and  the Solomon Islands people. While Cronin finds that 
SICA’s community advocacy around the TRC was largely successful 
because it emphasised the role that Christianity and the church might 
play, when the TRC submitted its Final Report to parliament in 2012, 
its analysis was overwhelmingly grounded in the international human 
rights discourse. Cronin concludes that the TRC is an example of 
superficial ‘vernacularisation’ of transitional justice discourses as there was 





The chapters in this collection paint a picture of the heterogeneity of CSOs 
and actors in Asia and the Pacific and the breadth of their transitional 
justice activities. This is a picture that illustrates the need to broaden 
understandings of what constitutes civil society and civil society practice 
in relation to transitional justice, and poses a challenge to the globalised, 
standardised, primarily legalistic, model of transitional justice that tends 
to dominate much of the scholarly and policy literature. The CSO 
organisations and actors discussed in these chapters are engaged in a great 
deal of activity beyond advocating for short-term, formal mechanisms 
such as criminal prosecutions and truth commissions. The richness of this 
activity suggests that local populations have much deeper understandings 
and expectations of what transitional justice should involve and achieve.
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Over the course of conducting research in Timor-Leste over the past 
decade I have become increasingly aware of the limits of the globalised, 
standardised model of transitional justice. My research has revealed to 
me that local understandings and expectations of transitional justice 
exceed – perhaps inevitably – the justice possibilities available through 
formal, time-bound mechanisms such as criminal prosecutions and truth 
commissions. It has also highlighted that the process of ‘dealing with 
the past’ is not confined to the initial transitional period but is being 
shaped in an ongoing way through the practices of, and the interactions 
between, a wide range of actors who possess varying degrees of power. 
These observations have led me to argue that transitional justice needs 
to be thought about differently – as a dynamic and open-ended social 
and political process, rather than as a short-term project oriented around 
a set of formal mechanisms. In other words, I have come to the view 
that transitional justice scholars, practitioners and activists need to move 
beyond a preoccupation with official institutions and short-term outcomes 
and consider how best to support people’s ongoing and locally grounded 
efforts to rebuild their lives after conflict.
With these insights in mind, I was initially optimistic about the decision 
by East Timorese civil society organisations (CSOs) around 10 years ago 
to establish a national victims’ association. It seemed to me that a victims’ 
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association (comprised of civilians who directly experienced human 
rights violations during the 24-year Indonesian occupation) presented an 
opportunity to build a locally grounded and inclusive social movement 
for transitional justice that was responsive to ordinary people’s needs and 
priorities. I also thought that this movement might help to challenge the 
forward-looking, heroic narrative of nation-building promoted by East 
Timorese political elites (which privileges the experiences and rights of 
elite former combatants) by encouraging new forms of solidarity and 
political agency grounded in common experiences of suffering.
Yet, over the past 10 years, I have observed the victims’ association 
struggle to develop into a social movement. In this chapter, I draw on 
recent fieldwork in Timor-Leste to reflect on some of the reasons why 
this may be the case. I have concluded that the victims’ rights agenda 
promoted by CSOs is grounded in a liberal, individualist human rights 
paradigm, which has limited mobilising power in a context where other, 
very different, subjectivities coexist. This agenda, I suggest, is unable 
to respond to people’s immediate and everyday needs and priorities, 
including the imperative to restore relations of trust, sociality and 
reciprocity with their kin.
In the first part of this chapter, I describe the evolution of the victims’ 
association and its connection to ideas of ‘victim-centredness’ that are 
now prominent in the field of transitional justice. I then draw on my 
observations of the 2015 Victims Congress to reflect on some of the 
challenges that arose in building the association, showing how many of 
these challenges reflect the degree to which victim-centred strategies have 
been interpreted narrowly, in accordance with a liberal transitional justice 
framework. In the second half of this chapter, I explore how ordinary East 
Timorese are seeking to address some of their important economic, social 
and spiritual needs in the aftermath of the conflict through strategies and 
practices embedded in the realm of the everyday. Some of these activities 
are being initiated by local communities with little or no external support, 
while others are being led by faith-based actors. I suggest that attending to 
these practices – which are often overlooked by the liberal, institutionally 
oriented transitional justice field – might foster a broader, more pluralistic 
understanding of civil society transitional justice activity.
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1 . RETHINKING ‘CIVIL SOCIETy’ AND ‘VICTIM-CENTRED’ TRANSITIONAL JuSTICE IN TIMOR-LESTE
Building the victims’ association: Promoting 
‘victim-centredness’?
The establishment of Timor-Leste’s victims’ association needs to be 
understood against the backdrop of political leaders’ ambivalent responses 
to the report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(CAVR). Entitled Chega! (No More! Stop! Enough!), and tabled in the 
National Parliament in 2005, the report offers a disturbing account of 
the ‘massive, widespread and systematic atrocities’ that took place during 
the Indonesian occupation – including extrajudicial killings, torture, 
disappearances and sexual violence –and finds the Indonesian Government 
and security forces ‘primarily responsible and accountable’ for the deaths of 
between 100,000 and 180,000 civilians (CAVR 2005, ch. 8, 5–6). Chega! 
also contains 205 recommendations for policy reform in areas as diverse 
as prosecutions for serious crimes perpetrators; reparations; human rights 
training; education; reforms to the military, police and security forces; 
prisons; missing persons; commemoration and memorialisation; and the 
rights of women and youth.
Since the report’s completion, East Timorese CSO activists and 
their international supporters have continued to advocate for the 
implementation of its recommendations, focusing their efforts on 
the  need  for a reparations program to support ‘vulnerable victims’ 
and for  the establishment of an ‘Institute for Memory’ (to implement 
other agreed-to Chega! recommendations, including a commission for 
missing persons). This small group of elite, educated, Dili-based activists 
has also continued to lobby both the Timor-Leste Government and 
the international  community for the establishment of an international 
tribunal to  prosecute those who committed war crimes and crimes 
against humanity during the Indonesian occupation (among them senior 
members of the Indonesian military). More than 10 years later, progress 
towards many of these goals remains elusive. There was some renewed 
momentum around the time of Chega! ’s 10-year anniversary, when civil 
society activists successfully lobbied Timor-Leste’s president to host 
a workshop on the report’s legacy and decided to bypass the parliament 
and appeal directly to the prime minister and president to establish an 
Institute for Memory. These efforts led, in 2016, to the passing of 
a presidential decree law to establish a Centro Nasional Chega! (National 
Chega! Centre) to implement some of the CAVR recommendations 
(as well as those of a second, bilateral truth commission, known as the 
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Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF)).1 Despite this promising 
development, the mandate of the new centre is limited. The focus is on 
the ‘institutionalisation of memory’ and the promotion of human rights 
through education and training; there is no reference to prosecutions, 
reparations or a missing persons’ commission, and the term ‘victim’ is 
eschewed in favour of the more politically palatable term ‘survivor’.2
The political elite’s lukewarm responses to Chega! can be understood, in 
part, as a reflection of the pragmatic priority that has been placed on 
building bilateral relations with Indonesia, the nation’s large neighbour 
and former occupier. This focus has led to the rejection of a prosecutorial 
path and the promotion of a ‘reconciliatory agenda’ that is perhaps best 
embodied in the bilateral institution of the CTF. Political leaders have 
argued that a reconciliatory path is more culturally appropriate to the 
Timor-Leste context than the pursuit of prosecutorial justice; in this vein, 
they have criticised local CSO activists – who have links to international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Human Rights 
Watch, the International Center for Transitional Justice and Amnesty 
International – for pushing a ‘foreign’ agenda that is of little relevance to 
the lives and priorities of ordinary people (Kent 2015, 66–67). In addition 
to pragmatic, geopolitical considerations, however, there is something 
about the narrative of civilian suffering contained in Chega! that members 
of the political elite take issue with. This narrative undercuts current 
heroic ‘imaginings’ of the Timor-Leste nation that celebrate the capacity, 
forbearance and fortitude of the East Timorese people in overcoming 
successive national occupiers and achieving independence. The heroic 
narrative of the conflict is contained in the nation’s Constitution, which 
underscores the importance of ‘valorising’ the nation’s heroes. Valorisation 
is occurring in a very tangible sense, through an elaborate and graduated 
veterans’ pension scheme that provides monthly pensions to those who 
can claim to have participated in the resistance struggle for the required 
number of years and to family members of deceased veterans (martyrs). 
Through the scheme, which provides monthly payments that are well 
1  The CTF was established by the East Timorese and Indonesian governments in 2005 to seek the 
‘conclusive truth’ in order to contribute to a ‘definitive closure on issues of the past [that] would further 
promote bilateral relations’ (Government of Indonesia and Democratic Republic of Indonesia 2005, 
para. 8).
2  Decree Law 48/2016, Establishing the Chega! National Public Institute: From Memory to Hope. 
It  should be noted that since this chapter was written, the CNC has shown itself to be a creative 
institution that is pushing the boundaries of its mandate.
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above the average East Timorese monthly income, a clear hierarchy of 
citizenship has been constructed, in which the status of elite (mostly 
male) former combatants is elevated over that of other citizens.
It is against this backdrop that CSOs have, since 2008, worked to establish 
and foster the national victims’ association. The association – known as 
the National Association of Victims of the Political Conflict 1974–1999 – 
consists of district-based ‘focal points’ in each of Timor-Leste’s 13 districts, 
plus a national coordinator, who is funded by a small consortium of 
Dili-based CSOs. The association holds annual meetings and a National 
Victims Congress every three years, during which members reflect on the 
progress made over the previous years and plan for the future. The activities 
of the association include, among other things, lobbying political leaders 
on the need for prosecutions and reparations, linking ‘vulnerable victims’ 
in each district into existing forms of social support and organising forms 
of commemoration of violent events of district significance.
The decision to build a national victims’ association resonates with the 
priority that has been placed on ‘victim-centred’ transitional justice over 
the last decade by scholars, practitioners and civil society activists. While 
victim-centredness remains ill-defined, it is often construed as requiring 
‘institutionalised avenues’ for victim participation in formal transitional 
justice mechanisms (Nesiah 2016, 24) and as suggesting that victims 
and/or victims’ representatives need to be engaged in the planning and 
implementation of transitional justice measures (Robins 2011, 77). 
Simon Robins proposes a more radical formulation, suggesting that 
a  victim-centred transitional justice process ‘arises in response to the 
explicit needs of victims, as defined by victims themselves’ (Robins 2011, 
77). Yet, regardless of how it is defined, victim-centredness is understood 
both as a good in itself and as having a ‘strategic’ value (e.g. Magarrell 
2007, 2). Its inherent good is said to lie in the fact that it reinforces victims’ 
dignity by treating them not as passive recipients of transitional justice 
measures but as active agents with the ability to claim their rights (Nesiah 
2016,  24). Its  strategic value is thought to lie in the fact that victim-
centredness increases the ground-level legitimacy of transitional justice 
processes and therefore enhances their long-term effectiveness. For East 
Timorese CSO activists working to establish the victims’ association, then, 
an implicit objective of this work is to build legitimacy for the transitional 
justice agenda (both among the political elite and among the broader 
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community) by ensuring that victims themselves have an opportunity 
to shape the national debate on questions of justice, reconciliation and 
reparations.
Despite these worthy goals, the very slipperiness of the concept of victim-
centredness has led some scholars to express wariness about its promotion 
as a panacea for questions of transitional justice legitimacy. Vasuki Nesiah 
(2016, 24–25), for instance, suggests there is a need to be alert to the ways 
in which victim-centredness is constructed within a transitional justice field 
that has become increasingly standardised and normative. As transitional 
justice has come to revolve around a ‘toolkit’ of prescribed mechanisms, 
including trials, truth commissions and reparations programs, there 
is a  danger that victim-centredness may amount to little more than 
requiring victims to channel their demands into a narrow, predetermined 
set of priorities ‘that may not accord with the specifics of local context’ 
(Nesiah 2016, 20). Current conceptualisations of victim-centredness have 
also been criticised for promoting a ‘homogenising model’ of victimhood 
that papers over the differences present within victimised populations 
(for instance, among victims of different socioeconomic, religious, ethnic, 
geographic and other backgrounds, and among victims with different 
political and ideological agendas) (Nesiah 2016, 25). It has also been 
argued that, because transitional justice has a close relationship to – and 
often intrinsically embodies the values of – ideological liberalism, victim-
centred strategies tend to promote narrow, individualistic victim identities. 
This may not do justice to the ways in which people in different societies 
conceptualise their identities, or understand questions of harm or redress 
(Robins 2015, 182–88). As I will now discuss, many of these issues have 
been at play in the context of the victims’ association in Timor-Leste.
Challenges of building the victims’ 
association in Timor-Leste
As many East Timorese CSO activists concede, progress in building the 
victims’ association has been slow. These difficulties were evident at the 
2015 Victims Congress I attended and during interviews I conducted 
around it. The congress involved the district focal points from around 
Timor-Leste and was facilitated by a number of prominent human rights 
CSO activists from Dili. A key aim was to consider how the victims’ 
association could reduce its reliance on the financial support of CSOs 
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(which, in any case, is minimal).3 The congress also reviewed progress 
made on resolutions since the last congress, in particular: strategies to 
support vulnerable women victims in the rural areas; collaborate with 
government, political parties and business; strengthen national and 
international cooperation; and lobby for a reparations law.
It soon became clear, however, that in some districts there was not a great 
deal happening at all. One very practical issue raised was that a lack of 
resources and transport made it difficult for district-based victims groups 
to organise themselves and plan activities. Compounding this was the fact 
that, 10 years after the winding up of Timor-Leste’s truth commission, it 
was felt that donors were no longer interested in supporting transitional 
justice initiatives. The difficulty of garnering support from the Timor-
Leste Government was also raised. While two members of the victims’ 
association had recently been elected to the National Parliament as 
part of a deliberate strategy to build the association’s profile and ensure 
victims’ interests were directly represented in the formal political process, 
these parliamentarians had ‘lost their spirit of voluntarism’, according to 
several congress participants, and were no longer interested in victims’ 
issues.4 All  of this has left the association reliant on Dili-based CSOs 
(who  themselves struggle with declining levels of donor funding) for 
logistical and financial support. Very little progress was made at the 
congress on how to reduce this dependency.
Yet, even if victims could overcome some of the financial and other 
constraints to meeting regularly, it was clear that other factors were 
complicating attempts to build a strong victims’ association. For instance, 
the difficulties of building common goals among a diverse group were 
evident. Aside from experiencing a violent event (for instance, the death 
of a family member, a rape, an experience of torture) at some point during 
the Indonesian occupation, the group of victims present at the congress 
seemed to have little in common. They were geographically dispersed, 
had very different socioeconomic circumstances and education levels and 
different political affiliations.
3  Only $30,000 is provided annually for the secretariat of the victims’ association in any case, 
which covers the running costs of one car and the costs of organising several meetings.
4  Observations from 2015 Victims Congress.
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Over the course of the congress, other confusions and anxieties also 
emerged. Several participants suggested that the population in their 
district remained confused about the purpose of the victims’ association. 
It was said that some community members erroneously believed that 
joining the association might provide a means through which they could 
negotiate access to a veterans’ pension. An undertone of anxiety also 
seemed to be present during the discussion of district-level memorials 
and commemorations; the subtext seemed to be that, in a context 
where political leaders were seeking to promote reconciliation with 
Indonesia, efforts by district-based victims’ groups to organise large-scale 
commemorations of violent incidents would be provocative. Anxiety 
also seemed to be present among those who had been victims of violence 
committed by Timor-Leste’s resistance movement. For instance, several 
participants who, during the early years of the Indonesian occupation had 
been detained and mistreated in makeshift FRETILIN-run rehabilitation 
prisons (Rehabilitação Nacional – RENAL) for ‘reactionaries’, raised 
questions about whether they could legitimately be part of the victims’ 
association.
The challenges that emerged at the congress suggest, then, that the 
victims’ association has struggled due to several overlapping obstacles. 
First is the general difficulty of building social movements in contexts of 
impoverishment and limited resources, where people are preoccupied with 
basic livelihoods concerns. Second is the extent to which, in accordance 
with the prescribed transitional justice toolkit, victim-centredness has 
been understood narrowly; it seems clear that CSOs have sought to 
deliberately create and shape the activities of victims’ groups, rather than 
responding to and supporting organic, ‘bottom-up’ initiatives (e.g. see 
Robins 2013, 204). Third, and relatedly, there seems an anxiety – perhaps 
borne from recent conflict (both with Indonesia and internally, as in 
the conflict of 2006) – about antagonising the state by undercutting its 
reconciliation agenda. Yet, more than this, there is also a sense that CSOs 
have attempted to promote a certain kind of subjectivity among members 
of the victims’ association – that of the individual, rights-holding victim 
who, through forms of active citizenship, is capable of exerting claims to 
rights (Jeffery and Jakala 2015, 44; Basok and Ilcan 2016, 314). In the 
Timor-Leste context, this form of subjectivity, and its related assumptions 
about political agency, associative life and citizenship, appears – now at 
least – to have limited resonance.
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As the work of Sally Engle Merry underscores, individuals are ‘the location 
of multiple and potentially contradictory subjectivities’ that are influenced 
by dominant and subdominant discourses (Merry 2006, 184). This is no 
less the case in Timor-Leste, where victim subjectivities promoted by 
CSOs coexist with other, often more powerful, forms of identification. 
In a context where the national liberation struggle continues to exert 
a powerful influence on understandings of identity, discourses that 
highlight the need to recognise the suffering of victims of all political 
persuasions struggle to compete with heroic, nationalist discourses that 
promote the rights of, and reward for, those who sacrificed for the nation’s 
liberation. The concerns raised at the victims’ congress by former detainees 
in FRETILIN prisons speak to these difficulties, revealing the extent to 
which discussion of violence committed by the East Timorese resistance 
movement remains taboo.
As already noted, resistance-based identities have in fact been deliberately 
cultivated by government policies in recent years, which have seen the 
establishment of a veterans’ scheme that provides substantial pensions to 
those who can successfully claim to have participated in the resistance 
struggle. In a context where many people struggle to meet their basic 
needs, the significant economic, social and political capital that is gained 
by successfully negotiating a veterans’ pension is a key driver of this 
form of identification. By contrast, there is very little to be gained, either 
socially or materially, by identifying as a victim.
Coexisting with nationalist, resistance-based identities are strong locally 
embedded conceptions of identity. As in many other kinship-based 
societies, East Timorese strongly identify as part of extended families, 
as linked to clan and ancestors. Survival, both social and economic, is 
fundamentally dependent on the maintenance of relations of reciprocity. 
These relations are regulated by strong moral codes – referred to as adat 
(custom) – that provide the basis for both solidarity and social control. 
In such a context, conceptions of harm as the violation of the rights of 
an individual, autonomous agent do not encompass the degree to which 
harm is experienced as socially shared, as a fracturing of complex webs of 
kinship and social alliances (Robins 2015, 196; Sakti 2013, 441). The fact 
that the state has a limited capacity to uphold rights, particularly outside 
of the nation’s capital, Dili, (and has shown little interest in recognising 
victim identities in any case) further reduces the power of the victims’ 
rights agenda. All of this means that while this agenda may promise a great 
deal, it is currently unable to respond to some of the most important 
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social, economic and spiritual needs of those who have been affected by 
the conflict. As I will now discuss, these needs are to some degree being 
addressed through everyday practices and strategies of social repair that 
are embedded in the realm of the extended family.
Beyond the victims’ association: 
Everyday reconciliation and the work 
of faith-based actors
To illustrate what I mean by everyday practices, let me begin with an 
anecdote. In July 2016, I travelled to the district of Aileu to interview 
the district-level ‘focal point’ for the national victims’ association about 
their activities. ‘Mario’, the young coordinator, who was also a teacher in 
the local school, explained to me that it was difficult to generate interest 
in the victims’ association and that there was very little district-related 
activity taking place. When I asked about programs such as organising 
district-level commemorations or lobbying local leaders on issues of 
justice or reparations, he had little to report. Most of the time, said Mario, 
he waited for direction from the national coordinator of the victims’ 
association. From time to time, he was called to participate in meetings 
or workshops in Dili. At other times, he was asked to provide the names 
of ‘vulnerable women victims’ so that they could be linked into forms of 
material support.
Feeling disappointed at the lack of interview data, I asked Mario if he 
would be willing to accompany me to some of the mass graves where, in 
1974/75 (at the height of the internal political conflict between Timor-
Leste’s two key political parties, UDT (União Democrática Timorense) and 
FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente)), UDT 
prisoners had been buried after being killed by FRETILIN. While on our 
travels, Mario and I talked about many things, including his own family 
background. He told me that he was originally from Viqueque District 
and that his mother, who had been a key member of the women’s resistance 
organisation OPMT (Organização Popular da Mulher Timorense), had 
been killed in the late 1970s. Mario then described how he had recently 
travelled as part of a group of 150 members of his extended family to 
collect his mother’s remains. The family, he said, had used ‘traditional 
methods’ to locate the site of the remains (which had involved listening 
to one member of the family, for whom the location had appeared in 
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a dream). Mario further explained that when they arrived in the vicinity 
of the remains they were able to identify the exact location because some 
blood suddenly appeared on the ground as a sign. Once recovered, Mario’s 
mother’s remains were reburied at her birthplace after elaborate rituals – 
both customary and Catholic – had been performed. It was clear that the 
whole process had taken many months of planning, had been a significant 
expense and had consumed several days. It had required all the members 
of Mario’s extended family to be present.
Mario’s story of recovering his mother’s remains is by no means unusual. 
Much has now been written about the extensive activity that has been 
occurring since the end of the occupation as families work to identify, 
recover and rebury the remains of those who died or were killed during 
the conflict (e.g. McWilliam 2008, 224–225; Bovensiepen 2014, 103; 
Grenfell 2012, 97; Kent 2016, 43). The whereabouts of many of these 
bodies was often unknown during the occupation. Large numbers of 
civilians perished from aerial bombardment, starvation and disease as 
they sheltered in the mountains behind FRETILIN lines in the early 
years of the occupation, their bodies interred in shallow bush graves or 
left to decay. Others were never seen by family members following their 
arrest by the Indonesian military or police. Part of the significance of 
these practices and rituals lies in the ways in which they work to reinforce 
kinship relationships, webs of sociality and trust that, in the wake of the 
fracturing effects of the Indonesian occupation, are critically important to 
families’ sense of wellbeing.
Reburial rituals such as those described by Mario also underscore the 
degree to which, for many East Timorese, the dead remain a very real 
presence in the lives of the living. It is well known that in contexts where 
burial rituals have been disrupted and where uncertainty surrounding 
the fate of disappeared persons persists victims’ families experience 
acute anxiety. This anxiety is magnified in a context such as Timor-Leste 
where the dead are thought to have a continuing influence in the lives 
of the living, and where relations with the dead are paramount to the 
wellbeing of their descendants. Maintaining good relations with the dead 
requires responding to their demands for attention and compensation, 
and conducting ‘proper’ burials (Myrtinnen 2014, 97). In cases where 
people are thought to have died ‘bad deaths’ – that is, deaths due to 
sudden and violent circumstances – there is a particular urgency about 
the need to conduct mortuary rituals, because of the power of the dead 
to disrupt the lives of the living. In these cases, it is often suggested that 
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the dead will continue to ‘wander’ as ghosts and torment the lives of their 
descendants (by causing illness and death among the living) unless rituals 
are performed to render them spiritually harmless (McWilliam 2008, 
224–225; Sakti 2013, 438).
An appreciation of the importance of maintaining equilibrium between 
the world of the living and the dead helps to shed a different perspective 
on some of the motivating factors behind families’ attempts to claim 
veterans’ pensions on behalf of their deceased relatives (martyrs). These 
efforts should not be understood simply as attempts by families to 
elevate their social, economic and political status (in contexts of acute 
poverty), but perhaps first and foremost as a means of appeasing the 
spirits of the dead by giving due recognition to their contributions and 
providing them with a dignified secondary burial. Accessing a veteran’s 
pension enables families to undertake expeditions to recover the remains 
of the dead, purchase cement to construct new graves and headstones, 
and conduct associated rituals, all of which are often extremely costly. 
As one informant explained to me, it is only after appropriately reburying 
the dead that money from veterans’ pensions can be used for everyday 
necessities. ‘The dead come first.’5
In addition to family-led practices of remembrance and reburial, which 
often take place with little external support, faith-based actors are also 
assisting Timorese communities to rebuild their lives after the violence 
of the occupation. For instance, alongside customary mortuary rituals, 
Catholic priests are often called upon by families to organise special masses 
to remember and bless the dead. Faith-based actors are also working to 
assist some of the hundreds of thousands of East Timorese who, after 
the 1999 referendum, were displaced across the border into neighbouring 
West Timor, to reconcile with their families and, in some cases, to return 
to East Timor.
One prominent faith-based actor is Maria Lourdes (or Mana Lou as she is 
popularly known) who, since 1989, has run a Secular Catholic Institute 
known as ISMAIK (Institutu Maun Alin Iha Kristu; brothers and sisters 
in Christ), based in Dare, in the hills behind Dili, that is dedicated to 
working with the poor and the marginalised.6 Since the 1999 referendum, 
5  Interview with Oldericho Coimbra, Los Palos, July 2017.
6  A Secular Catholic Institute is an Institute of Consecrated Life in which men and women live as 
lay people in the world and seek to provide an example of Christian living. 
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Mana Lou has been engaged in efforts aimed at reconciling East Timorese 
families living on different sides of the border, which she describes as 
spiritually informed. She intensified these efforts after 2012, when 
she had a vision of Christ on the cross during a mass at Timor-Leste’s 
10-year independence celebrations. Since then, she has been visiting West 
Timor every month to provide spiritual companionship to displaced 
East Timorese, working with the leaders of the refugees (many of them 
former militia leaders) to pray and reflect. She also offers support and 
encouragement to those seeking to return to Timor-Leste.7
Faith-based actors such as Mana Lou command enormous respect among 
the communities in which they work. This respect is a legacy, in part, of 
the Indonesian occupation, when Catholic leaders took on an increasingly 
activist role and churches became ‘safe havens’ for resistance fighters 
and those seeking sanctuary from persecution (McGreggor et al. 2012, 
1134–1135). Catholic doctrines also provided a source of solace and 
strength to those who were suffering. Moreover, the church’s decision to 
use Tetum as the language of the church and its preparedness to tolerate 
the coexistence of animist beliefs and practices allowed Catholicism to 
become interwoven, over time, with local cultural and spiritual beliefs 
and practices. Significant rituals – such as those surrounding burials of 
the dead – often incorporate both Catholic and animist components 
(Grenfell 2012).
But more than this, the respect commanded by faith-based actors such as 
Mana Lou is grounded in their long-term relationships with specific local 
communities. Indeed, Mana Lou is at pains to stress that ISMAIK is not 
an NGO, and that she never does ‘proposals’ for her activities because, 
regardless of whether funding is available, she is committed to ongoing 
accompaniment of the poor and marginalised. Perhaps most importantly, 
in comparison to the transitional justice activities promoted by CSOs, 
which are grounded in a liberal rights framework and are directed towards 
building a nationwide victim constituency capable of directing rights 
claims to the state, the activities undertaken by faith-based actors such as 
Mana Lou implicitly recognise that, for those for whom the state is often 
a remote presence, the ongoing rebuilding of highly localised community 
and family relationships (including with the dead) is essential to viable 
social life.
7  Interview with Mana Lou, July 2016.
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Conclusion
What I have drawn out in this chapter is that a great deal of the activity 
taking place in Timor-Leste, as families and communities seek to negotiate 
the legacies of the Indonesian occupation, bears little resemblance to the 
liberal transitional justice strategies promoted by CSO activists. This 
activity often occurs with little or no connection to the work of CSO 
activists, including the victims’ association. Much of this activity is being 
undertaken by families and kinship groups with little external support. 
All of this suggests that, while CSOs may be facing difficulties cultivating 
a certain kind of civil society transitional justice activity in Timor-Leste, 
there is a lot of this activity going on if both ‘civil society’ and ‘transitional 
justice’ are viewed through a wider lens.
To be clear, I do not wish to argue that the strategies pursued by CSOs 
are fundamentally flawed or misguided. Over the long term, it may prove 
attractive, or empowering, to some East Timorese to identify as victims of 
the conflict and to elevate aspects of their identity associated with liberal 
conceptions of human rights over others, such as resistance credentials or 
kinship. My argument is simply that, at this point in time, there is a need 
for careful and critical reflection on the form of ‘victim-centredness’ that 
is currently being promoted by CSOs in Timor-Leste, and the extent 
to which it accords with prevalent understandings of subjectivity and 
people’s immediate and everyday needs. In a context where families, clan 
and ancestors are intricately linked through blood, spirit and ties to the 
land, the victims’ rights agenda – with its assumptions about individual 
victimhood and rights that should be upheld by the state – cannot, for 
ordinary East Timorese, necessarily be taken for granted as natural or self-
evident (Robins 2015, 188). Moreover, investing in the victims’ rights 
agenda requires a considerable leap of faith (not to mention time and 
resources) in a context where the state’s presence in most of the country 
is remote, intermittent or in name only, and where basic issues of survival 
are paramount. In this context, there is little evidence that the victims’ 
rights agenda will be transformative.
At a broader level, the Timor-Leste experience provokes reflection on how 
conceptions of both ‘civil society’ and ‘victim-centredness’ are constructed 
within a transitional justice field that has become increasingly prescriptive. 
Specifically, it raises questions about the kinds of activities and practices 
that current imaginings of transitional justice render visible and invisible, 
and how these imaginings connect to broader relations of power. 
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That  there are significant power differentials at work in Timor-Leste is 
evident in the fact that local CSOs are required to navigate declining 
levels of donor funding, a state that has little interest in a victims’ rights 
agenda and an international transitional justice industry that demands 
increased professionalisation and standardisation. This context inevitably 
provides incentives for CSOs to focus on certain issues, and detracts 
from their efforts to incorporate ‘local knowledges’ and develop creative, 
community-based approaches (Nesiah 2016, 29). It also leads to the 
neglect of everyday practices and strategies of social repair, due to their 
foreignness to the liberal transitional justice template. Greater attention 
to these practices might help to imagine more pluralistic, locally resonant, 
ways of addressing legacies of mass harm.
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Justice within the National 
Imaginary: Civil society 
and societal transition 
in Timor-Leste
Damian Grenfell1
Since the end of the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste in 1999 there 
has been much energy expended by activists, international aid agencies, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) 
agencies towards ensuring a sustainable civil society. Such an effort can 
be understood for a range of reasons: the necessity of responding to 
immense suffering following 24 years of occupation; the need for broad 
societal participation in the creation of a new state and nation; and as a 
reflection of the commonly held view that a liberal democracy requires 
an active civil society. Given the extraordinary material destruction, 
mass displacement and wide-ranging human rights abuses that occurred 
as a result of the Indonesian occupation, civil society actors working in 
the field of transitional justice have concentrated efforts in Timor-Leste 
since  in two key ways: first, through attempts to support victims; and 
second, to ensure that those responsible for crimes are held to account.
1  I would like to thank my colleagues in the Centre for Global Research at RMIT University in 
Melbourne, Australia, and the Instituto de Ciências Sociais (ICS) at the Universidade de Lisboa where 
I was based while drafting this chapter. 
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While civil society very often plays an important role in transitional justice 
efforts, the experience of Timor-Leste demonstrates that any assumption 
of a necessarily positive impact should at least be met with caution. As the 
key contention for this chapter, it is argued that as long as civil society 
remains anchored within a ‘national imaginary’ it can, at certain points, 
relegate or even diminish forms of recognition important to victims. This 
is especially the case where patterns of mourning and remembrance do not 
sit in commensurate relation with the ‘nation’. In the continuing need to 
identify the fate of the missing or advocate for justice for those accused of 
human rights violations, for example, civil society efforts have been drawn 
into a fraught relationship with the state. Moreover, the experiences of 
victims have often been embedded discursively in national terms rather 
than reflecting the localised sociocultural patterns of remembering the 
dead and missing.
To make this argument, the chapter opens with a conceptual discussion 
that distinguishes civil society from the state on the basis that each 
are founded in different forms of legitimacy and each have a different 
relationship to the use of violence. Even as the state and civil society 
remain distinct in key ways, the second section nevertheless argues that 
civil society actors in Timor-Leste have often imagined justice largely in 
national terms, reinforcing the same territorial dimensions that demarcate 
state sovereignty. The third section draws the first two together to 
demonstrate that the emphasis given to the nation by civil society actors 
has limited the effectiveness of transitional justice efforts to some extent. 
Justice framed in national terms has on the one hand been undermined by 
an antagonistic state, while on the other it has risked alienating survivors 
and families of those killed and missing. In terms of the latter, this occurs 
both discursively and in practice via attempts to ‘draw together’ a war-
torn society in ways that may not always give adequate priority to victims, 
including in the forms of recognition given to the dead and missing.
The ideas in this chapter are based on interviews with civil society 
actors in Timor-Leste between 2003 and 2017, analysis of policy and 
programmatic documents, project-related work within civil society and 
donor organisations, and general observation. The arguments made here 
are not of absolutes but of important trajectories and do not seek to 
diminish the many social benefits generated by civil society actors. It is 
nevertheless important to identify points of possible tension between the 
contributions of transitional justice processes to nation-building on one 
the hand and the needs of those who have suffered on the other.
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Civil society and transitional justice
Transitional justice refers to a multifaceted process that simultaneously 
accounts for the crimes of perpetrators while creating new systems of 
justice in societies that have experienced widespread violence (Brahm 
2007; Grenfell 2009; Lambourne 2009, 34, 36). For Andrieu (2010, 
540), transitional justice represents ‘nothing less than the transformation, 
or regeneration, of a whole society’ requiring a range of interventions. 
Civil society actors are typically central to this process, and in Timor-
Leste transitional justice initiatives have included support for victims’ 
material restoration, assisting displaced peoples, locating the missing, 
collecting the remains of the dead, recording the experience of survivors, 
commemorating and memorialising incidents from the occupation, 
holding reconciliation events, promoting human rights, campaigning for 
an international tribunal to bring Indonesian perpetrators to trial, as well 
as developing a formal justice system. Together such practices are often 
assumed by policy actors, donors and academics as pivotal to ‘ending 
the cycles of violence’ (Minow 2002; Kovras 2012) in post-conflict 
states, drawing the intimate experiences of violence into larger societal 
frameworks that achieve a ‘transition’ in society.
To explore the tensions between programmatic assumptions and the 
needs of victims, it is important that some definitional shape is given to 
the concept of civil society. While ‘civil society’ is frequently employed 
in justice and peacebuilding literature, its actual meaning is often left 
implicit. In some instances it is defined empirically, for example by 
a typology of organisations, while elsewhere it is described by negation, as 
Gray and co-authors acknowledge:
civil society (of which NGOs are an element) is that which exists 
between other elements of our social world and hence, civil society 
is defined by what it is not. Definition is, as a result, difficult and 
contingent on definitions/descriptions of the other elements of 
society from which civil society emerges. Changes in these other 
elements will, likewise, affect the size and character of civil society 
(Gray, Bebbington and Collison 2006, 322).
What is meant by the other ‘elements’ tends to shift according to ideology 
and context, though they typically include government (or state), market 
(or capital) and the family (or private sphere), with the ‘civil’ broadly 
encompassing other associations and collaborations that comprise social 
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life. Civil society is not, however, simply the sum of the ‘rest’ of society, 
but defined in this chapter rather as marked by two key traits: first, in 
terms of the legitimating claim to civic virtue; and second, via a particular 
kind of relationship to violence.
In terms of the first trait, in accounting for associations outside of the 
state the ‘civil’ in civil society refers to actions that in some way claim to 
be for the wider benefit of a particular community. Such claims will differ 
remarkably and, as such, do not suggest a homogeneity other than the 
activity is legitimated by the claim that it positively contributes to social 
needs, wellbeing or sustainability. The emphasis on both its associational 
nature and public virtue has meant that civil society is often strongly 
associated with either the creation or the maintenance of democratic 
society as discussed by Foley and Edwards (1996) in a response to Michael 
Walzer (1992).
In the rough pastiche that has become the commonly accepted 
version, a ‘dense network of civil associations’ is said to promote 
the  stability and effectiveness of the democratic polity through 
both  the effects of association on citizens’ ‘habits of the heart’ 
and the ability of associations to mobilize citizens on behalf of 
public causes. Emergent civil societies in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe are credited with effective resistance to authoritarian 
regimes, democratizing society from below while pressuring 
authoritarians for change. Thus, civil society, understood as 
the realm of private voluntary association, from neighborhood 
committees to interest groups to philanthropic enterprises of 
all sorts, has come to be seen as an essential ingredient in both 
democratization and the health of established democracies 
(Foley and Edwards 1996, 38).
While civil society actors may make this claim at all different levels of 
society – including at the most local community level – in the case of 
transitional justice in Timor-Leste public benefit or ‘cause’ has been largely 
framed in terms of the potential contribution to nation-building in the 
wake of conflict. Speaking more generally, Shils points to the importance 
of the connection between civil society and the state by arguing that 
‘nationality is a necessary ingredient, perhaps even precondition for 
civil society. It is the collective self-consciousness which sustains the civil 
society. Concern for one’s nation reinforces the concern for the common 
good’ (Shils 1995, 116). While perhaps overstating the case, Shils points 
to an important aspect that is common to civil society actors: namely that 
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the nation frequently sets the methodological and operational parameters 
to how activities are organised and the terms on which a ‘common good’ 
are imagined. How this relates more specifically to transitional justice is 
discussed in the next section, though here the point is that the kind of 
‘civicness’ displayed is very often done so in national terms.
A second defining trait is that civil society actors do not challenge the 
state’s claim to the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within 
a  given territory. Such an approach clearly adapts Weber’s famous 
definition of the state (Gerth and Mills 1946, 77), albeit by following Gray 
and others in forming definitions based on other ‘contingent elements of 
society’, namely the state. The key here is to delineate the purpose of the 
violence, as civil society actors frequently contest the state including to 
the point of violence – seen often for instance with civil rights groups, 
unions and as part of social movement protests.2 The important difference 
to highlight here is that between violence that is used towards specific 
objectives or occurs incidentally compared to that which overtly challenges 
the central legitimating claims of the state. Armed social movements may 
be thoroughly coherent in their claims to act for a common good and be 
recognised as having widespread authority. Nevertheless, in challenging 
the foundational legitimacy of the state, such groups and movements 
transition out of the category of civil society actors.3
In the case of Timor-Leste, FALINTIL4 – the armed force for East 
Timorese independence during the Indonesian occupation – was part of 
a larger movement that included civil society actors. However, given its 
own commitment to the violent overthrow of a state, FALINTIL itself 
is understood here as an actor located outside of civil society. Even as 
2  For example, a key policy platform of government may be challenged in strident terms and 
via large-scale mobilisation of people – as was the case in Timor-Leste when the Catholic Church 
demonstrated against government changes to school curriculums in 2005 – but when it does not 
challenge the core legitimacy of the state then such groups remain as part of civil society.
3  This position is distinct to that of the work of authors such as Labigne and Nassauer who 
name three distinct forms of violence that occur within civil society: reformist violence, demarcation 
violence and non-political violence. Demarcation violence is defined as politically radical and often 
opposed to the state, and includes organisations such Obraz, a fascist Serbian group. Such a group 
is able to be included in their definition as they define civil society without any reference to its civic 
nature, namely as ‘the arena – outside of the family, the state, and the market – which is created by 
individual and collective actions, organizations and institutions to advance shared interests’ (Labigne 
and Nassauer 2012, 3). As such, in effect beyond the state, family and market, any form of association 
is deemed as civil society, even fascistic ones. See Labigne and Nassauer (2012). 
4  Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste; Armed Forces for the National Liberation 
of East Timor.
CIVIL SOCIETy AND TRANSITIONAL JuSTICE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
44
civil society actors contested Indonesia’s unlawful claim to legitimate 
rule of Timor-Leste – and therefore ultimately shared the objectives of 
independence with FALINTIL – at an organisational level they did not 
engage directly in armed insurrection and thus remained distinct from the 
militarised responses to occupation.
In the post-independence period, groups such as Conselho Popular 
pela Defesa da República Democrática de Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL) 
maintained a significant space in contesting the state (Escollano Brandão 
2015) until they were disbanded by the combined efforts of the police 
and the military (Belun 2017). This was also the case with the Conselho 
Revolucionário Maubere (CRM) – a group led by a dissident commonly 
known as ‘Mauk Moruk’5 – which was targeted again by joint police-
military operations with Moruk being killed (RDTL 2015).6 Again, the 
approach here draws a connection between civil society and the form that 
the challenge to the state takes; once violence is used to challenge state 
legitimacy then such actors move beyond that realm (and are often named 
in terms of criminals, terrorists, extremists and so forth by the state they 
are contesting).
In short then, in this chapter civil society accounts for forms of social 
collaboration grounded in a public virtue that do not challenge the state’s 
claim to the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within a given 
territory. Such a relationship ebbs and flows as the state itself changes, as 
seen in Timor-Leste across the transition from pre- to post-independence. 
The Suharto regime that was in power in Indonesia for almost the full 
duration of the occupation of Timor-Leste permitted at times a narrow 
and highly prescribed civil society to counter international criticism and 
manage internal dissent. In comparison, the kind of liberal democratic 
state that has been advanced in Timor-Leste post-independence has seen 
a civil society that is interested in the consolidation and maintenance 
of democratic society, often emphasising a role in providing a ‘check 
on government’ (Bell and O’Rourke 2007; Cubitt 2013, 91). This is 
particularly evident through the development of local NGOs whose key 
5  His actual name was Paulino Gama.
6  In 2014, civil rights monitoring group Yayasan Hak (HAK) provided an update of Parliamentary 
Resolution No. 5/2014 outlawing the CPD-RDTL and CRM, and initiating joint operations 
between the police and military targeting these groups (Asosiasaun HAK 2014). 
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purpose is the monitoring of the state justice sector (JSMP7), government 
spending and development projects (Lao Hamutuk), security (Belun), 
human rights (Yayasan Hak), as well as corruption.
In a development or post-conflict context, aid organisations and donors 
tend to focus on the most structured and institutionalised aspects of civil 
society. Local NGOs provide a point of mutual legibility that facilitate 
shifts in resources from international agencies into national and local 
contexts. In practice, this can often mean that NGOs and civil society 
are treated as synonymous, even though, as recognised by Holloway, civil 
society encompasses far greater diversity in Timor-Leste:
[The] interpretation of what constitutes civil society in Timor-Leste 
is very limiting and very unfortunate since it puts forward only 
a partial selection of Timorese organisations to represent what is, in 
fact, a very rich and complex series of associations and organisations. 
The interpretation partly springs from the language of donors who 
have put a high priority on supporting NGOs with their funds, 
and who have not identified or engaged with the richer complex of 
CSOs that exist in East Timor (Holloway 2004, 3).
In Timor-Leste, civil society incorporates a range of social collaborations 
including local, national and foreign NGOs, as well as NGO networks 
and umbrella organisations. However, it also extends much further – 
encompassing religious groups, including church governance, orders, 
parishes, prayer groups; community groups, including women’s, youth, 
veterans and sporting groups; a myriad of community-based organisations 
(CBOs); not-for-profit education providers; farmer cooperatives and 
collectives. While recognising the need to consider these groups as part of 
civil society, the focus in this chapter will largely be on NGOs and related 
networks given that they have been so central to transitional justice efforts 
in Timor-Leste.
Finally, it is important to be clear that in this chapter the nation and 
the state are taken as two distinct entities: the state is a set of political 
structures, practices and processes involved in a particular form of 
governance within a defined territory (and legitimated as per the above), 
whereas a nation – which typically encompasses a state – is comprised of 
people who identify with and are integrated into a particular territorial 
domain. For the latter, the term the ‘national imaginary’ is used in this 
7  Judicial System Monitoring Program.
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chapter in the tradition of Benedict Anderson (1983). It is shorthand for 
the ‘patterned convocations of the social whole’ as argued by Steger and 
James (2013, 23), meaning the dominant ways the basis or parameters 
on which social life and collective endeavour are imagined. The national 
imaginary is a powerful way of understanding the connection between 
people, not least where independence has recently been won. Where this 
first section has argued that a key point of differentiation between civil 
society and the state are in the claims to sovereign power and the use of 
violence, the following section discusses how the two share the national 
imaginary and in turn the consequences for transitional justice.
Transitional justice, the state and the 
national imaginary
Arguably the three most significant transitional justice initiatives for 
Timor-Leste have been the Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation (CAVR), the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and the 
Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF). The CAVR was initiated 
in 2001 during the United Nations interregnum (from October 1999 
though to May 2002) and undertook nationwide truth-telling and 
community reconciliation programs for less serious crimes committed 
during 1999. The SCU ran from 2000 through to 2005 and examined 
human rights abuses deemed severe, making 391 indictments over a five-
year period8 (Kirk and da Costa Bobo 2010, 9). As a later initiative, the 
CTF began in 2005 as a joint Timor-Leste–Indonesia state-level effort 
mandated to establish the truth with regards to human rights abuses 
committed in 1999 (CTF 2008; Hirst 2008). Rather than being part of 
civil society, these three organisations are understood as para-institutions 
of state formed via different orders of legislated authority.9 Nevertheless, 
they remain important for discussion of civil society in this chapter for 
two reasons.
8  According to the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), of the total SCU 
indictments made, 84 defendants were convicted, 3 were acquitted during trial while more than 300 
avoided trial as they remained in Indonesia, which would not comply with the indictments (Kirk and 
da Costa Bobo 2010, 9).
9  CAVR was created under the United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET) 
via UNTAET Regulation 2001/10. It was given significant autonomy under this regulation though 
remained the legal creation of a transitional authority that in effect was a surrogate state. The SCU 
was likewise created under UNTAET Regulation 2000/11, while the CTF was created directly by 
both the East Timorese and Indonesian governments. 
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First, the CAVR and the SCU generated significant resources that could 
in turn be used by civil society actors. This included the collection and 
publication of different kinds of information including testimonies, 
indictments and qualitative and statistical analysis, their efforts in 
organising events that linked actors and communities together, as well as 
giving public legitimacy to transitional justice agendas. Even though there 
was much criticism that the CTF was designed to absorb international 
critique rather than further claims for justice (Kent 2011, 449–450), 
its final report has also become an important resource, especially as it 
endorsed much of CAVR’s work (Kent 2011, 450).
Second, all three institutions framed and reinforced discourses and the 
programmatic purpose of transitional justice as bound tightly to the new 
national form. The CTF was justified in terms of ensuring sustainable 
relations for Timor-Leste as a new nation with its former occupier 
Indonesia. The SCU – and a follow-up Serious Crimes Investigation 
Team (SCIT) – viewed prosecutions as pivotal to the sustainability of 
a new nation in the establishment of accountability and the rule of law, 
and the CAVR considered reconciliation rather than retributive forms 
of justice as an important step in preventing future cycles of violence. 
Whether moving outwards to discussions of an international tribunal, 
or inwards towards reconciliation at the level of local community, the 
national imaginary provided the cornerstone from which transitional 
justice agendas were formed.
This approach has appeared to be again reflected in the formation of the 
state-sanctioned Centro Nasional Chega! (CNC), created in late 2016 by 
the East Timorese Council of Ministers and inaugurated in 2017. 
Carrying on the tradition of CAVR and the work of the Post-CAVR 
Secretariat, CNC focuses on important transitional justice efforts that 
include memorialisation and human rights advocacy (Leach 2016, 214). 
Reflecting its name, CNC’s remit is a national one, and thus it continues 
the work of threading justice and nation together in how it engages with 
survivors and communities. This connection has been a constant theme in 
academic literature over the last two decades in terms of the state (Fletcher, 
Weinstein and Rowen 2009; Hamber and Wilson 2002) as well as truth 
and reconciliation commissions (Babo-Soares 2004; McAuliffe 2008; 
Wilson 2003). However, here the focus is on civil society actors and the 
consequences of framing transitional justice within a national imaginary.
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The principal endogenous civil society actors – namely, those that have 
originated within and remain organisationally based within Timor-Leste – 
whose work has included transitional justice initiatives are NGOs, church-
related organisations, community level activism and, in turn, associations 
and networks that incorporate, represent or are in part resourced by the 
former. For instance, East Timorese NGOs such as Yayasan Hak, Fokupers 
and Lao Hamutuk took leading roles in the early years of independence10 
(Robie 2015, 218). Other groups joined these three as part of the Timor-
Leste National Alliance for an International Tribunal (ANTI), a ‘coalition 
of organisations representing local and international NGOs, churches, 
students and victims’ who campaigned for international mechanisms 
that would bring particularly Indonesian perpetrators of abuse to justice 
(ETAN 2004). The JSMP emerged principally to promote judicial 
accountability with its support of female victims of violence leading to 
the formation of Asistensia Legal ba Feto no Labarik (ALFela).11 Other 
associations and networks have included the Popular Organisation of 
Timorese Women (OPMT)12 that, following independence, undertook 
various activities including a women’s history project. The 12 November 
Committee is comprised of victims of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, 
and the National Association of Victims and Martyrs and the Association 
of Ex-Political Prisoners (ASSEPOL) have represented different survivor 
led efforts (See Kent 2012; Rothschild 2017). In addition, Associacaon 
Chega! Ba Ita (ACbit) has undertaken the task of continuing to promote 
the work and principles of the CAVR through research and publications, 
as well as through initiatives such as reforming school curriculums and 
supporting activities for survivors. Into the early years of independence, 
these organisations and networks very often imbued their actions with 
a similar nationalism to that which fuelled their pursuit of independence, 
particularly the conflation of ‘nation’ and ‘struggle’. This kind of sentiment 
is reflected in an interview with a RENETIL (Resistência Nacional dos 
Estudantes de Timor Leste) leader in 2004 where themes of struggle and 
liberation connect through to the national ‘whole’:
10  Fokupers for instance developed a database on violence against women during 1999 as well as 
provided support to widows post-independence, while all three organisations were advocated strongly 
on human rights.
11  Asistensia Legal Ba Feto no Labarik is a local NGO which provides free legal assistance to women 
and children.
12  Organização Popular de Mulher Timor.
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We still maintain the vision of a national liberation. In two 
different ways. People liberation, and country liberation. Still 
country liberation is relevant because we still have problem of 
sea border with Australia, the government … And the second 
is people liberation, means liberating people from poverty, from 
illiteracy, from disease and so on. It’s very ambitious, it’s not 
organization vision, it’s the country vision. But you take this as 
a kind of RENETIL vision as well, to motivate people to see the 
reality, not as a part but as a whole. That’s why we still keep this 
vision as an organization vision (interview, Dili, 2004).
Here, the nation remains the motivating frame for practice. Even as 
a  civil society organisation, the task of securing the national territory 
remained  a priority, while the second objective was one that took ‘the 
people’ as a generalised and homogenised entity. Of relevance here is that 
this vision of post-independence liberation would be performed ‘not as 
part but as a whole’, a comment that is analogous in terms of scale to 
the quote from Andrieu (2010, 540) at the outset of this chapter where 
transitional justice is described as the transformation of ‘a whole society’. 
In both instances the society in question is that of the nation.
Whether classified as endogenous or exogenous, CSOs in Timor-Leste 
have tended to work in ways that are grounded in the national imaginary. 
This is manifest in various ways: for instance, discursively in terms of 
the justification for transitional justice measures being important to the 
‘sustainability of the nation’ or, as discussed above, to prevent cycles of 
violence that may put the new nation at risk. Participation of victims 
in programs has often been justified as an individual’s or a community’s 
role in founding the nation. It is also seen, more implicitly perhaps, in 
the design of programs where representatives from different locations are 
drawn into events, workshops and other programming efforts on the basis 
of ensuring national representation. Stories of abuse are told by people 
from an ‘illustrative number’ of districts in spaces supported by civil 
society, drawing their narratives into a national framing in a way that 
is repeated as compilations of testimony that are published in reports, 
advocacy materials and academic literature.
Concentrically related to these endogenous actors are a host of what 
will be categorised here as exogenous CSOs. These are organisations – 
typified by NGOs that are globally networked such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Jesuit Refugee Service, Amnesty 
International and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) 
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– whose authority and resource base are located beyond Timor-Leste 
while they are working directly on programs ‘in country’ and/or by the 
further funding of local partner organisations for projects. For instance, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has coordinated 
with the Jakarta-based Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR) and the Timor-
Leste Red Cross to reunite families that fled Timor-Leste to Indonesia 
in 1999 and continues to assist with the identification of those killed 
during the independence struggle (ICRC 2016). Other initiatives have 
included the Living Memory Project driven by Australia-based activists 
and ASSEPOL to record the testimonies of former political prisoners, 
as well as teams of forensic experts from both Australia and Argentina 
who have worked with the 12 November Committee in searching for the 
remains of victims.13
In Timor-Leste, demands for justice in national terms have been 
reinforced, rather than negated, by these exogenous civil society actors. 
This might sound contradictory given that NGOs have often been seen 
as central to an emergent ‘global civil society’ (Glasius 2009, 497) that 
can contest or undermine national sovereignty. Yet even NGOs that are 
part of highly mobile networks remain bound into, and typically self-
organise along the lines of, a nation-state system. Moreover, exogenous 
and highly globalised NGOs have often set their practice according to 
a ‘methodological nationalism’, namely a belief that the nation is the 
appropriate scale for political and social organisation. In other words, an 
aid worker may be born elsewhere but still be motivated by the task of 
building a sustainable ‘Timor-Leste’ as it is assumed that, as anywhere, 
the nation sets the basic parameters for political life. The following quote 
from an ICTJ report written by both foreigners and East Timorese typifies 
how human rights abuses, their effects and the need for intervention are 
often framed (at least discursively) in a way that takes the nation as the 
natural basis for justice:
Valorising victims and responding to their material needs 
can assist Timor-Leste’s nation-building project. Although 
not posing a  significant political threat due to their lack of 
organisation, victims of the past conflict represent a large, angry 
and disenfranchised group with a legitimate claim to reparation 
13  The Jesuit Refugee Service assisted with border visits and communication between refugee 
groups (and resumed working with refugees during the 2006–2008 political crisis), West Timorese 
organisations collected information on human rights abuses in refugee camps, and other organisations 
such as Catholic Relief Services that have run peacebuilding programs. 
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from the Timor-Leste state. By addressing victims’ specific needs, 
Timor-Leste will combat one of the underlying causes of social 
disadvantage in Timor-Leste – the experience of a serious human 
rights violation. It will also promote an inclusive Timor-Leste 
society by supporting victims’ ability to enjoy their rights as full 
citizens (Kinsella and Pereira 2010, 3).
As per the discussion above, here again the frame is the national. Where 
the first section of this chapter discussed key elements of civil society, the 
contention in this section has been that civil society actors working in 
the  field of transitional justice have tended to take the nation as the 
natural platform from which discourse and practice is oriented. Civil 
society actors may move downwards into ‘local’ communities or upwards 
to the ‘international’, but these shifts are anchored in an assumption 
that the national is the starting point for activity. Even ‘universal human 
rights’ become embedded in national treaties. In this way, civil society 
often reinforces the territorial basis for states, albeit even when there is 
antagonism and contestation between different elements of the state. That 
civil society actors are geared to such a scale may not be surprising given 
the origin of the nationalist conflict that underpinned the creation of 
Timor-Leste as an independent nation-state, though as will be discussed 
in the following section, this has ramifications for how civil society has 
engaged on issues of transitional justice.
The limits of national justice
In many respects, framing transitional justice agendas in national terms 
might seem the most obvious way in which to secure positive outcomes 
for survivors. Linking the experiences of people who have suffered abuse 
and human rights violations with the interests of the state via a nationalist 
discourse could conceivably lead to broadly inclusive and empathetic 
forms of recognition. The careful founding of common narratives based 
on inclusion and difference, and the development of solidarity and 
compromise as a way to navigate community-wide claims for justice, 
could also be potential outcomes of approaching justice integrated into 
broader processes of nation-formation. However, this has largely not been 
the case in Timor-Leste, where working at the level of the nation has 
limited the possibilities for justice in some respects. This is explored in this 
final section by examining the ramifications of approaching transitional 
justice in close association with the state and also imagining justice on 
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a macro-level. Here, and as reflected on in the following quote by McEvoy 
as he engages with the work James Scott, there is a continuous risk in 
generating interventions that are imagined at a scale that in practice may 
limit rather than fulfil justice:
One of the reasons Scott suggests ‘state-centric’ grand schemes 
often fail spectacularly is that they oversimplify. They may fail to 
take sufficient account of local customs and practical knowledge 
and to engage properly with community and civil society 
structures. Such failures, often justified in the name of efficiency, 
professional expertise or simply ‘getting the job done’, may in turn 
lead to incompetence or maladministration and encourage grass-
roots resistance to such state-led initiatives (McEvoy 2007, 424).
As suggested by McEvoy, while large-scale programs may be justified 
in terms of efficiency, they can fail by not being able to adapt to local 
intricacies. Beyond instrumental reasons of efficiency, programs may also 
be driven by actors that see a particular scale as appropriate, needed and 
justified in ideological terms, including that of nationalism. The concern 
here then is not that civil society is left out of consideration, but rather 
that civil society may take on some of the same characteristics as a state, 
in this instance in terms of imagining the nation as the appropriate scale 
by which justice is primarily located. This, it is argued, has at least two 
quite different ways of limiting the opportunities for transitional justice 
to gain traction.
In the first instance, by making a strong connection between the nation 
and justice, civil society actors draw debates into a framework that can 
be directly contested in cases of an antagonistic state. This is not to 
conflate the nation and the state, but rather to argue that when civil 
society actors frame transitional justice in national terms the topic is 
drawn into a  domain where the state tends to be able to claim a very 
significant level of legitimacy. If the state takes a contrary position to 
civil society, the latter can become quickly outmanoeuvred and justice 
agendas delegitimated. In cases where a governing elite is antagonistic to 
particular strategies or programs, claims to know and act in the national 
interest can be used to contain and undermine advocacy for transitional 
justice measures. This is a position that can be consolidated even further 
in sites such as Timor-Leste where a state elite is comprised of former 
resistance leaders who have themselves paid heavily for their contribution 
to national independence.
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In Timor-Leste, political leaders have shown considerable reluctance 
to engage in transitional justice measures, including those proposed or 
initiated by civil society actors (Kingston 2006). In fact, the response from 
the political elite has very often been one of antagonism, particularly to 
agendas that have called for different forms of international accountability 
for human rights abuses, especially those committed by Indonesia. State 
responses from the East Timorese state to such agendas and advocacy 
have included undermining the CAVR report when it was first released, 
continuously delaying the debate of the CAVR recommendations in 
parliament, opposing the issuing of indictments by the SCU, creating 
organisations such as the CTF to undermine claims that an international 
tribunal was required, and the granting of pardons (including in 
contravention of the law preventing the release of indicted Indonesians 
who have re-entered Timor-Leste). Further to this, a governing elite has 
sanctioned clear hierarchies in the commemoration, recognition and 
distribution of resources, not only giving priority to veterans over civilian 
survivors but also with a clear delineation in terms of gender (Kent and 
Kinsella 2014). The significance of these hierarchies is that it focuses 
forms of recognition on former combatants for its own ends, though this 
has also meant that any claims for justice by or for the broader population 
occur without the legitimating support of the state.
The state’s undermining of transitional justice agendas has occurred for 
domestic political reasons (for instance, to ensure veterans are seen as 
a priority) and also as a reflection of the desire not to antagonise its former 
occupier. Indonesia geographically surrounds Timor-Leste, controls the 
western portion of the same island as well as vital air and sea routes, and is 
the key source of imported goods. To be seen to be supporting civil society 
agendas for prosecutions or an international tribunal could potentially 
antagonise elements within the Indonesian state, not least the military, 
and create any number of potential problems for Timor-Leste.
While the placation of Indonesia has led to much criticism of former 
president and prime minister Xanana Gusmão (Kingston 2006), 
antagonism by the state can in part be understood via the distinctions 
made earlier in this chapter between the state and civil society. The state 
claims sovereign authority and, as an enabler of that, a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence. While civil society plays a role in governance 
– for instance, the regulation of social relations via changes in norms and 
behaviours frequently referred to as ‘socialisation’ in Timor-Leste – civil 
society actors do not make a claim to a legitimate use of violence. As such, 
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contestation over transitional justice in Timor-Leste, and what often 
appears as an inappropriate level of appeasement to the Indonesians, can be 
understood as born out of one of the key points of differentiation between 
civil society and the state. As such, civil society has often approached 
transitional justice (especially on questions of accountability for human 
rights abuses) within a national imaginary that has left it vulnerable to an 
antagonistic state that cannot risk the same ‘civic virtue’. In Timor-Leste, 
no matter the nationalist credentials of civil society actors, state elites 
have often claimed a pre-eminent relationship to the nation as a way to 
undermine certain transitional justice initiatives in a bid to avert risking 
challenges from other states to capacity to govern, including a claim to the 
legitimate use of violence.
While working within a national imaginary has meant that certain civil 
society efforts have to date been countered by the state, the second 
limitation discussed here relates to the effect of giving preference to the 
national over other more localised forms of polity. This is particularly 
evident when addressing the issue of the dead of war and the burial 
of human remains in Timor-Leste. As a result of the struggle for 
independence, a large number of people remain missing. Statistically it is 
almost impossible to know how many, though the figure has been put at 
the ‘tens of thousands’ (Robins 2010, 5). Children were forced to work 
with the Indonesian military and thousands were abducted and taken to 
live in the homes of Indonesians across the archipelago (CAVR 2005, 
26). Many thousands of other people died as combatants and civilians: 
buried in massacre sites and temporary graves, left where they were killed, 
or were ‘disappeared’. Since 1999, remains have been recovered through 
the efforts of former East Timorese commanders, forensic investigations 
undertaken with support from countries such as Australia and Argentina, 
along with support from civil society actors and by the efforts of families 
themselves (Kinsella and Blau 2013, 4). Many remains have yet to be 
located and the state’s approach to the missing thus far can be described 
as ad hoc and at times selective, where priority is given to retrieving the 
remains of the political elite.
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of recovering the remains 
of the deceased in any circumstance in Timor-Leste, even more so when 
the person has died or been killed through violent events (Bovensiepen 
2014, 116). Of fundamental importance is ensuring that the spirits of 
the deceased are shown proper respect. Following funerary rituals is key 
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in fulfilling this need. An unnatural or violent death, or one where the 
death incurs a sense of debt to those still alive, can mean a spirit is left 
in a restless state and can be a source of potential risk to the living. Poor 
health, misfortune and accidents are often understood as being caused by 
angry ancestors. This is not a secondary or residual element in Timorese 
culture, but is frequently expressed as foundational to understanding why 
and how things happen to people. Often scarce resources are deployed 
to ensure recognition. The need to recover the remains of the dead, or 
to undertake surrogate forms of recognition, is considered of paramount 
importance (Winch 2017).
The burying of former veterans in the ‘national heroes’ cemetery in Timor-
Leste, or in one of the various ossuaries that have been built in regional 
centres around the country, ensures that these deaths are irrevocably tied 
to the formation of the nation (Viegas and Feijó 2017). And yet these 
bodies and their spirits, along with the thousands of non-combatants 
killed in the war, are very often connected into a different community 
comprised of the living and the ancestral domain, via association with an 
uma lulik (sacred house). This is a kind of ‘customary polity’ that exists 
across a different kind of space and time to that of the nation (Grenfell 
2015) where there is a specific and exclusive affiliation to one sacred house.
On issues of transitional justice, civil society actors may reach into the 
local levels and gather the most intimate stories of abuse, but these stories 
are elevated and recalibrated via workshops, research, training, advocacy 
and campaigns as if part of a national ‘whole’. Even as civil society 
has shifted its focus from an international tribunal to reconciliation, 
reparations and the rights of survivors (and has recognised the need to 
include more space for their voices) (Kent 2012, 194–195), the national 
imaginary still figures as the natural basis from which organising occurs: 
from how initial engagement with communities is framed and legitimated, 
to how programs are designed in terms of lifting discreet communities 
into common dialogue and, in turn, to how final presentation of facts 
are framed in national terms. This may have some benefits, but such an 
approach should also be met with some caution.
Drawing testimony from victims in order to advocate on their behalf 
for reparations, or to create a record of their struggle as a public good, 
presents risks when people are drawn into a domain where there are not 
the resources or political will to, in turn, ensure adequate recognition and 
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action.14 Testimony can lead to a sense of emptiness rather than fulfilment 
and, as Simon Robin’s work attests, it can lead communities who do not 
receive hoped-for outcomes to disengage from the efforts of civil society:
Like from the Red Cross, they came here last year and informed 
us that, for those who had lost their family and did not find their 
bones yet, you come together here so we can find ways or solutions 
to resolve this problem, and afterwards we never heard anything 
again from them and it seems they lost it [the bones] on the way. 
As we said before the Red Cross also came here, collected all 
our names, they brought the entire list but where are they now; 
they have probably thrown them away or thrown them in the 
garbage. That is why we as the family of the victims, we find it 
hard to meet or talk to you people, as if you came now. Because 
so many interviews on the same topics have been made with us as 
the victims’ family but they never yield any result (Focus group 
participant, Bobonaro) (Robins 2010, 32).
Whether this is a common experience or otherwise is not the point. 
Rather, what is important are the dynamics that produce antagonism 
or indifference to efforts that are framed as assisting the community.15 
Either way, such a sentiment is indicative of the kind of dilemma where 
the experience of personal trauma and abuse is elevated into a national 
discourse without the necessary resources or political motivation at 
that level to respond adequately. Asking for people’s participation raises 
expectations and when these remain unfulfilled then people may choose 
to withdraw. This is even more difficult when there is a failure to recognise 
the implications for customary practice. Giving testimony means to ‘konta 
uluk’ – to talk about the past. Yet, to speak about the dead and then 
not respond with action is to risk the wrath of one’s ancestors (Robins 
2010); the ancestors are listening and their own heightened expectation 
of recognition and peace may lead to reprisal if left unmet.
14  This is not to say that there are not advantages for people in the way that testimony has been 
collected, as it may assist with the return of remains for instance, or with end results that assist with 
everyday needs including spiritual. There may also be therapeutic and social advantages in drawing 
victims together to share and be afforded some level of public recognition, even more so in instances 
where the state has not provided adequate levels of recognition.
15  See also Lia Kent’s ‘Sounds of Silence’ (2016) for her analysis of silence, in this instance for 
reasons of pragmatism as well as civility.
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Conclusion
The establishment of the Centro Nasional Chega! over 2016 and 2017 
may give a new momentum to the transitional justice agenda in Timor-
Leste. And it is not insignificant that this body was formed by the Council 
of Ministers, thus suggesting that both difference and space may exist 
at the upper levels of state for certain transitional justice agendas to 
be recognised. Given the above arguments, the CNC could also be an 
opportunity to explore different ways forward in terms of how discourses, 
activities and strategic objectives are formulated and enacted. It may mean 
that working locally, for instance, is given emphasis and in a way where 
what the nation means to people evolves as one part and one layer to how 
justice is approached. If this is to occur, however, it is important that 
consideration is given to how different actors – including civil society 
– interact with local communities and the way priorities and needs are 
expressed to emanate outwardly from that level. Again, this may mean 
that survivors will choose to speak in terms of the nation as part of that 
discourse. However, it may also give survivors the space necessary to forge 
a localised form of recognition that answers to customary sociality while 
also finding avenues for recognition and reconciliation at the national level 
in a way that is negotiated with and supported (rather than contested) by 
the state. This might enable a new and necessary space for justice to be 
imagined.
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The omnipresent past: 
Rethinking transitional justice 
through digital storytelling on 
Indonesia’s 1965 violence
Ken Setiawan
Almost 20 years since the fall of authoritarianism, Indonesia is yet to 
deliver justice on the human rights violations the country witnessed during 
the New Order (1966–1998). As such, the Indonesian transitional justice 
process can be described at best as ‘delayed’ (Suh 2016, 241) or at worst 
as ‘failed’ (Kimura 2015, 73). This raises the question of how Indonesian 
civil society actors have responded to this situation, particularly regarding 
arguably the most complex of past human rights violations in the country: 
the 1965–1966 violence (henceforth the 1965 violence) during which 
more than half a million were killed and hundreds of thousands were 
detained for long periods of time without trial. This chapter focuses on the 
recent emergence of digital activism on Indonesia’s 1965 violence in which 
the non-witness generation, who were not physically present at the event 
(Jilovski 2015, 11), has taken a prominent role. I will discuss why these 
platforms have emerged and what the stories disseminated through them 
can tell about processes of transitional justice, taking a particular interest 
in the societal legacies of the violence.
This chapter starts with a historical background of the 1965 violence and 
the trajectory of transitional justice in Indonesia following the fall of the 
New Order regime in 1998. The 1965 violence is particularly significant 
in the context of transitional justice in Indonesia, both because of its 
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large scale and because it marked the ascendancy of authoritarian rule. 
Moreover, the New Order regime successfully hijacked the memory of 
the violence, portraying communists as traitors and a threat to stability 
and security. In so doing, the regime justified the killings as necessary for 
the nation’s survival and legitimised its political rule. As this chapter will 
show, this discourse has remained strong in the post-authoritarian period 
despite increased human rights protections in law and the development 
of transitional justice mechanisms. The salience of this discourse has 
once again become evident during the current presidency of Joko 
Widodo (‘Jokowi’), where dominant political discourses remain largely 
unconducive towards transitional justice efforts.
The second part of this chapter addresses how civil society actors continue 
to challenge these narratives, representing a ‘fragile, but persistent culture 
of contestation’ (Kuddus 2017, 82). Focusing on the emergence of digital 
storytelling websites on the 1965 violence, in which I also have been 
personally involved, I discuss why civil society actors have turned to digital 
media. Through analysing two stories of grandchildren of those who were 
directly affected by the 1965 events, I will argue that these websites are not 
only relevant for transitional justice because they seek to connect young 
people with a largely unknown past, but also because stories of the non-
witness generation convey how a dark chapter of history is experienced 
today. Using the concept of postmemory, or the strong connection of 
persons to an event that preceded their births (Hirsch 2008, 106–107), 
this chapter explores what the experiences of the non-witness generation 
may offer to the understanding of the transitional justice process in 
Indonesia, and in particular the societal legacies of state terror.
The 1965 violence
On the night of 30 September 1965, a group of conspirators in the 
Indonesian Army abducted and murdered six high-ranking generals 
and a lieutenant. Almost immediately Major General Suharto, the then 
commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, took action and crushed the 
‘30th of September Movement’ within a day. In the period that followed, 
the Army-controlled press labelled the movement as ‘counter-revolutionary’ 
and accused the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia; Indonesian Communist 
Party) of being its mastermind. In mid-October, Suharto was appointed 
commander of the Army, in which capacity he ordered troops to initiate 
operations against remnants of the movement. Between October 1965 and 
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early 1966, approximately 500,000 party members and their sympathisers 
were killed, while another 600,000–750,000 were imprisoned, often for 
lengthy periods without trial (McGregor 2013, 138).
The massacres and mass imprisonments provided the stage for Suharto’s 
ascendancy to power. He ruled the country until 1998, during which time 
Indonesia witnessed severe and systematic human rights violations. The 
Suharto regime, named the New Order, portrayed its role in crushing the 
30th of September Movement as saving the country from the communist 
threat. In so doing, it legitimised the killings and mass detentions, which 
served to eliminate the Indonesian Left and created an authoritarian state 
friendly to western geopolitical objectives in the context of the Cold War.1
With anti-communism being the cornerstone of the new regime, the 
consequences were grim for members of leftist organisations or individuals 
who had an affiliation to them. This included family members, who 
became ‘Indonesia’s own version of the untouchables’ (McGregor 2013, 
139). The stigmatisation of ‘communists’, a label used not only to describe 
party members but also anyone regarded as subversive, was propagated by 
the government through mass media and at schools. Consequently, during 
the New Order public memories of the 1965 violence were surrounded 
by ‘fearful silence and … collective amnesia’ (Wahyuningroem 2013, 
120). There was virtually no space for alternative discourses as political 
opposition was shut down violently by the Suharto regime. It was only 
after the fall of the New Order in 1998 that experiences of the violence 
could be shared in the public domain, and that human rights groups 
were able to demand openly that the government take responsibility for 
its crimes.
Seeking to end an inconvenient past: 
Transitional justice in Indonesia
In the immediate years following the fall of the New Order, human 
rights protections swiftly became incorporated into Indonesia’s legal 
system because of international and domestic pressure. This included the 
enactment of the Human Rights Law (Law 39/1999), which provided 
1  The elimination of the Left repositioned Indonesia into the Western bloc, and secured Western 
economic and military interests across maritime South-East Asia (McGregor 2013, 140–141). 
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guarantees of both civil and political, as well as economic, social and 
cultural, rights and strengthened the legal status and mandate of Komnas 
HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia; the National Human 
Rights Commission). Human rights norms were also included in the 
Constitution (2000), which saw the addition of a specific chapter on 
human rights, modelled on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). In addition, the Human Rights Courts Law (Law 26/2000) 
established permanent Human Rights Courts with the jurisdiction over 
gross human rights violations including crimes against humanity and the 
crime of genocide. This law also provided the possibility to establish Ad 
Hoc Courts for cases that occurred before 2000. Indonesia ratified all 
major international human rights treaties, established a number of state 
institutions charged with human rights protection and introduced the first 
five-year National Action Plan on Human Rights (RANHAM), setting 
out priorities and strategies with regard to human rights implementation. 
State capacity for responding to present and past human rights cases thus 
improved remarkably (Setiawan 2016a, 12–13).
Yet justice for past human rights violations remained an uphill battle, 
whether through judicial or non-judicial mechanisms. To date, only two 
Ad Hoc human rights courts have been established. These concerned gross 
human rights violations in East Timor in the lead up to, and following, 
the 1999 independence referendum2 and the 1984 Tanjung Priok case.3 
These tribunals did not have the desired outcomes: in both cases, only 
lower-ranked military officers were tried, and all were acquitted at various 
stages of the judicial process (Sulistiyanto 2007; Cammack 2016). While 
Komnas HAM recommended that a number of cases of past violations be 
addressed in Ad Hoc Courts, these were rejected by the Attorney General’s 
Office (Setiawan 2016a, 24–25) and contributed to ongoing impunity. 
In 2012, following a lengthy investigation, Komnas HAM recommended 
the establishment of an Ad Hoc Court for the 1965 violence,4 which 
2  This meant that violence perpetrated by the Indonesian military during the occupation of East 
Timor was excluded. The establishment of an Ad Hoc Court served to pre-empt the creation of an 
international tribunal (Cammack 2016, 191).
3  In the Tanjung Priok case, the Indonesian military opened fire on demonstrators led by Amir 
Biki, an Islamic leader and regime critic. The demonstration took place in the context of new policies 
to restrict the place of Islam in Indonesian politics. According to some estimates, 400 people were 
killed by the military. 
4  In the same report, Komnas HAM also recommended the 1965 violence to be resolved through 
non-judicial means. 
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was rejected by the Attorney General who argued that it was ‘difficult 
to investigate cases which have happened that many years ago’ (Voice of 
America 2012).
While the argument put forward by the Attorney General reflects 
a  preference for non-judicial mechanisms, which has received renewed 
attention under the current presidency of Joko Widodo (see below), 
their establishment at the national level has been largely unsuccessful.5 
In 2004, parliament passed Law 27/2004 on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) to settle cases of past human rights violations 
outside of the courts. Drafted to address cases that occurred before the 
enactment of the 2000 Human Rights Courts Law, it was anticipated 
that the TRC would also address the 1965 violence. However, a number 
of provisions in the Law were problematic, including that compensation 
for victims would only be offered in conjunction with an amnesty. Several 
human rights organisations then brought the Law to the Constitutional 
Court, which agreed that this provision contradicted the Constitution 
and the principles of international law. However, rather than annulling 
the particular article, the Constitutional Court cancelled the entire law, 
leaving Indonesia without a formal non-judicial mechanism to settle past 
human rights violations.
The ineffectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms in Indonesia has 
been attributed to both a lack of political will to address past human 
rights violations (Sulistiyanto 2007, 90; Wahyuningroem 2013, 126) 
and to a direct result of the continued presence of New Order players 
in today’s political elite (Kimura 2015, 88). Elite continuity has been 
identified as a major constraining factor in transitional justice efforts 
(Posner and Vermeule 2004, 770–772). In Indonesia, the domination of 
‘old faces’ in Indonesian politics has been attributed to the characteristics 
of authoritarianism. Hadiz and Robison (2013) have ascribed this to the 
destructive nature of the previous regime that ‘disorganised civil society 
and destroyed liberal forces’ (Hadiz and Robison 2013, 36). The lack of 
political and ideological alternatives has thus allowed New Order elites to 
continue to yield power and wealth, while new players continue to engage 
with the political practices of the past. Aspinall has argued that during 
the New Order, political and social forces were tolerated as long as they 
obeyed the rule of the regime and did not challenge it directly. This led to 
5  It should be noted that, at a local level, there have been some successful reconciliation processes. 
See, for instance, Wahyuningroem 2013 and Kuddus 2017.
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‘semi-opposition’, a combination of opposition and compromise, which 
has continued to influence the nature of the democratic transition and 
that explains why most key political forces after 1998 were either direct 
participants or marginal semi-oppositional players in the Suharto regime 
(Aspinall 2010, 21).
Both concepts draw relationships between present-day elite continuity 
and the nature of past authoritarianism. This has arguably limited the 
development of more liberal society and politics (Hadiz and Robinson 
2013, 36) and led to low-quality democracy (Aspinall 2010, 32). 
In  relation to human rights protections, this low-quality democracy is 
represented by significant institutional and legal reform on one hand, yet 
a lack of implementation on the other (Hadiprayitno 2010, 374; Setiawan 
2016a, 5).
Diluting transitional justice: The Jokowi 
presidency
The 2014 election of Joko Widodo (‘Jokowi’) as president brought 
new hopes that past human rights violations would be addressed. This 
was influenced by the general, but inaccurate, perception6 that Jokowi 
had limited links to the military, political and business elites, which, as 
discussed above, are considered a key obstacle in human rights reform. 
Moreover, Jokowi was the only presidential candidate who explicitly 
promised to deliver justice for past human rights violations in his campaign 
program (Hearman 2014). Nawa Cita, the nine-point priority agenda put 
forward by Jokowi and his running mate Jusuf Kalla, stated that ‘the just 
finalisation of past human rights violations’ was of utmost importance, 
as they represented a ‘social and political burden’ on the country. This 
document also identified numerous past human rights violations that 
were to be addressed by the government, including the 1965 violence.7 
Once installed as president, Jokowi repeated the importance of solving 
6  While Jokowi has far less direct ties to the New Order regime than his rival in the presidential 
contest, Prabowo Subianto, many of his allies are members of Indonesia’s political and business elites, 
including some with a poor human rights record (see Warburton 2016, 304–305, 314).
7  In addition to the 1965 violence, the campaign program identified the following cases: 
Talangsari; Tanjung Priok; the enforced disappearances of activists in 1997–1998; the May 1998 
violence; and the Trisakti and Semanggi shootings. 
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past human rights cases in his 2015 State of the Nation address, stating 
that ‘future generations may not be burdened by the past’ (Sekretariat 
Kabinet Republik Indonesia 2015).
Many human rights activists supported Jokowi’s campaign because of the 
promises made8 and expected his administration to bring past human 
rights violations to court. Instead, several non-judicial mechanisms were 
introduced, starting with the establishment of a Reconciliation Committee 
in May 2015 to address past human rights violations, including the 1965 
mass violence (Setiawan 2016b). However, this initiative was abandoned 
after the August 2015 appointment of retired general Luhut Panjaitan to 
the post of Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law and Security. While in 
April 2016 Panjaitan supported the organisation of a National Symposium 
on the 1965 violence,9 opening dialogue between government officials, 
former members of the military and survivors, the recommendations of 
the symposium have not been released. Prospects for human rights reform 
became even more uncertain after the July 2016 appointment of retired 
general Wiranto as Coordinating Minister, replacing Panjaitan. Wiranto 
had been indicted by the United Nations in 2003 for atrocities committed 
in Timor-Leste. In early 2017, Wiranto announced the establishment of 
a National Harmony Council that would also be mandated to settle past 
human rights abuses (The Jakarta Post 2017).
The turn towards non-judicial mechanisms with little public participation 
and that shield those responsible for violations from being held to account 
can be explained by the ties that many members of the political elite have to 
organisations directly involved in human rights abuses. For example, Vice 
President Jusuf Kalla strongly denied rumours of a possible presidential 
apology ahead of the 50th anniversary of the 1965 violence. In the 1960s, 
Kalla had led the Indonesian Students Action Front in Makassar (South 
Sulawesi), which supported Suharto’s rise to power. The strength of 
organisational ties was also evident among actors who were less directly 
involved than Kalla. Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu, for instance, 
also rejected a possible apology. This position can be explained considering 
8  At the same time, the support from many human rights activists for Jokowi can be understood 
as an effort to counter the rise of Prabowo Subianto, who was involved in human rights violations 
in East Timor and Papua, the enforced disappearances of democracy activists (1997–1998) and the 
1998 violence. 
9  It is likely that the symposium was organised in a response to heightened attention for the 1965 
case domestically and abroad (McGregor and Purdey 2016). 
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his previous role (2000–2002) as head of the Army Strategic Command, 
which four decades earlier played a crucial role in the annihilation of the 
Communist Party.
Ongoing elite influence must also be seen in the context of Jokowi’s 
limited political authority, a result of his marginal win in the presidential 
elections (Setiawan 2016b). This has forced Jokowi to use a number 
of strategies in order to increase his power, including the building of 
alliances with conservative elites (Warburton 2016, 315). This has 
enabled Jokowi to expand his administration’s programs that are primarily 
focused on the economy. These favour infrastructure, deregulation 
and de-bureaucratisation, with the reducing of red tape to enhance 
infrastructure projects being a personal priority of Jokowi (Warburton 
2016, 308). At the political level there is thus little room for considering 
questions of justice for past human rights violations. Moreover, societal 
support for transitional justice is limited, with a broad section of the 
population showing reluctance or even antipathy (Kimura 2015, 89; 
Warburton 2016, 315). Public discussions on the 1965 violence (including 
cultural events such book launches, photo exhibitions and film screenings) 
have been regularly shut down following pressure from the security forces 
or vigilante groups.10 While it is difficult to identify a pattern in these 
occurrences as many events proceed without any problems, pressure on 
civil society actors illustrates that the challenges for transitional justice for 
the 1965 violence are not only in the political and legal spheres, but also 
in the broader societal context.
Beyond law and politics: Transitional justice 
as a societal process
It is evident that in so far as Indonesia is willing to answer claims for 
justice for past human rights violations in general, and the 1965 case in 
particular, it favours the establishment of non-judicial mechanisms. These 
state-led initiatives have largely focused on reconciliation, without much 
attention given to establishing what has happened. It has been observed 
that political factions generally oppose the notion of ‘truth’, even when 
10  Examples are the forced cancellation of a series of panels on 1965 at the Ubud Writers and 
Readers Festival (2015), the Belok Kiri (Turn Left) Festival (2016) and the 2017 attack on the Legal 
Aid Foundation, following its organisation of an academic discussion on the 1965 violence. 
71
3 . THE OMNIPRESENT PAST
they are more supportive of reform (Kimura 2015, 77–78). An example 
of that unease is that during the Jokowi presidency political discourses 
on historical justice have shifted from ‘reconciliation’ to ‘harmony’, with 
limited references to human rights frameworks or public participation. The 
primary concern of the Jokowi administration is to address these cases as 
quickly as possible: when the Reconciliation Committee was established, 
the government announced the committee would finalise its work within 
months. Both the administration’s preference for the creation of short-
term institutions and its emphasis on ‘closure’ reflect an approach towards 
transitional justice characterised by short-term mechanisms, overlooking 
the social legacies of mass violence.
To an extent, the tendency towards a state-centric and top-down approach 
in transitional justice processes in Indonesia reflects many of these efforts 
globally, which, according to McEvoy (2007), have been dominated by 
legalism. One aspect of legalism is the institutionalisation of transitional 
justice, often leading to the establishment of ‘state-like’ structures 
including specialised courts and commissions. While the development of 
institutional capacity is important in the transition to more democratic 
forms of governance, this is no guarantee for success. As argued by McEvoy, 
one of the shortcomings of the institutionalisation of transitional justice is 
the tendency that these render justice as the business of the state. In this 
process, the complexities of past violence are oversimplified and fail to take 
into account local sources of knowledge. Similarly, these structures often 
do not engage sufficiently with the community and civil society, which 
means that they do not appropriately respond to the needs of its intended 
beneficiaries (McEvoy 2007, 421–424). In the Indonesian context, the 
top-down and state-centred approach is even more problematic because 
of the strong political and societal resistance towards transitional justice: 
it has more to do with protecting vested political interests, rather than 
delivering to those who have been affected by past violence.
One of the challenges of transitional justice mechanisms, whether of 
a judicial (i.e. special tribunals) or non-judicial (i.e. truth commissions) 
nature, is to acknowledge that the consequences of violence continue 
long after the event and even after the delivery of formal justice. In her 
seminal work on truth commissions, Priscilla Hayner remarked that, 
while these institutions are often welcomed as a way to break through 
social silences and an opportunity for healing, they ‘do not offer long-
term therapy’ (Hayner 2001, 135). There is thus no direct correlation 
between transitional justice mechanisms and healing. As such, it is crucial 
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to differentiate between justice processes pursued at a national and 
political level, and individual reconciliation (Hayner 2001, 157). This is 
more difficult to achieve, if it is at all possible: those who ‘have suffered 
the long hand of power may never be able to stitch their lives together’ 
(Gómez-Barris 2009, 26). Taking these realities into account, it is evident 
that transitional justice mechanisms will be more effective when they are 
part of a longer-term healing process. This constitutes a call to rethink 
transitional justice, taking it beyond traditional parameters of law and 
politics. Instead, transitional justice should be conceptualised as a process 
that concerns both the settling of accounts after violent conflict and 
the coming to terms with damages that have been inflicted on a society 
(Brants 2016, 16).
Coming to terms with the past requires the creation of a physical space 
where the past can exist in the present. From this perspective, transitional 
justice is thus intrinsically linked to storytelling. Indeed, ‘the story’ has 
increasingly gained prominence in human rights work (Kurusawa 2007). 
As testimonial acts, stories have various roles to play in the pursuit of 
justice. Not only do they generate factual knowledge about what has 
happened, to whom and who is responsible, but stories are also ‘voices 
against silence, interpretation against incomprehension, empathy against 
indifference and remembrance against forgetting’ (Kurasawa 2007, 25). 
As such, stories are invaluable in ‘restitching the social fabric’ (Gómez-
Barris 2009, 94) in order for both individuals and society to come to 
terms with the past.
Cases of historical violence have shown us that the intense and often 
deeply painful experiences of the past are not only relevant for those who 
experienced it directly. Focusing on the remembrance of the Holocaust, 
Marianne Hirsch (2008) has argued that postmemory plays a crucial 
role in the intergenerational transmission of trauma.11 Postmemory is 
the relationship of individuals to experiences that preceded their births 
(Hirsch 2008, 103). It is thus not memory in a literal sense, but refers 
to a profound connection with the past that conveys the lasting presence 
of painful experiences. While postmemory is a generational structure 
of memory transmission taking place within the family, thus between 
first and subsequent generations, it also has a horizontal, or affiliative, 
11  There are, of course, many differences between the Holocaust and the 1965 violence. In contrast 
to the Holocaust, there is not yet an authorised narrative on the 1965 violence that acknowledges the 
crimes, and to some extent survivors and their families continue to carry a stigma as a consequence of 
New Order propaganda. 
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component. In an affiliative sense, postmemories serve to connect with 
a person’s contemporaries who may not have a familial link (Hirsch 2008, 
114–115). In reactivating a distant past and bringing it to the present, 
raising awareness of the event, postmemory is crucial to civil society 
transitional justice efforts. This is all the more relevant as time passes, 
and the distance between the present and the event increases, and there is 
arguably more knowledge to be generated.
Postmemory is not only relevant as a trigger for human rights activism, but 
also because it provides insights into the long-term and intergenerational 
effects of violence. This has been conceptualised by Macarena Gómez-
Barris (2009) as the ‘afterlife’ of violence. In contrast to ‘aftermath’, defined 
as the political and economic legacies of past human rights violations, 
afterlife constitutes the struggles and realities of people living through 
political violence. Afterlife thus represents the continuing and persistent 
symbolic and material effects of the original event of violence on people’s 
daily lives, their social and psychic identities, and their ongoing wrestling 
with the past in the present (Gómez-Barris 2009, 6).
In providing insights into what it means to live with the legacies of past 
violence, the concept of postmemory also allows us to critically consider 
transitional justice efforts, particularly when those have given little space 
for truth-telling.
Digital storytelling on the 1965 violence
While justice efforts for the 1965 violence continue to be disputed or 
rejected at the national political level, there is a growing awareness of and 
interest in these events, fed by various civil society activities and scholarly 
studies both in and outside of Indonesia (Kuddus 2017, 80–81). This 
includes the emergence of digital storytelling websites: 1965setiaphari 
(‘1965 each day’)12 and Ingat 65 (‘Remember 65’).13 While there are 
differences between the two websites – Ingat 65, for instance, aims to 
develop ‘a young people’s movement’14 whereas 1965setiaphari is intended 
12  The English-language component of the website is called Living1965. From 2018, 
1965setiaphari has primarily used social media, including Instagram (@1965setiaphari) and Twitter 
(@1965setiaphari).
13  Other websites include Learning 65, initiated by the Culture-Centred Approaches to Research 
and Evaluation Centre at the National University of Singapore and the Yogyakarta-based Kotak Hitam 
Forum (Black Box Forum), which was established in 2008 and mainly produces short documentaries. 
14  Ingat 65 Concept Note, on file with author.
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as an ‘ongoing and living memorial’ – there are also striking similarities. 
Both projects were initiated by individuals who have not experienced 
the events directly, or the non-witness generation. Similarly, many of the 
stories that appear on these websites have been contributed by young 
Indonesians reflecting on the 1965 violence, an event that they never 
directly experienced.
The use of digital platforms by civil society can be understood in the 
context of the global rise of digital technologies in general and in Indonesia 
in particular. With the fourth-highest number of Facebook users and 
Jakarta once named the most active city on Twitter, digital technologies in 
Indonesia are ‘fast becoming the core of life, work, culture and identity’ 
(Jurriëns and Tapsell 2017, 1). It is therefore unsurprising that civil society 
actors have turned towards these technologies. The popularity of social 
media is also important for the storytelling platforms as they largely rely 
on these avenues for the stories to be disseminated. In addition, the use 
of digital technology has numerous potential advantages, including that 
the projects are not situated in local contexts and are therefore not subject 
to some of the limitations of localised activism, such as the wider public’s 
limited access to these efforts (Wahyuningroem 2013, 135). At  the 
same time, it is important to recognise that most of Indonesia remains 
underdeveloped for digital technologies (Jurriëns and Tapsell 2017, 2) 
and thus not all Indonesians will be able to access the websites as intended 
by those who created them.
The emergence of the storytelling platforms on the 1965 violence should 
also be situated in a context where human rights issues remain highly 
contested. Discussing digital activism in the context of Papua, Postill 
and Saputro (2017) argue that digital technologies offer activists both 
a method to evade opposition from certain political and societal actors 
and a way to connect with like-minded people (Postill and Saputro 2017, 
139). The digital storytelling platforms on the 1965 violence certainly 
avoid some of the challenges that many civil society actors have recently 
faced in the public sphere when attempting to debate the 1965 violence 
(Setiawan 2016c). Similarly, through the stories that are published on the 
websites, they raise awareness, particularly to an audience that generally 
lacks such knowledge about the 1965 violence and its afterlife. In so doing, 
the storytelling platforms create a new and alternative space, where voices 
and views excluded from mainstream discourses can exist, where they are 
not subject to censorship and physical intimidation, and where people 
can potentially connect across local and national boundaries.
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Three generations removed: 
Grandchildren’s stories
In this section, I will discuss the stories of two grandchildren of the witness 
generation, Puri Lestari and Rangga Purbaya. Puri is the granddaughter 
of one of generals killed, while Rangga is the grandson of a member of 
a leftist organisation who was disappeared. Their stories illustrate their 
strong connection to an event that occurred before they were born, or 
postmemory, and the impact it has had on their families, thus providing 
insights into the afterlife of 1965.
Puri Lestari’s story Ini kan buku komunis? (Isn’t this a communist book?) 
appeared on Ingat65. The story gives an insight into the family of Mayor 
General Sutoyo, who was killed on the night of 30 September 1965. For 
Puri, 1965 is significant not only because of her grandfather’s fate, but also 
because of her father, Agus Widjojo. A reformist general, Widjojo was an 
open supporter of reconciliation (Kuddus 2017, 71) and in 2016 was one 
of the key drivers of the National Symposium. Yet, during Puri’s childhood 
1965 was barely spoken about. Despite the silence in the family, Puri was 
curious – particularly as a photo framed in her grandmother’s home also 
featured in a history textbook. But she did not ask any questions, especially 
after her mother warned her not to upset her father, described by Puri 
as ‘one of thousands, if not millions, who experienced fear, pain, anger, 
disappointment, sadness and trauma’. However, as a university student in 
Australia Puri read what her father called ‘communist books’ (the work 
of the late author and former political prisoner Pramoedya Ananta Toer) 
and learned about Indonesia’s human rights record. Studying abroad 
proved to be a turning point for Puri, with the 2008 Apology to Australia’s 
Stolen Generation15 offering an example how states can face their dark 
pasts and ask forgiveness. Accompanying her piece with a photo of her 
father  and her child, Puri concludes that it represents ‘his [Widjojo’s] 
motivation to make peace, move on, and attempt to address the 1965 
tragedy for Indonesia’s new generation’ (Lestari 2016).
An absent grandfather is also at the heart of Rangga Purbaya’s story 
Di  Mana  Kakek? (Where Is Grandpa?). Featured on 1965setiaphari, 
Rangga’s story concerns his grandfather Boentardjo Amaroen Kartowinoto, 
15  The Stolen Generation are Indigenous children who, between 1910 and 1970, were forcibly 
removed from their families as a result of various Australian Government policies.
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who was disappeared and presumably killed in 1965. In his essay, Rangga 
recalls his childhood visits to Yogyakarta and to his grandmother’s grave, 
a common practice for Javanese families. However, he never visited his 
grandfather’s grave, who, according to his father, was buried in Semarang. 
When Rangga was around eight years old, he looked at a family photo 
album with his father, finding a rather large picture of his grandfather. His 
father then told Rangga: ‘If you see this person, talk to him immediately. 
Tell him you are his grandson, the son of Bima!’ Surprised, Rangga asked 
his father ‘but hasn’t grandpa passed away?’ The question was not answered 
and Rangga did not pursue it, but he realised later why his father was 
silent: ‘[he] was always hoping to find grandpa alive’ (Purbaya 2016).
Both stories provide a glimpse into the intimate spaces of the family 
where the past continues to dwell. A striking resemblance between the 
two stories is that photographs of absent grandfathers triggered questions 
for both Puri and Rangga, illustrating that photographic images play 
a key role as a medium of postmemory (cf. Hirsch 2008, 115). The stories 
also illustrate the familial dimension of postmemory, as illustrated by 
the writers’ conversations with their parents. At the same time, it is also 
through photographs that both essays bring the past into the present day. 
Puri Lestari uses a photo of her father and her child to position herself, 
as well as her father, in the political debate on the 1965 case. While 
Rangga’s story does not have such an explicit message, his grandfather’s 
disappearance has played a key role in his work as photographer, in 
which images of family members, personal objects (i.e. his grandfather’s 
razor) and places (including sites of mass murder) prominently feature. 
As such, their stories and photographs also represent the affiliative aspect 
of postmemory, where past events transcend the space of the family and 
are shared in a larger context with contemporaries.
Through photos of their grandfathers, both Puri’s and Rangga’s stories 
evoke a sense of loss and the unknown. Puri’s story, in particular, mirrors 
the experience of many young Indonesians who learned not to question 
official history and who only encountered alternative narratives following 
the fall of the New Order, or when studying abroad. Similarly, silence 
is also present in the story of Rangga, who during the New Order was 
unsure what had happened to his grandfather. However, as soon as Suharto 
stepped down, his father informed him about his grandfather’s political 
affiliation.16 Their stories also raise the question of who was affected and 
16  Personal communication. 
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in what ways, as illustrated by Rangga’s father’s hope to find his father, and 
by Puri’s comment that her father – the son of one of the ‘Heroes of the 
Revolution’ – was one of many who suffered, while not part of the leftist 
movement. Both stories thus give insights into the complex legacies of 
mass violence that continue to touch lives, including of those who were 
born many years later and never knew their grandparents.
Conclusion
While Indonesian governments since the end of authoritarianism 
have made tentative steps to address the violence of 1965, these efforts have 
largely consisted of the enactment of laws and establishment of short-
term institutions. This legalistic but non-judicial approach has largely 
failed to address the societal legacies of the 1965 violence, which as this 
chapter has argued is a crucial aspect for both individuals and society to 
come to terms with the past.
The challenges of human rights reform in Indonesia, and particularly in 
the area of transitional justice, can largely be explained by the trajectory 
of democratisation that has been characterised by compromise and that 
has shielded those involved in human rights violations from being held 
accountable. In the area of human rights this has meant that while legal 
frameworks were established, their implementation leaves much to be 
desired. This can be attributed to the persistence of New Order elites 
that remain indifferent or even hostile towards transitional justice as 
a consequence of their political affiliations. The 1965 violence has been 
particularly complex in this context because the memory of the event was 
hijacked by the regime for its own political objectives. The argument that 
violence was justified in the interests of the nation, and by extension 
that thus there are no human rights issues to address, continues to 
command authority.
In this context, civil society actors have persistently challenged 
state narratives. They have made important contributions towards 
communicating the experiences of those who lived through the events of 
1965 in an effort to raise awareness and enhance societal support for the 
justice process. In considering the recent emergence of digital storytelling 
platforms on the 1965 violence, this chapter has argued that they have both 
emerged as a response to the increased presence of digital technologies in 
Indonesians’ lives, and the limited public space to discuss these events. 
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As such, through using digital technologies alternative public spaces have 
been created, where knowledge on the 1965 violence and its ramifications 
is generated and can be debated freely. What distinguishes the digital 
platforms discussed in this chapter from other civil society efforts 
is that they have given a specific space to the non-witness generation, 
descendants of those who were directly affected by the violence, to share 
their experiences and thoughts.
The stories discussed in this chapter illustrate the strong connection 
individuals have with an event that preceded their births. These 
postmemories thus resurrect a distant past, bringing it to the present. 
Their  stories evoke a sense of lives that were lost, families torn apart, 
silences and unanswered questions. In so doing, the stories not only 
seek to engage audiences with events that happened more than 50 years 
ago, but also enhance understanding of the deep scars that violence has 
inflicted on a society. As works of postmemory, the digital storytelling 
platforms are calling for a reconsideration of transitional justice beyond 
the paradigms of law and politics. Rather, a young generation is arguing 
that justice must be rooted in historical and social awareness, where the 
past can openly exist in the present.
Bibliography
Aspinall, Edward. 2010. ‘The Irony of Success’. Journal of Democracy 21 (2): 20–34. 
doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0157.
Brants, Chrisje. 2016. ‘Introduction’. In Transitional Justice: Images and Memories, 
edited by Chrisje Brants, Antoine Hol and Dina Siegel, 1–12. London and 
New York: Routledge.
Cammack, Mark. 2016. ‘Crimes against Humanity in East Timor. The Indonesian 
Ad Hoc Human Rights Court Hearings’. In Trials for International Crimes in 
Asia, edited by Kirsten Sellars, 191–225. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316221754.010.
Gómez-Barris, Macarena. 2009. Where Memory Dwells. Oakland: University of 
California Press.
Hadiprayitno, Irene. 2010. ‘Defensive Enforcement: Human Rights in Indonesia’. 
Human Rights Review 11: 373–399. doi.org/10.1007/s12142-009-0143-1.
79
3 . THE OMNIPRESENT PAST
Hadiz, Vedi and Richard Robison. 2013. ‘The Political Economy of Oligarchy 
and the Reorganisation of Power in Indonesia’. Indonesia 96: 35–57. doi.org/ 
10.1353/ind.2013.0023.
Hayner, Priscilla. 2001. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. 
Routledge: New York and London. doi.org/10.4324/9780203903452.
Hearman, Vannessa. 2014. ‘Spectre of Anti-Communist Smears Resurrected 
against Jokowi’. The Conversation, 4 July 2014.
Hirsch, Marianne. 2008. ‘The Generation of Postmemory’. Poetics Today 29 (1): 
103–128. doi.org/10.1215/03335372-2007-019.
The Jakarta Post. 2017. ‘Wiranto Backtracks on Harmony Council’s Purpose’. 
10 March 2017.
Jilovsky, Esther. 2015. Remembering the Holocaust: Generations, Witnessing and 
Place. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. doi.org/10.5040/9781474210942.
Jurriëns, Edwin and Ross Tapsell. 2017. ‘Challenges and Opportunities of the 
Digital ‘Revolution’ in Indonesia’. In Digital Indonesia: Connectivity and 
Divergence, edited by Edwin Jurriëns and Ross Tapsell, 1–18. Singapore: 
ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. doi.org/10.1355/9789814786003-007.
Kimura, Ehito. 2015. ‘The Struggle for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia’. Southeast Asian Studies 4 (1): 73–93.
Kuddus, Rohana. 2017. ‘The Ghosts of 1965. Politics and Memory in Indonesia’. 
New Left Review 104: 45–92.
Kurasawa, Fuyuki. 2007. The Work of Global Justice: Human Rights as Practices. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511 
619465.
Lestari, Puri. 2016. ‘“Ini kan buku komunis?” Kisah cucu pahlawan revolusi 
[“Isn’t This a Communist Book?” The Story of a Grandchild of a Hero of the 
Revolution]’. Medium, 20 April. Available at medium.com/ ingat-65/ini-kan-
buku-komunis-d39a72da473f#.vb1iyis0n (accessed 4 October 2017).
McEvoy, Kieran. 2007. ‘Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional 
Justice’. Journal of Law and Society 34 (4): 411–440. doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6478.2007.00399.x.
McGregor, Katharine E. 2013. ‘Mass Violence in the Indonesian Transition from 
Sukarno to Suharto’. Global Dialogue 15 (1): 133–144.
CIVIL SOCIETy AND TRANSITIONAL JuSTICE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
80
McGregor, Katharine E. and Jemma Purdey. 2016. ‘Indonesia Takes a Small 
but  Critical Step toward Reconciliation’. Indonesia at Melbourne (blog), 
26 April. Available at indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/indonesia-takes-
a-small-but-critical-step-toward-reconciliation/ (accessed 13 November 2019).
Posner, Eric A. and Adrian Vermeule. 2004. ‘Transitional Justice as Ordinary 
Justice’. Harvard Law Review 117 (3): 761–825. doi.org/10.2307/4093461.
Postill, John and Kurniawan Saputro. 2017. ‘Digital Activism in Contemporary 
Indonesia: Victims, Volunteers and Voices’. In Digital Indonesia: Connectivity 
and Divergence, edited by Edwin Jurriëns and Ross Tapsell, 127–145. Singapore: 
ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. doi.org/10.1355/9789814786003-014.
Purbaya, Rangga. 2016. ‘Di Mana Kakek? [Where is Grandpa?]’. #1965setiaphari, 
1 May. Available at 1965setiaphari.org/1965setiaphari/di-mana-kakek 
(accessed 4 October 2017).
Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia. 2015. ‘Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden 
Republik Indonesia Dalam Rangka HUT Ke-70 Proklamasi Kemerdekaan 
Republik Indonesia Di Depan Sidang Bersama DPR RI dan DPD RI, Jakarta 
14 Agustus 2015 [State Speech of the President of the Republic of Indonesia 
on the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Proclamation of  the 
Independence of the Republic of Indonesia at the Joint Session of the DPR 
RI and the DPD RI, Jakarta 14 August 2015]’, Transcript. Available at setkab.
go.id/pidato-kenegaraan-presiden-republik-indonesia-dalam-rangka-hut-ke-
70-proklamasi-kemerdekaan-republik-indonesia-di-depan-sidang-bersama-
dpr-ri-dan-dpd-ri-jakarta-14-agustus-2015/ (accessed 18 May 2017).
Setiawan, Ken. 2016a. ‘From Hope to Disillusion. The Paradox of Komnas HAM, 
the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission’. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, 
Land- en Volkenkunde 172: 1–32. doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17201002.
Setiawan, Ken. 2016b. ‘The Politics of Compromise’. Inside Indonesia 123 
(January–March). www.insideindonesia.org/the-politics-of-compromise-2.
Setiawan, Ken. 2016c. ‘The Fear of Communism Still Haunts Indonesia’. 
Indonesia at Melbourne (blog), 3 March. Available at indonesiaatmelbourne.
unimelb.edu.au/belok-kiri-fest-fear-of-communism-still-haunts-indonesia/ 
(accessed 13 November 2019).
Suh, Jiwon. 2016. ‘The Suharto Case’. Asian Journal of Social Science 44: 214–245. 
doi.org/10.1163/15685314-04401009.
Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi. 2007. ‘Politics of Justice and Reconciliation in Post-
Suharto Indonesia’. Journal of Contemporary Asia 37 (1): 73–94. doi.org/ 
10.1080/ 00472330601104623.
81
3 . THE OMNIPRESENT PAST
Voice of America. 2012. ‘Korban Peristiwa 1965–66 Kecewa dengan Kejakasaan 
Agung [Victims of the 1965–66 Event Disappointed with Attorney General]’, 
12 November.
Wahyuningroem, Sri Lestari. 2013. ‘Seducing for Truth and Justice: Civil Society 
Initiatives for the 1965 Mass Violence in Indonesia’. Journal of Current Southeast 
Asian Affairs 32 (3): 115–142. doi.org/10.1177/186810341303200306.
Warburton, Eve. 2016. ‘Jokowi and the New Developmentalism’. Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies 52 (3): 297–320. doi.org/10.1080/00074918.
2016.1249262.






The evolution of Cambodian 
civil society’s involvement 
with victim participation at the 
Khmer Rouge trials
Christoph Sperfeldt and Jeudy Oeung
In the scholarly literature on the role of civil society in transitional justice 
processes there seems to be broad agreement that civil society actors can 
make important contributions to these processes (Backer 2003; Duthie 
2009). However, the scope and nature of civil society’s involvement is 
rarely examined by way of more in-depth case studies. This chapter looks 
at the case of Cambodian non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs) 
involvement with victim participation at the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) with a view to examining civil society’s 
contributions in more detail.
The ECCC is a hybrid criminal court, combining national and 
international elements, established in 2003 through an agreement 
between the United Nations and the Cambodian Government. Based 
on Cambodia’s national law, the ECCC introduced provisions that allow 
victims of crime to participate in its proceedings as civil parties and thus 
beyond a role as a witness. Civil parties at the ECCC are considered 
parties to the proceedings with a range of participatory rights, including 
the right to request investigations (McGonigle Leyh 2011). It is this aspect 
of the ECCC’s mandate that attracted local NGOs’ attention. The influx 
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of development aid in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the  United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), at the beginning 
of the 1990s, led to the creation of a comparatively strong and diverse 
local NGO community in Cambodia (Hughes 2009; Dosch 2012). With 
the establishment of the ECCC, some of these local NGOs began to 
develop activities in support of the Khmer Rouge trials.
This chapter takes an evolutionary perspective in that it explores how local 
civil society engagement with the ECCC’s victim participation scheme 
has changed over time. Internationalised criminal trials often span a long 
time period. An evolutionary perspective allows capturing over time 
the dynamic development of different forms of NGO engagement with 
a  formal transitional justice mechanism, such as the ECCC. In doing 
so, the chapter builds upon and expands arguments, which have been 
published previously by the authors (Oeung 2016; Sperfeldt 2012a; 
Sperfeldt 2013a). The focus is here on Cambodian NGOs and their 
involvement with victim participation at the ECCC, and not on the 
contributions of the many international NGOs or other Cambodian 
NGOs’ work in related transitional justice areas.
The chapter begins by providing an overview of the four different phases 
of NGO engagement to date, and examines the various roles that these 
actors have progressively assumed in supporting and complementing 
the Court’s victim participation scheme. The case of the ECCC is an 
example of extensive NGO involvement, including in areas of the judicial 
process that would normally fall within the responsibility of a court. 
At a point where the ECCC’s trial proceedings in its second and largest 
case are coming to an end, this chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the opportunities and limitations that come with such wide-ranging 
NGO involvement.1
1  At the time of writing the ECCC is pursuing four cases – often referred to as Case 001, 002, 003 
and 004 – but only the first two cases have moved to the trial stage.
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The evolution of Cambodian civil society’s 
involvement with the ECCC’s victim 
participation scheme
Phase I: Advocacy and early outreach (2003–2007)
Following the Cambodian Government’s request to the United Nations 
in 1997 for assistance ‘in bringing to justice those persons responsible 
for genocide and crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer 
Rouge from 1975 to 1979’,2 it took years to negotiate this agreement 
and establish a tribunal. Throughout the negotiation process, Cambodian 
and international civil society organisations advocated for a survivor-
friendly tribunal. Once the ECCC started its operations in 2005/2006, 
discussions began within civil society regarding the future procedural 
rules of the Court (Acquaviva 2008). Cambodian NGOs showed a keen 
interest in this process. Members of the Cambodian Human Rights 
Action Committee (CHRAC),3 an umbrella organisation of Cambodian 
human rights NGOs, suggested that the ECCC’s Internal Rules include 
a  mechanism that might address the survivors’ suffering, arguing that 
such provisions would restore survivors’ dignity and provide recognition 
of what happened during the Khmer Rouge period (CHRAC 2005).
Many Cambodian NGOs spoke out in favour of a model where victims 
could participate as parties civiles, or civil parties – such a model, inspired 
by the French criminal code, also exists under Cambodian national law.4 
In May 2006, NGOs met with the Deputy Prime Minister Sok An and 
ECCC officials, and provided them with a list of recommendations 
favouring the incorporation of provisions for a civil party system in the 
ECCC Internal Rules (see Collectif pour les Victims des Khmer Rouges 
2006). These NGOs’ actions were guided by the belief that ‘victim 
participation will help bridge the gap between the Court and the people 
and will give victims a voice in this important process’ (CHRAC 2006, 7). 
2  Letter dated 21 June 1997 from the First and Second Prime Ministers of Cambodia addressed 
to the Secretary-General, republished in UN doc. A/51/930-S/1997/488 of 24 June 1997, Annex.
3  Established in 1994, CHRAC is coalition of 21 local NGOs working in the fields of human 
rights, democracy and legal aid in Cambodia.
4  Authors’ interview with Hisham Mousar, former project manager of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal 
Project at the Cambodian NGO ADHOC, Phnom Penh, 1 May 2013.
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On 12 June 2007, the Judges Plenary adopted Internal Rules that made 
the ECCC the first internationalised criminal court with a victim 
participation scheme based on the civil party model.5
Moreover, these NGOs emphasised the importance of an active role for 
civil society in any future victim participation process. CHRAC noted 
that ‘Cambodian NGOs are eager to assist the Court’ (CHRAC 2006, 9). 
Similar views were expressed by a number of ECCC officials. David Boyle, 
who was closely involved in the drafting of the Internal Rules, wrote in 
2006, ‘active participation by Khmer Rouge victims, aided by NGOs, will 
constitute one of the essential conditions for impartial and independent 
trials before the [ECCC]’ (emphasis added by the authors) (Boyle 2006, 
313). These remarks already foreshadowed the active role NGOs would 
play in the ECCC’s future victim participation scheme.
This account shows that civil society organisations played an instrumental 
role in advocating for the inclusion of victim participation into the 
Khmer Rouge trials. Considerations of local ownership and the potential 
legacy for Cambodia’s domestic judiciary led many, but not all, NGOs to 
speak out in favour of the civil party system. Moreover, the majority of 
these NGOs were motivated by the firm belief that victim participation 
could make a positive contribution to social reconstruction, healing and 
reconciliation among survivors and the Cambodian society at large.6
These expectations would remain hollow, however, if Cambodians were 
unaware of the Khmer Rouge trials. The Open Society Justice Initiative 
(OSJI) was one of the earliest proponents for comprehensive outreach to 
local populations. Considering the limited budget of the ECCC and the 
strength of local civil society, OSJI recommended:
[to] use existing NGOs already operating throughout the country 
to help with outreach. Existing non-governmental organizations 
have already established communication mechanisms with the 
people they serve. Establishing credibility and a positive working 
relationship with local NGOs will engender more trust with 
victims and witnesses (OSJI 2004).
5  ECCC Internal Rule 23 states that ‘the purpose of Civil Party action before the ECCC is to 
(a) participate in criminal proceedings against those responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ECCC by supporting the prosecution; and (b) allow victims to seek collective and moral 
reparations, as provided in this Rule’.
6  Also at author’s interview with Youk Chhang, Director of DC-Cam, 17 May 2013.
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OSJI called therefore on Cambodia’s main donors to ‘complement ECCC 
efforts with appropriate initiatives from civil society’ (OSJI  2006). By 
that time, Cambodian NGOs had already started to engage in outreach 
activities. A 2006 report found that nearly a dozen NGOs had ECCC-
related activities (Penh et al. 2006, 7). Cambodian NGOs, including 
the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), the Cambodian 
Association for Human Rights and Development (ADHOC) and 
CHRAC, had started with radio broadcasts about the Khmer Rouge 
trials as early as 2002 and further intensified their activities from 2005 
onwards. CHRAC added a monthly newsletter in Khmer language with 
information about the ECCC, while the Center for Social Development 
(CSD) began to organise public dialogue forums in Cambodia’s provinces. 
These outreach efforts demonstrate the enthusiasm among Cambodian 
NGOs about the Khmer Rouge trials, as well as the capacity to design new 
activities and raise funds in support of ECCC-related work. These and 
subsequent nationwide outreach activities also contributed to increasing 
awareness among the Cambodian population of the Khmer Rouge trials 
(Pham et al. 2011a, 21). Through their established relations of trust, 
NGOs had access to communities that would often be out of reach to 
official institutions, such as a temporary court. These outreach activities 
in turn laid the foundation for subsequent victim participation activities.7
Phase II: Extensive NGO support – limited ECCC 
capacity (2007–2009)
The ECCC struggled to keep pace with the developments during this 
formative phase. A victim participation process was initially not planned 
and not budgeted. The Victims Unit (later renamed as the Victims Support 
Section, VSS) began its operation with limited capacities in January 
2008. However, it took almost another two years, and only after receiving 
earmarked funding from the German Foreign Office, for the unit to be able 
to operate at a more considerable threshold (ECCC 2008). A new Practice 
Direction, issued by the ECCC in October 2007, provided a so-called 
‘Victim Information Form’, which survivors interested in participating in 
the trials had to complete. The complexity of the form combined with the 
lack of outreach indicated that most survivors, especially those residing in 
rural areas, would encounter considerable difficulties with filling in and 
submitting the form.
7  Interviews with Youk Chhang, 17 May 2013, and Leakhena Nou, 30 June 2013.
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Support to the application and participation process
Against this background, NGOs feared that only a few survivors 
would be able to participate. Following the announcement of the first 
indictments at the ECCC in 2007, these NGOs expanded their initial 
outreach activities to include information about victim participation 
at the ECCC. Eventually, around a dozen Cambodian NGOs became 
involved in different aspects of victim participation activities (Sperfeldt 
2013a, 348–350). Some of these local NGOs gradually assumed the role 
of ‘intermediaries’ between the ECCC and participating survivors. Such 
intermediary functions related initially to facilitating the application 
process and communication between the Court and victims.
The first three Cambodian intermediary NGOs that began assisting 
survivors with the application process from late 2007 onwards, were DC-
Cam, ADHOC and the Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID). After 
only a few months – by February 2008 – the ECCC’s Victims Unit had 
already received more than 600 applications, providing an indication of 
the capacity of NGO provincial outreach networks (CHRAC 2008). 
DC-Cam even set itself the ambitious goal of assisting more than 10,000 
survivors in submitting complaints to the ECCC (Kinetz and Yun 2008). 
These NGOs adapted their existing project structures for the purposes of 
ECCC-related outreach: DC-Cam undertaking provincial missions from 
their head office in Phnom Penh; ADHOC making use of its extensive 
provincial office network; and KID mobilising its provincial volunteer 
network.
There was no doubt that for many non–legally trained intermediary staff, 
the process was a steep learning curve. The challenges were particularly 
acute during the application process, where NGOs struggled with the 
difficult victim information form. The completeness of forms submitted 
by NGOs varied greatly, although the quality improved over time. 
This situation was exacerbated by a lack of guidance from the ECCC, 
requiring many intermediary NGOs to go back and forth between 
applicants and the Court to seek supplementary information or further 
proof of identity.8 Yet, through their intermediary role, Cambodian 
NGOs established important channels of communication between the 
Court and the participating survivors. In doing so, they helped to bridge 
the gap between the majority of survivors who reside in rural areas and 
8  Interview with Long Panhavuth, 27 May 2013.
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the ECCC. Youk Chhang, Director of DC-Cam, argues that ‘it created 
a space for the victims to walk through, come to the court … it creates 
communication lines with the court. This, to me, can be considered a 
success’.9
In early 2008, the ECCC recognised the first civil parties who now 
sought legal representation. Following inquiries by civil party applicants 
and NGOs, the ECCC administration declared that it did not intend 
to establish a legal aid scheme for civil parties (Kinetz and Prak 2008). 
In a country where most survivors lacked the means and an appropriate 
education to follow the proceedings by themselves, this would be 
a major obstacle to active participation (Thomas and Chy 2009). Local 
intermediary organisations, fearing that civil parties were not able to 
exercise their right to participate, reached out to local legal aid NGOs, 
such as the Cambodian Defenders Project (CDP) and Legal Aid of 
Cambodia (LAC) (Sperfeldt, Oeung and Hong 2010). These Cambodian 
lawyers, often in conjunction with international pro bono lawyers, began 
representing the first civil parties before the ECCC.
These NGOs and individual lawyers used their involvement to direct 
attention to issues that were initially neglected by the ECCC, including 
sexual and gender-based violence as well as crimes against minority 
populations (Nguyen and Sperfeldt 2014). For instance, NGOs were 
crucial in working with civil party lawyers in getting the ECCC to 
investigate the crime of forced marriage and include it as part of the 
indictment (Studzinsky 2012). One of the most innovative non-judicial 
NGO activities was the so-called ‘women’s hearing’ initiated by the 
NGO CDP (Ye 2014). Thus, local NGOs and their collaboration with 
lawyers and survivor groups were essential in complementing the ECCC’s 
investigative activities and painting a more complete historical account of 
the crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge regime.
Against the background of a growing backlog of unprocessed forms at 
the Victims Unit, considerable delay in notifying applicants of the status 
of their applications and the lack of a court-funded legal aid scheme, 
a number of Cambodian NGOs decided that they needed to bring their 
engagement to another level. The main concern cited by NGO workers was 
that many Khmer Rouge survivors would lose out on the opportunity to 
be part of the ECCC process. Yet coordination among NGOs was difficult 
9  Cited from interview with Youk Chhang, 17 May 2013.
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(Oeung 2012, 40). NGOs are by their nature independent organisations, 
each with their specific goals and approaches. The only systematic 
effort of coordination among NGOs took place within the CHRAC 
network and its extended membership. CHRAC’s member organisations 
established a coordinated support scheme for victim participation.10 
The support scheme consisted of three components: assisting interested 
survivors with completing and submitting the ECCC Victim Information 
Form;11 sending these forms to the CHRAC Secretariat, as focal point 
for quality control and coordination; and offering legal representation to 
unrepresented civil parties, through two legal aid member organisations 
and in collaboration with international pro bono lawyers (see Figure 4.1).12
Figure 4.1: Chart of the CHRAC Support Scheme.
Source: Oeung and Sperfeldt (2010) .
10  These coordination efforts were influenced positively by the fact that a number of local NGOs 
engaged in ECCC-related work and received funding through a comprehensive donor support 
program, implemented by the German Development Service (DED, later merged into GIZ).
11  These NGOs included the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), 
the Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID), the Center for Social Development (CSD, whose 
responsibilities were later carried on by the Center for Justice and Reconciliation, CJR) and the Khmer 
Kampuchea Krom Human Rights Association (KKKHRA).
12  The legal aid organisations were the Cambodian Defenders Project (CDP) and Legal Aid of 
Cambodia (LAC). Two lawyers from each organisation were involved in representing civil parties 
before the ECCC, often in partnership with various international pro bono lawyers. In addition, 
CDP lawyers later specialised in representing victims of gender-based violence. The only other NGO 
providing a continuous presence of two Cambodian lawyers was Avocats Sans Frontiers (ASF) France.
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Figure 4.2: Accumulated submissions by CHRAC of ECCC Victim 
Information Forms.
Source: Oeung and Sperfeldt (2010) .
From its inception in March 2008 until the deadline for Case 002 civil 
party applications in December 2009, more than 4,440 applications 
were submitted to the VSS through the CHRAC support scheme 
(see  Figure  4.2, Oeung and Sperfeldt 2010). The majority of those 
applicants were female (63 per cent), and more than 60 per cent applied 
for civil party status, with the rest submitting general complaints. Based on 
statistics provided by the VSS, an estimated 60 per cent of all application 
forms were submitted to the VSS through the CHRAC support scheme 
and its member organisations.
Data from the VSS confirm the prominent role played by NGOs 
in facilitating the victim participation process at the ECCC. Of the 
more than 8,200 victim information forms received by the VSS in 
Case 002 in total, more than 80 per cent were submitted through NGO 
intermediaries (ECCC OCIJ 2010, para. 11). Apart from the Cambodia-
based intermediaries, outreach among the Cambodian diaspora has also 
contributed to this achievement.13
In response to a perceived lack of ECCC capacities, many intermediary 
NGOs gradually expanded their involvement with the victim 
participation process, taking on ever greater responsibilities. Initial 
straightforward outreach projects developed into more comprehensive 
victim support programs including activities such as notifying survivors 
of the status of their applications, facilitating legal representation for 
civil parties and supporting civil parties with travel and other logistics 
13  Interview with Leakhena Nou, Phnom Penh, 30 June 2013.
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(Sperfeldt  2013a,  350–351). These NGOs simply had not anticipated 
that, after the initial application stage, they would be left to deal with 
numerous follow-up activities, which they had expected to fall within the 
responsibility of the Court.
NGOs at their zenith – comprehensive support in Case 001
The ECCC’s first trial in Case 001 against Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, 
proved to be the zenith of NGO support to victim participation. More 
than 90 civil parties in Case 001 benefited from various forms of NGO 
assistance ranging from help with their application and visits to the 
ECCC, to facilitating legal representation and arranging meetings with 
their lawyers. All civil parties eventually found a legal representative, with 
little assistance from the Court and mostly through NGO facilitation. 
These lawyers often worked on a pro bono basis and had no further 
resources available to meet with their clients. It was left to NGOs to 
organise regular meetings between lawyers and their clients and to provide 
support for civil parties and other victims who wished to attend the trial 
hearings. This presence in the courtroom throughout the trial hearings 
increased understanding among civil parties of the issues at trial and 
provided a forum for consultations.
In addition, psychological care through Cambodian mental health 
workers  of the local NGO Transcultural Psychosocial Organization 
(TPO) assisted in minimising negative side effects from the participation 
process (Strasser et al. 2011a). As the ECCC did not retain any in-house 
counselling capacity, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
TPO, making the NGO responsible for providing mental health services 
to survivors participating in the Court’s proceedings. Working in close 
cooperation with the VSS and the Witness and Expert Support Unit, TPO 
counsellors delivered psychological support to approximately 90  civil 
parties and 31 witnesses during the trial of Case 001 (Strasser et al. 2011b).
Cambodian NGOs’ engagement with victim participation in Case 001 
showed how far-reaching NGO support can be, as well as the extent to 
which an internationalised criminal court has ultimately relied on such 
assistance. The fact that some NGOs assumed roles as intermediaries 
compensated, to some extent, for the lack of preparedness and services 
from the ECCC in this phase. In a study conducted among civil parties 
who testified at the trial in Case 001, ‘all of the civil parties said that their 
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primary connection to the court was not through the Victims Unit but 
through their lawyers and local NGOs’ (Stover, Balthazard and Koenig 
2011, 14).
There is evidence of a correlation between extensive NGO support to 
victim participation and the attitudes of civil parties to the justice 
process as a whole. A survey conducted by Pham and colleagues among 
Cambodian civil parties in Case 001, found that 63 per cent of the 
respondents felt ‘extremely’ supported by NGOs during the application 
process, and 68 per cent received information from NGOs at least 
once a month (Pham et al. 2011b, 273–277). The authors of this study 
conclude that ‘despite some disappointments in the Duch trial outcomes, 
civil parties felt positive about their overall participation, suggesting the 
importance of that process’ (Pham et al. 2011b, 284–285). These results 
highlight the importance of support services to enable a satisfactory 
participation process.
Phase III: Decrease in NGO capacity – more ECCC 
activities (2010–2013)
Prior to the beginning of the ECCC’s second trial in Case 002 the 
balance between NGO and ECCC activities began to shift. A steady 
decline of NGO support was accompanied by an expansion of capacity 
at the ECCC. A number of reasons may explain these changes, including 
(i) a  rebalancing in the flow of external donor funding, with further 
earmarked funding allowing the VSS to expand its activities, while donor 
funding to NGOs saw a considerable decrease;14 (ii) a recognition among 
ECCC officials that the Court had to deliver some minimal victim 
support measures in view of the large number of civil parties participating 
in Case 002, most visibly manifested in the fact that the ECCC now 
provided a limited legal aid capacity for unrepresented civil parties; and 
(iii) organisational changes among NGOs, with some organisations ceasing 
their operations,15 accompanied by frustration among intermediaries 
about the limited progress in enhancing the collaboration between the 
Court and NGOs.
14  The German Government extended its earmarked funding to the VSS twice, while larger 
EU-funded projects to ADHOC and KID came to an end, without replacement at a similar level.
15  CSD, and later CJR, and KKKHRA ceased their ECCC-related operations sometime in 2009 
and 2010.
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Paradoxically, this decline in NGO activities occurred in a context of 
growing needs with almost 4,000 civil parties now requiring support 
for their participation in Case 002. The major donors to the ECCC 
showed little far-sightedness when they cut their complementary 
funding to civil society in the midst of ongoing trials and with little 
coordination among themselves – eventually donor fatigue prevailed.16 
In response to these constraints, some NGOs decided to scale back and 
consolidate their activities. During the trial of Case 002, NGO support 
was, by and large, limited to two larger intermediaries, ADHOC and 
DC-Cam, complemented by specialised NGO programs for vulnerable 
victim groups, such as victims of gender-based violence and those from 
minorities.17
Against these odds, and considering the much larger number of 
participating victims in Case 002, some NGOs became inventive. 
ADHOC amended its victim support scheme and devised, in 2010, 
a countrywide network for the approximately 1,800 civil parties that had 
applied through the NGO. From among these civil parties, the NGO 
identified so-called civil party representatives (CPRs), who were directly 
involved in the communication process. These CPRs benefited from 
capacity-building and served as focal points in their respective geographic 
area, where they facilitated communication with ADHOC, the ECCC 
and lawyers. This network not only empowered survivors by directly 
involving them in participation activities, it also represented the most 
comprehensive communication effort with civil parties during the trial 
phase of Case 002/01, from 2011 to 2014, covering nearly half of all civil 
parties before the ECCC (Balthazard 2013).
Although Cambodian NGOs supported ECCC victim participation 
with a high level of good will, care should be taken, however, to avoid 
underestimating the divergences within the relationship between NGOs 
and survivors – particularly when NGO representatives claim to speak on 
behalf of victims. Even though NGOs and survivor groups often share 
a number of common objectives, they are rarely unified in their opinions 
16  The only continuous donor program around the ECCC with a focus on civil society was 
implemented, since 2007, by the German Development Service’s Civil Peace Service Program and 
later continued under the auspices of the GIZ.
17  CDP was able to expand its support for victims of gender-based violence, while LAC maintained 
a small support project for Khmer Krom and ethnic Vietnamese minority civil parties. DC-Cam 
continued to implement a special project for the Cham population.
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and attitudes. Nascent victim associations, such as Ksem Ksan, struggled 
to find a foothold in Cambodia’s competitive civil society sector and were 
often left to fend for themselves.
Despite the decrease in funding, Cambodian NGOs involved in the 
ECCC’s victim participation scheme continued their advocacy around 
victims’ rights. NGOs organised numerous advocacy events and radio 
call-in shows. During the phase from 2010 to 2013, many Cambodian 
NGOs stepped up their advocacy especially regarding the ECCC’s 
collective reparations mandate with the aim of achieving more tangible 
outcomes for the participating survivors.
Phase IV: NGO engagement with collective 
reparations (2014–2018)
The most recent phase saw a further decline in NGO outreach capacities 
– ADHOC’s vital civil party representative scheme ended its operations 
in 2015, citing a lack of sufficient donor support. Suddenly, half of the 
civil parties before the ECCC were cut off from their most important 
platform for information and engagement with the trials. The combined 
decrease in support to outreach and to non-ECCC Cambodian lawyers, 
who nominally still represented the majority of civil parties, left many 
civil parties without the ability to contact their lawyers (Oeung 2016). 
Sporadic ECCC provincial outreach fora never fully compensated for the 
waning NGO support. As a result, many civil parties know little about 
the proceedings in Case 002 (Sperfeldt, Hyde and Balthazard 2016).
While activities that had dominated a decade of NGO involvement with 
the Khmer Rouge trials were gradually coming to an end, NGO interest 
in the ECCC’s evolving collective reparations scheme was on the rise. 
Alongside the International Criminal Court (ICC), the ECCC is one 
of the few internationalised criminal courts with a reparations mandate 
(Sperfeldt 2012b). The ECCC’s Internal Rule 23 limits the scope of 
reparations in that civil parties are only allowed to seek ‘collective and 
moral reparations’, thus excluding individual reparations. In 2010, ECCC 
judges amended the Internal Rules with a view to providing for more 
flexibility in designing and implementing collective reparations measures 
in relation to Case 002 and beyond. The Internal Rules now empower the 
VSS to identify and design projects, which give effect to the reparations 
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awards sought by civil parties.18 The rules specifically mention that 
the VSS can collaborate with NGOs in developing and implementing 
such projects.
Local NGOs and survivors alike have put much hope in the reparations 
process, and it is foreseeable that the ECCC will not be able to satisfy 
all expectations. After a slow start, a number of Cambodian NGOs 
began working with the VSS to see a few symbolic measures materialise. 
At the preparatory stages for Case 002, these NGOs provided space for 
discussions, facilitated input from external stakeholders, and submitted 
multiple proposals to the Court with the aim of exploring options for 
the implementation of collective reparations (Sperfeldt and Winodan 
2009). Moreover, intermediary NGOs’ support was vital for facilitating 
consultations with civil parties about their preferences for collective 
reparations measures. The result of these consultations fed into the 
consolidated reparations request in Case 002, where civil parties requested 
measures in relation to remembrance and memorialisation, rehabilitation, 
documentation and education, and a few other projects (Kirchenbauer 
et al. 2013, 38–44).
From the 13 reparations projects proposed by the civil parties in Case 
002/01, 10 projects involved NGOs as implementers and some projects 
were associated with initiatives from the Cambodian diaspora. External 
donors contributed more than US$770,000 to the 11 reparations projects 
ultimately recognised by the Trial Chamber in Case 002/01. Both the 
ECCC and the NGOs benefited from this arrangement: the Court was 
able to take credit for almost a dozen reparations projects it could never 
have implemented on its own, and NGOs were able to improve their 
standing and raise additional funding. The relative ‘success’ of this scheme 
meant that more NGOs became involved – further broadening NGO 
participation in Case 002/02 reparations projects beyond the group of 
NGOs that had engaged in ECCC-related work over the first decade of the 
tribunal’s existence. Considering the lack of outreach capacities, however, 
the impact of these reparations initiatives on survivors is less certain.
NGOs’ involvement with this type of restorative and rehabilitative work 
has expanded the possibilities of the ECCC’s legacy, especially in the 
fields of memory culture, documentation and education. For instance, 
DC-Cam is building a new genocide education and research hub – the 
18  ECCC Internal Rules 12bis (2) and (3), and Rule 23quinquies.
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Sleuk Rith Institute – while smaller NGOs, such as Youth for Peace and 
Kdei Karuna, work with youth and community-based approaches in 
promoting storytelling, art projects and exhibitions to learn about and 
remember Khmer Rouge atrocities. Many of these projects have a pilot 
character and provide valuable lessons for future up-scaling in a post-
ECCC memory and education environment (Oeung 2016, 120).
Harnessing civil society involvement in 
official transitional justice mechanisms
By complementing a purely retributive justice process with some 
restorative justice elements, transitional justice mechanisms like the 
ECCC have created both new opportunities and challenges for the 
institutions involved and the participating survivors (McGonigle Leyh 
2009). In particular, the participation of a large number of survivors 
creates demand for a whole range of associated services that may exceed 
a court’s resources or expertise. In some contexts, local civil society may 
be well positioned to support victim participation and serve some of the 
many demands of complex participation schemes.
The ECCC provides a case for studying extensive NGO support to victim 
participation in an official transitional mechanism (Hermann 2010). The 
observations in this chapter suggest that courts should be encouraged 
to utilise the comparative advantage of local civil society organisations, 
including their knowledge of the local context, proximity to target 
populations and their generally less cost-intensive activities. In relation 
to the ECCC, Pham and colleagues recommended that ‘NGOs who have 
been the backbone of victim participation should be further supported 
and recognized in their role as intermediaries between the court and the 
victims’ (Pham et al. 2011b, 285).
Thus, while reaching out to civil society appears advantageous, the 
observations in this chapter also suggest that such an engagement with 
actors outside the courts requires a more structured collaborative process. 
No strategic approach to collaboration developed between the ECCC 
and intermediary NGOs.19 Sporadic meetings between the VSS and 
intermediary NGOs were only replaced at the beginning of 2010 by more 
19  Interviews with Long Panhavuth, 27 May 2013, and Youk Chhang, 17 May 2013.
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regular outreach coordination meetings with the ECCC Public Affairs 
Section. The Court simply failed to recognise that it would benefit from 
playing a lead role in coordinating NGO activities of relevance to  the 
implementation of its mandate on victim participation. As a result, 
the civil party process lacked a joint outreach and victim strategy from the 
ECCC and civil society (ICTJ 2010, 11–18).
Stover and colleagues therefore suggest that ‘it may even behove courts to 
formalize their relationship with such NGOs and facilitate the creation of 
an official or unofficial network of local organizations to meet the needs 
of victim participants’ (Stover, Balthazard and Koenig 2011, 43). Courts 
need to develop a forward-looking approach towards collaboration with 
civil society and states, lead the planning process and, where necessary, 
assist with capacity-building. Such an approach to collaboration would 
ultimately contribute to making victim participation and outreach 
processes more efficient. In view of increasing workloads with large-scale 
victim participation and stagnant budgets, it may even be one of the few 
avenues available to implement a court’s mandate in these areas (Sperfeldt 
2013b, 1111–1137).
Yet, the evolutionary perspective applied in this chapter has also shown 
that this will not be possible, if transnational justice donors – domestic 
or international – do not begin with rebalancing their assistance. This 
is best illustrated by the fact that only 9 per cent of international 
assistance to transitional justice in Cambodia between 2002 and 2012 
was going to civil society, while the ECCC absorbed US$250 million 
in the same time period – around 91 per cent of that assistance (Arthur 
and Yakinthou 2015, 6). Thus, even if local NGOs engage in advance 
planning and offer more coordinated support activities, they ultimately 
cannot guarantee the continuation and reliability of these services. Such 
decisions remain in the hands of mostly external donors who have to 
deal with fiscal uncertainties and often do not display the endurance 
required by lengthy internationalised criminal justice processes. NGOs’ 
dependency on external funds ultimately proved to be their Achilles heel. 
It also introduced dynamics that were not always driven by the needs of 
the victim participation process, but instead by the availability of funds 
and changing donor priorities.
While many donors question the sustainability of longer-term civil society 
engagement, they have not shown that sole reliance on state-centric 
approaches delivers better or locally more relevant outcomes. Diversifying 
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transitional justice initiatives among multiple actors in society may 
assist with spreading risks and opportunities, as well as mobilising 
greater segments of the population to engage with transitional justice 
mechanisms and thereby increasing local ownership of their outcomes. 
Such an approach may produce more positive and sustainable legacies 
than temporary mechanisms, including internationalised courts, can 
achieve on their own.
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Showing now: The Bophana 
Audiovisual Resource Centre 
and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia1
Rachel Hughes
The Bophana Centre is an audiovisual archive, a training centre and 
a venue for free film screenings in the centre of Phnom Penh, capital of 
Cambodia. The centre was founded in 2006 by two Cambodian film-
makers, Rithy Panh and Pannakar Ieu.2 In the same year, the United 
Nations–supported Khmer Rouge Tribunal – formally the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) – was also established in 
Phnom Penh. Although vastly different initiatives, the organisation and 
tribunal share a concern to work towards some form of justice for victims 
of Khmer Rouge crimes and to foster dialogue about how to constitute 
a better present and future in light of this and other historical conflicts in 
the country.
1  The fieldwork that forms the basis of this chapter was conducted in Cambodia in November 
2016–January 2017 and June 2017 and was funded by an Australian Research Council Discovery 
Early Career Research Award [DE160100501].
2  Originally trained in France, Ieu had assisted King Sihanouk’s film-making in the heyday of 
Cambodian film-making from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s (Ly and Muan 2001, 150). At the time 
he co-founded Bophana, Ieu was responsible for the cinematic division of the Ministry of Culture and 
Fine Arts (Jarvis 2015, 528).
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This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted in and around the ECCC 
between late 2011 and early 2017. It introduces the work of the Bophana 
Centre as a unique Cambodian organisation and critically explores its 
relationship to the ECCC in the wider context of what is generally termed 
Cambodian civil society. It argues that the practices fostered at Bophana 
are ontologically and epistemologically at variance with transitional 
justice theory and practice. The creative labour of Bophana’s film- and 
app-makers is cultural, material and relational. These kinds of practices 
have seen Bophana play a key role in the outreach and reparation activities 
of the ECCC, and in turn has changed the nature of these activities.
Ten years after its inception, Bophana is a relatively large and well-
organised NGO, with both international and Cambodian-based donors 
and upwards of 25 paid staff. Its exhibitions, public events and weekly 
film screenings are well-attended. The Centre’s Hanuman audiovisual 
archive (of film and audio material produced in or about Cambodia) is 
an excellent resource for students and researchers, being well-organised, 
centrally located in Phnom Penh and free to access. Conferences hosted 
by the centre also aim wide – to ‘better understand Cambodian history, its 
culture, architecture, traditions [and] current challenges [as well as] image 
analysis and film-making’ (Bophana 2016).
Counter to the exclusively project-based, developmentalist approaches 
of many NGOs in Cambodia, Bophana offers a long-term, modest, 
creative arts–based program of action, with some supplementary project 
work. The usual subjects of international development interventions and 
transitional justice in Cambodia – what Alexander Hinton identifies in 
his critical analysis of Cambodian transitional justice as ‘victims [who] 
remain wounded and unhealed, awaiting rescue’ (see Hinton 2013, 191) 
– are not found at Bophana. Rather, the centre emphasises shared creative 
labour, questioning of and dialogue about the past, and film appreciation. 
In and through this organisation, film-making and film-screening practices 
assemble diverse subjects, objects and affects. In this chapter, I first offer 
some observations about Bophana’s prominent co-founder, Rithy Panh, 
before turning to the unique relationship between Bophana and the 
ECCC in the context of more than a decade of so-called transitional 
justice and civil society activity in Cambodia.
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Rithy Panh
Rithy Panh was 12 years old when the Khmer Rouge came to power on 
17 April 1975. He was forced from Phnom Penh to work as a farmer in 
Battambang in the country’s north. He suffered greatly from starvation 
and  illness due to overwork during the following years and lost many 
family members, including both his parents and his siblings. After the 
Khmer Rouge were ousted in 1979, Panh travelled to the Thailand–
Cambodia border and was eventually resettled in Grenoble, France 
(Jarvis  2015, 527). After trying his hand at woodcarving, he studied 
film-making. He made 18 films between 1989 and 2016. Many of 
these films take a specific geographical place of personal (and also wider 
Cambodian) experience as their documentary subject matter. His 1989 
film, Site 2, returns to life in the Cambodia–Thailand border camps, while 
his 2002 film, S-21: The Khmer Rouge Killing Machine, details the horror 
of a high school-turned-security centre in Phnom Penh. An earlier film 
of Panh’s – Bophana: A Cambodian Tragedy (1996) – traced the fate of 
two young lovers, one of whom, a young woman named Bophana, was 
eventually interrogated, tortured and killed at the S-21 complex. Bophana 
has now lent her name to the Centre, and her painted portrait hangs 
in the main stairwell that takes visitors and staff from the street to the 
first-floor digital archive.
Of Panh’s larger body of work, comparative literature scholar Panivong 
Norindr argues that it is:
through the sounds of everyday life and ‘filmed speech’ [that] 
Rithy Panh succeeds in bringing to the fore, and through the voice 
of putatively unsophisticated subjects, some of the most tragic and 
under-acknowledged truths of our time (Norindr 2010, 189).
It is also true that the element of filmed silence or ‘non-speech’ has 
contributed to Panh’s popularly acknowledged title of ‘Cambodia’s 
greatest living film-maker’. Helen Jarvis adds that Panh’s films and books 
contribute ‘penetrating silences’ (Jarvis 2015). Some of the most affecting 
of these are silences between speech, when a subject of his film cannot or 
does not speak. However, media scholar Dierdre Boyle’s characterisation 
of Panh’s work as ‘shattering [official] silence’, may be misplaced praise. It is 
not true that ‘official silence’ followed the Khmer Rouge regime, because 
the successor state in Cambodia – the People’s Republic of Kampuchea – 
initiated multiple forms of public memory about the genocide. As well, 
speech and silence, like memory, is culturally specific. As Carol Kidron 
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argues in relation to silence in Canadian–Cambodian intergenerational 
interaction, ‘the lived experience of the silent or silenced past may not 
always be politically motivated, performed as acts of resistance, or as 
capitulation to hegemonic indoctrination’ (Kidron 2012, 726–727; see 
also Kent 2016). Panh himself has explained one moment in his film S-21 
where his subject had no words with which to explain his past events:
I told [one former Khmer Rouge guard] ‘you can complete your 
words by showing me what happened’ … I just try to take the 
memory out of the body, what your body keeps, what your body 
feels (Panh and Bataille 2012, 41).
Such scenes in S-21 nonetheless complete more than words. Filmed 
gestures, of former perpetrators especially, complete – in the sense of join 
up – viewing and embodied memory. This ‘being shown’ is more intimate, 
and more shocking, than ‘being told’. Although film critics and scholars 
have lauded such scenes, terming them ‘re-enactments’, Panh has stated 
that the term ‘re-enactment’ ‘is not the right word’ for his work (Panh in 
Oppenheimer 2016, 244).
Panh is probably best known outside of Cambodia for his 2013 film 
The Missing Picture, which won 10 international film awards, including 
at the Cannes and Toronto Film Festivals. The Missing Picture takes as 
its starting point and abiding challenge the absence or impossibility of 
‘a picture’ of Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia, particularly an evidentiary 
photograph. In an English-language trailer a narrator states: ‘I seek my 
childhood like a lost picture, or rather it seeks me’. In a French version, 
it is stated:
For many years … I have been looking for the missing picture: 
a photograph taken between 1975 and 1979 by the Khmer Rouge 
when they ruled over Cambodia … On its own, of course, an 
image cannot prove mass murder … I searched for it vainly in 
the archives, in old papers, in the country villages of Cambodia. 
Today I know: this image must be missing … So I created it … 
(Panh 2013).
The film supplements historical footage with images and sequences of 
painted miniature clay figures – the work of sculptor Mang Sarith – set 
in dioramas. These figures populate and animate a remembered rather 
than recorded past. The scenes show rather than tell of life under 
Khmer Rouge rule; though poignant and incriminating, they avoid 
simplistic indictments.
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Bophana and the ECCC
Bophana has been one of many NGOs to assist Cambodia’s 
internationalised  tribunal, the ECCC (see Sperfeldt 2013). Following 
a  Memorandum of Understanding between itself and the tribunal, 
Bophana has provided audiovisual support for the legal outreach activities 
of the Public Affairs Section (PAS) of the tribunal. Since 2009, the PAS 
has been running a specific legal outreach program known as the Khmer 
Rouge Study Tour (hereafter Study Tour). The first part of a Study 
Tour involves PAS officers travelling from Phnom Penh to a provincial 
city, town or village to hold a Memory Night of film screenings and 
presentations about the ECCC. Bophana technicians travel with PAS 
staff to the location of the Memory Night, usually a central, open-air, 
public space. There they erect a large white screen, locate a power source 
and set up the film projector and recruit speakers necessary for the PAS 
presentations and film screenings (see Figure 5.1).
Later that night or the next morning, the community is invited to board 
free buses to Phnom Penh (see Figure 5.2), taking in the Tuol Sleng 
Genocide Museum (the former S-21 site), the Choeung Ek ‘killing field’ 
memorial and the ECCC itself (see Elander 2012). The PAS outreach 
staff, accompanied by Bophana staff, have taken the Study Tour to scores 
of provincial communities, and tens of thousands of Cambodians have 
subsequently passed through the ECCC Public Gallery to observe or hear 
about the work of the tribunal. In this way, Bophana is facilitating larger 
ECCC outreach efforts to inform and engage Cambodians in a legal 
process that is unfolding, for a great many people, in distant chambers.
Bophana has also played a key role in ECCC outreach by way of its 
development of the audiovisual materials that are screened at the Study 
Tour Memory Nights. Bophana has produced a short Khmer-language 
film for children, The Hermit and the Tiger, which uses animal characters 
(played by child actors) to tell the story of a quest for justice. This film 
is shown early in the night’s proceedings, so that children might see it 
before they fall asleep on mats and laps. Both of the award-winning 
documentaries that are routinely shown as the main feature at Memory 
Nights – About My Father (2010) and Red Wedding (2012) – were directed 
or co-directed by Bophana-trained film-makers and produced by Bophana. 
Both films follow women victims of the Khmer Rouge – Phung-Guth 
Sunthary in About My Father, and Pen Sochan in Red Wedding. Painful 
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events, including gender-based and sexual violence in the form of forced 
marriage, are remembered or uncovered in the films as these women 
participate in cases before the ECCC.
Figure 5.1: Bophana technicians and PAS staff setting up for an outdoor 
ECCC Memory Night in Kompong Chhnang, Cambodia.
Source: Photo by author .
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Figure 5.2: Free ECCC outreach bus taking villagers from Kompong 
Chhnang to Phnom Penh.
Source: Photo by author .
About My Father and Red Wedding have been received by critics as being 
‘in the tradition of Rithy Panh’ (Chan in Titi-Fontaine 2013). One of the 
co-directors of Red Wedding has said in interview that Panh taught her ‘to 
be especially close to … characters and to go deep into the questioning 
of subjects’ (Chan in Titi-Fontaine 2013). Lida Chan’s statement speaks 
to a learned empathic intimacy as a means for eliciting words or gestures 
from her subjects. To capture ‘many voices’ or ‘penetrating silences’, one 
must be ‘close’ and ‘go deep into the questioning’. To fully understand 
Bophana’s work in and around the Memory Nights, however, recognition 
must be given to the organisation’s critical familiarity with colonial and 
neo-colonial cinematic traditions in Cambodia.
Film screening
Public screening of films to Cambodian audiences, in both urban 
and village settings, dates back to at least the early twentieth century. 
Cambodia scholars Daravuth Ly and Ingrid Muan note that cinema 
first arrived in Cambodia during the French protectorate period, and 
historian Penny Edwards reports that by 1916 a small cinema catered to 
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Phnom Penh’s 1,600 Europeans (Edwards 2007, 59). A General Mission 
of Cinema of the colonial Government of Indochina reportedly passed 
through the country in 1917–18, screening to Cambodian audiences in 
open-air venues (see Ly and Muan 2001, 143). Two striking images in Ly 
and Muan’s book depict the General Mission ‘in the field’. One of these 
images shows a group of men raising a large outdoor screen – white fabric 
stretched taut inside a frame of bamboo poles (see Figure 5.3). A similar 
object is used by Bophana technicians at present-day Memory Nights. 
Although the technology of film production and projection has changed 
enormously, the kinds of objects onto which images are projected – large, 
portable, open-air screens – are largely unchanged.
Figure 5.3: The General Mission of Cinema of the colonial Government 
of Indochina setting up for an outdoor screening.
Source: Image courtesy of Daravuth Ly and Ingrid Muan .
Little is known of the actual films shown during this General Mission, but 
the use of film as a method of pacification and propaganda-dissemination 
was gaining traction in the French empire at the time (see Slavin 2001, 59). 
Four to five decades on, after Cambodia gained independence from France 
in 1954, the United States Information Service (USIS) ‘cinecars’ travelled 
through the country projecting films on American life, health, education 
and contemporary domestic and foreign affairs to village audiences (Ly 
and Muan 2001, 145).
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These accounts confirm that Cambodian audiences – like many other 
populations in colonial and Cold War South-East Asia – have long been 
audiovisually enrolled in imperial and geopolitical projections of power. 
As the Cambodian population is still predominantly rural, and because 
of the colonial segregation of viewing subjects – whereby Europeans 
watched films inside theatres while indigenous populations were offered 
‘wandering cinema’ in rural areas (Campbell and Power 2010, 178) – the 
latter form of cinema survives in the country to the present day. Those 
best placed to produce ‘wandering cinema’ in the present, however, are 
not ruling or meddling powers but Cambodians themselves.
Film-making in Cambodia
Film-making in Cambodia has always been an internationalised affair. 
The  USIS ran a film-making training program in Phnom Penh in the 
1950s and 1960s, taking in students from various ministries, the Police, 
and the Army (Ly and Muan 2001, 145–146). Cambodia’s King Sihanouk, 
himself an avid film-maker, presided over the first International Film 
Festival of Phnom Penh in 1968, a year before Cambodia’s first National 
Film Festival in November 1969 (Ly and Muan 2001, 153–154). By the 
1960s and into the early 1970s both film-making and film-viewing 
(in cinemas) were well-established practices in Phnom Penh. As the war 
between the advancing Khmer Rouge and ruling US-backed Lon Nol 
forces came closer to the city, cinemas (like other businesses) closed up, 
fearing for the safety of their patrons (Ly and Muan 2001, 154).
Film-making during Khmer Rouge rule (April 1975 to January 1979) was 
an insular practice – largely limited to the regime’s own experimentation 
with film production. The films were subsequently shown in some areas of 
the country. These propaganda films – showing large-scale infrastructure 
worksites of hundreds of workers, including children, moving earth 
without the help of machinery, and often without shoes – were recently 
shown at the ECCC as evidence of Khmer Rouge crimes against humanity. 
These films can be found in Bophana’s Hanuman archive, and Rithy Panh, 
along with many other film-makers – including Public Affairs officers at 
the ECCC – have included these grainy black and white film sequences 
as opening shots in their contemporary films.
CIVIL SOCIETy AND TRANSITIONAL JuSTICE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
116
In the period immediately following Khmer Rouge rule, efforts to revive 
Cambodian film-making met with limited support. Two Cambodian 
film-makers who survived the Khmer Rouge period and returned to 
Phnom Penh – Yvon Hem and Ly Bun Yim – spoke in 2001 of their 
frustration with the lack of official interest in re-establishing a Cambodian 
film industry in the post-conflict period (see Ly and Muan 2001). Over 
the last decade, Bophana has led efforts to accumulate a significant 
audiovisual archive and organise the means for its public access and the 
capacity for professional audiovisual training and services to once again 
be offered in Phnom Penh.3 Importantly too, Bophana has fostered the 
creative talent of a group of young Cambodian film-makers, not least by 
providing them with technologies of film-making (see Hamilton 2013).
Bophana and Cambodian civil society
Cambodia has, since the United Nations Transitional Authority period 
of 1991–1993, played host to a significant number of international 
and Cambodian NGOs. Peace studies scholar Caroline Hughes (2009) 
and others (Ear 2013; Slocomb 2010; Springer 2015) point to the 
growing inequality and aid dependency brought about by 30 years of 
liberalising Cambodia’s economy, a shared priority of the Cambodian 
state and international interests in the country since the 1980s 
(see  Slocomb 2010, 225). As economic historian Margaret Slocomb 
notes, Cambodian economic policy of the 1990s was dictated more from 
outside than from within Cambodia as a direct consequence of a 1994 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with international creditors 
(Slocomb 2010, 235). With significant increases in inequality following 
this, experienced geographically as a further entrenched rural–urban 
divide, the SAP was subsequently replaced (by the same international 
fund and bank actors) with a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in 1999 
(Slocomb 2010, 236). Through the 2000s, aid remained central to 
political priorities and economic policy. Aid dependency also elevated 
donor-preferred practices and competitive project-based funding that 
engaged NGO partners in fixed cycles of project design, monitoring and 
evaluation (Hughes 2009). Geographer Tim Frewer argues that NGOs 
in Cambodia have recently found a new and expanded role thanks to 
3  Like Bophana, Khmer Mekong Films, also founded in 2006, offers full film production services 
in Phnom Penh, but does not engage in archival work or regular public film screenings.
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donor emphasis on civil society and good governance, and that NGOs 
in Cambodia are generally considered by donors, think tanks and local 
scholars to be playing a positive role – so much so that recent government 
attempts to regulate the NGO sector have been understood as an ‘attack’ 
on civil society (Frewer 2013, 99).
Like many other Cambodian NGOs, the Bophana Centre receives 
international funding, but is also significantly embedded in Cambodia in 
terms of staffing, training and cooperation with various state and non-state 
actors. Bophana advertises that it offers archive and production services to 
‘individuals, civil society organisations, enterprises and State institutions’ 
(Bophana 2016). In this statement, the organisation positions itself as 
a service provider to Cambodian civil society. Bophana has also engaged 
with the ECCC as a service provider. As discussed above, Bophana has 
assisted with both the content and operation of the PAS Study Tour. The 
PAS has in turn assisted Rithy Panh by granting many hours of interview 
access to Duch, defendant in ECCC Case 001, out of which Panh made 
his film, Duch: Master of the Forges of Hell (see Panh and Bataille 2012).
Panh was also involved in a key discussion with the ECCC over the 
filming of the tribunal for livestreaming and recording purposes. Footage 
from six cameras in the ECCC courtroom is edited in situ into a single 
stream of images to be sent to live screens around the public gallery, as 
well as to the media room situated below the public gallery, and to the 
web via the ECCC livestream. Panh advised that footage from all cameras 
be preserved, such that it would be possible to record and later show 
simultaneous occurrences in different parts of the chambers (Helen Jarvis, 
pers. comm., Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 15 June 2017). For example, 
he felt strongly that a camera should be trained on the defendants at all 
times, to record their responses to the evidence and arguments being 
presented, and that this footage should be preserved in perpetuity (ibid.). 
Unfortunately, Panh’s advice and offer of Bophana’s help with this 
approach was not taken up by the non-Cambodian group responsible for 
ECCC filming, with the result that footage not used in the livestream feed 
is generally discarded.
Unlike many development and good governance–focused NGOs, Bophana 
does not explicitly appeal to liberal democratic conceptualisations of civil 
society that have been ‘influential in guiding the “good governance” 
agendas among development agencies’ (McIlwaine 2007; see also Frewer 
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2013).4 Bophana eschews the general separateness-with-suspicion between 
international NGOs and the Cambodian state, whereby the Cambodian 
state is understood as the current government, and the current government 
as Cambodia’s ruling party. By taking a wide historical and cultural view of 
the audiovisual arts, Bophana implicitly supports a politics of polyphony 
in the present as well as a l’histoire sa polyphonie (see Norindr 2010, 189). 
Just as subjects in Panh’s films – and in those of his students – are given 
space to speak and gesture their truths, so does Bophana create a space for 
multiple, coexisting audiovisual activities that are always already political.
While Cambodian civil society is dominated by humanitarian and human 
rights–based work, Bophana appears to step back from these normative 
approaches, offering instead an emphasis on practice, study and enquiry, 
and on dialogue within and about creative processes. Because memory 
is part of the creative process, this is also dialogue about memory – 
personal memory, public memory, social memory and memory that 
exceeds these categorisations. It is in this sense that Bophana, unlike 
most civil society actors operating in and around the ECCC, does not 
participate straightforwardly in the discursive field of ‘transitional 
justice’. The  emphasis on creative practice at Bophana does not cleave 
to the priorities of the interventionist and technical enterprise denoted 
as ‘transitional justice’ in Cambodia (and elsewhere). Creative enquiry 
and experimentation is more open in its approach, and its effects more 
uncertain, potentially wide-ranging and longer-term, than is countenanced 
by the prescriptions and evaluations of transitional justice. Focusing on 
the work Bophana does on a daily basis, following the approach taken by 
Claire Mercer and Maia Green elsewhere, allows for an understanding 
of how ‘civil society’ or ‘transitional justice’ approaches ‘dovetail with 
[Cambodian] agendas, and with local histories … that provide further 
templates for action’ (Mercer and Green 2013, 107). I close my analysis 
with a discussion of yet another shared focus of Bophana and the ECCC 
that again shows the difference of Bophana’s work, a difference that can 
be thought about by recourse to the tension between the terms ‘technical’ 
and ‘technological’.
4  Bophana does appeal to notions of ‘capacity building’ in the form of education and training 
of Cambodians in film direction, production and film production services.
119
5 . SHOWING NOW
App-learning on Khmer Rouge history
Bophana is currently developing an internet-based application, a project 
known as ‘App-learning on Khmer Rouge history’ (hereafter KR-app). This 
is a multimedia offering that combines archival audiovisual material with 
Bophana-developed text, drawn images, film sequences and interactive 
elements. It aims to educate Cambodians, especially youth, about the 
rise, rule and fall of the Khmer Rouge regime via their internet-enabled 
devices, especially smartphones and tablets.5 By compiling and writing 
this history, incorporating filmed and transcribed survivor testimony, and 
by newly (audio)visualising many historical details and events, the KR-app 
also aims to assist the healing of survivors, generate dialogue (especially 
between younger and older Cambodians) and encourage Cambodians to 
read the existing historical sources on this period (interview with Chea 
Sopheap, Phnom Penh, 9 December 2016). The project has been formally 
endorsed by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports so that it may be 
incorporated into schools nationwide (ECCC 2017, 10). The KR-app is 
a proposed reparation project of ECCC Case 002/02, under the ‘guarantee 
of non-repetition’ measure. As well as finding funding through the New 
Zealand–based Rei Foundation, Bophana was successful in its bid for 
European Union funding (via UNOPS, the United Nations Office for 
Project Services) that was earmarked for ECCC reparations.6 The KR-app 
has been developed with assistance from the two sections of the ECCC 
responsible for victim participation and reparation requests, the Civil 
Party Lead Co-Lawyers Section and the Victims Support Section.
While the UNOPS call for proposals did not explicitly use the phrase 
‘transitional justice’, the background section of the document refers to 
a general state of ‘injustice and lack of understanding’ in Cambodia about 
the Khmer Rouge past, a gross simplification of the politics of the past in 
Cambodia since 1979, but one often perpetuated in transitional justice 
discourses about Cambodia and its tribunal. Although calling for proposals 
5  A 2015 research report showed that 39.5 per cent of Cambodians own at least one smartphone 
(up from 26.1 per cent in 2014), with smartphone ownership rates higher among urban residents 
(51.7  per cent) than rural residents (34.4 per cent), and very high amongst those studying for or 
holding a university degree (82 per cent) (Phong and Solá 2015, 7). In the same study, 28.6 per cent of 
Cambodians claimed to access the Internet using their own phone and use of the Internet was also found 
to decrease dramatically with age, from 51.6 per cent of those aged between 15 and 25 to 10 per cent 
of those aged between 40 and 65 (Phong and Solá 2015, 16).
6  The Call for Proposals was titled ‘Awareness & Education on Khmer Rouge History Programme 
– Supportive Educational Resources Development’ and was made in December 2015 for projects to 
be completed over 2016–2017.
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that might ‘remedy’ this situation ‘nation-wide’, supporting information 
delivery was the main aim of the grant. The call for proposals stated that 
the successful project will ‘provide supportive educational resources to be 
disseminated to high schools and university students’ (UNOPS n.d., 2). 
In reality, Bophana is developing a high-quality creative and interactive 
educational resource that will likely be used far more widely than in high 
schools and universities.
The development of the KR-app is in itself a creative process. Both its 
content and software development are labour intensive, with more 
than 20 staff affiliated to the project over 2016–2017. The KR-app will 
have eight ‘chapters’, dealing in loose chronological order with the rise, 
rule and fall of the Khmer Rouge. Bophana has convened a ‘Scientific 
Committee’ for the project that regularly advises the lead writer and 
project manager. Committee members are Cambodian academics and 
experts with research and publication backgrounds in Khmer Rouge 
history. Monthly meetings of the Scientific Committee allow for new 
content that has been developed by the writers to be debated, improved 
or corrected. Consensus or compromise on wording and explanation is 
attempted on a sentence-by-sentence basis, a laborious but ultimately 
highly productive arrangement that also has the potential to enhance 
research capacity and scholarly networks between committee members, as 
well as between Bophana and allied organisations dedicated to preserving 
and promoting critical engagement with Cambodia’s past.
Bophana has also produced bespoke images and film content for the KR-
app, employing artists and film-makers to draw, sculpt, photograph and 
film objects and images that will (audio)visually enhance the text-based 
content of the app (see Figure 5.4). The process of this creative visualisation 
work is described by the project manager in the following way:
our artists listen to the memory of the survivor and, under the 
supervision of the writers … recreate the story and then the film-
makers film it … some images you cannot find [in the archives], 
so we have to draw … to recreate (interview with Chea Sopheap, 
Phnom Penh, 9 December 2016).
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Figure 5.4: Website image advertising the KR-app.
Source: Image courtesy of Bophana Centre .
Although transitional justice discourses imagine information 
dissemination and awareness raising to be largely technical processes, 
the significant and creative technological and cultural aptitude of an 
organisation like Bophana demands far greater attention to processes of 
understanding, rendering and deliberating past events and claims to truth. 
This attentiveness is part of the professionalism of the organisation, but it 
is also generated within the creative process, as a part of being enrolled in 
the affective and highly material process of working with archival material 
and survivor memory for public memorialisation, broadly conceived. This 
is a therapeutic practice that extends outward through technologically 
mediated relations with diverse others and materialities, not inward 
towards a perceived fragile ego (see Boyd 2017). Such practice goes largely 
unrecognised within a development project approach that emphasises 
‘objectives’, ‘stakeholders’, ‘target activities’ and ‘evaluation’.
While the UNOPS call required successful applicants to ‘be recognised by 
the ECCC as a Judicial Reparation project’, this is a wholly separate ECCC 
process with additional conditions. Recognition as a reparation project 
can only be granted in a judgement handed down by the Trial Chamber 
or Supreme Court Chamber of the ECCC. Reparation projects relating 
to a specific trial of the ECCC can be proposed to these chambers by the 
Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers if certain criteria have been met – namely 
that the proposed project will involve and benefit participating victims 
(known as ‘civil parties’), is directly related to a crime being prosecuted in 
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the case and has already found full funding. The UNOPS requirement for 
reparation recognition effectively added additional conditions for potential 
applicants, and asked that they guarantee something they could not.7
ECCC civil parties have been involved in the development of Bophana’s 
KR-app. The app development team has also consulted ECCC documents 
– including case files, civil party testimonies, and judgements – and has 
also conducted new interviews with civil parties (interview with Keo 
Duong, Phnom Penh, 30 December 2016). The reported benefit to civil 
parties of the KR-app is largely one of participating in the development 
of its content, of contributing their story to a multimedia source that will 
educate fellow Cambodians and others over coming years. The UNOPS 
requirement that the project benefit Cambodian youth, however, demands 
that Bophana consult with young people as well as civil parties (who are 
predominantly older).
It is difficult to imagine how this careful work of producing high-quality 
and interactive audiovisual content, technological functionality across 
multiple devices,8 and continuous public engagement and testing of ‘beta’ 
versions (with civil parties and youth) is adequately covered by the original 
EU and Rei Foundation (NZ) funding and two-year project duration. 
This project-based work, emerging out of international donors’ desire to 
support the restorative justice aims of an internationalised tribunal, risks 
(perhaps unwittingly) entering into the exploitation of Cambodian NGO 
staff in a manner akin to multinational corporations sourcing software 
development in parts of the developing South (see Harindranath 2002, 
57–58; Potter et al. 2012, 143).
Conclusion
As critical development scholars have long argued, NGOs are highly 
specific to particular places and times, despite their appeal to broader – 
and sometimes global or universal – ideals. With such emplaced specificity 
comes a complex role in the politics of development, but acknowledgement 
of this remains largely outside mainstream NGO literatures (Mercer 
7  Organisations could commit to applying – and seeking to meet the criteria required by the Civil 
Party Lead Co-Lawyers (CPLCLs) for proposed reparation projects – but recognition is a matter for 
ECCC judges, it is beyond the control of either the organisations or the CPLCLs. 
8  The aim is to have the app accessible on iOS, Android and Windows systems (for both phones 
and tablets) and in two languages, English and Khmer. 
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2002; Mercer and Green 2013). Rather than understanding NGOs as 
key agents of civil society, this paper has considered ‘civil society’ and 
‘transitional justice’ to be key rationales for the continued existence 
and salience of NGOs already well entrenched in Cambodia’s society and 
economy. The Bophana Centre provides an example of how organisations 
intervene in these largely discursive, albeit economically consequential, 
fields, such that there is both the realisation and refusal of different kinds 
of work (Mercer and Green 2013).
What is the nature of Bophana’s intervention, specifically? I have echoed 
here the observations of others on the importance of ‘filmed speech’ 
and ‘filmed gesture’ in Panh and his students’ work. Some of this work 
pre-dates both the Bophana Centre and the ECCC. The terms ‘testimony’ 
(speech or gesture that aims to ‘voice’ a direct experience) and ‘witnessing’ 
(as film-making and film-viewing) are often attributed to this work. 
After the ECCC, these terms have specific legal meanings and resonances 
in contemporary Cambodia and, as such, are often discussed in legal 
and transitional justice literatures in relation to an individual subject 
(see Elander 2012; Hughes 2016). Testimony and witnessing at Bophana, 
however, are distributed or shared practices.
At Bophana, old and new cinematic and communication technologies 
coexist in productive, creative tension. Here, speech and silence are 
relational processes, rather than opposed and individualised states. 
Relationships between people, families, communities, animals, spirits, 
visions and objects are given representation, as is violence and suffering. 
As a film-maker, Panh has taken his belief ‘in form, in colors, in light, in 
framing and editing [and] in poetry’ (Panh and Bataille 2013, 247) and 
has widened the horizon of contemporary Cambodian engagement with 
its various pasts and presents. At the Bophana Centre, ‘Uncle Rithy’ has 
situated his own work and teaching within this horizon and, in doing so, 
practices a different kind of organisation.
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The rape and murder of Maran Lu Ra and Tangbau Hkawn Nan Tsin, 
which took place in January 2015 in a small village in Shan State, 
Myanmar, became a focal point for civil society activism around issues 
of justice and impunity during Myanmar’s transition to democracy.1 
There are several reasons for this. Of note, first, is the character of the 
victims. Ra and Tsin were young female schoolteachers and members of 
one of Myanmar’s minority ethnic groups, the Kachin. From the 1960s 
until 1994, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) waged war against 
Myanmar’s military, seeking greater autonomy for Kachin State (Sadan 
2015). During the decades of insurgency, Kachin women and children 
experienced severe human rights violations at the hands of both Myanmar’s 
military and ethnic armies. A ceasefire between the government and 
the KIA broke down in 2011, leading to the displacement of civilians 
and to increasing levels of human rights violations. Ra and Tsin came 
to represent, for many, the suffering of women and children during the 
government’s long-running civil conflict with armed ethnic organisations.
1  Throughout the chapter, the term ‘Burma’ is used when the text refers to the country and 
‘Burmese’ for the people, before 1990. ‘Myanmar’ is used for the country after this date, as the 
country was officially renamed in 1990. The same applies to ‘Rangoon’ and ‘Yangon’. ‘Myanmar’ 
refers to citizens of the country as a whole. ‘Bamar’ is used to describe the ethnic group that has 
dominated governance of the country and is the most numerous in the country.
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Second, the suspected perpetrators were members of the military’s Light 
Infantry Battalion 503, which had been stationed in the village at the 
time of the crimes. The inadequate police investigation into the case 
highlighted the fact that Myanmar’s democratisation, which began in 
2010 with the election of a nominally civilian government, had not ended 
military impunity. Legal and administrative barriers to justice remained in 
place: the military was not subject to the jurisdiction of national courts; 
the police force lacked institutional independence; and the judiciary was 
not impartial. The perfunctory and flawed investigation into the rape and 
murder of Ra and Tsin and the failure on the part of authorities to charge 
anyone for the crimes reflected the systemic justice failures that persisted 
into Myanmar’s transition.
Third, Ra and Tsin were members of the powerful Kachin Baptist 
Convention (KBC), a Christian religious organisation dominant in 
Kachin State and across Myanmar’s largely Christian north. In the wake 
of the crimes against Ra and Tsin and the subsequent police investigation, 
the KBC formed its own Truth-Finding Committee and conducted its 
own investigation into the crimes. The KBC investigation established 
serious procedural failures by the police and uncovered evidence that 
strongly suggested the culpability of the military. The case of Ra and Tsin 
brings to the fore the role assumed by civil society in the pursuit of truth 
and justice during Myanmar’s transition, in a context where the primary 
political actors – the military and the country’s major democratic political 
party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) – have strong reasons 
not to pursue a transitional justice agenda. In the face of resistance from 
these actors, the KBC and other civil society organisations articulate 
a unique and powerful perspective on the forms and processes that justice 
could take during Myanmar’s transition to democracy.
This chapter shows how measures to advance justice during Myanmar’s 
transition are being led from the bottom up by community-based 
groups, local religious organisations and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), without support from key political actors in the transition.2 
The conception of justice put forward by organisations such as the KBC 
focuses on securing justice in individual cases such as those of Ra and 
Tsin, in order to deter further crimes, end military impunity and bear 
2  In this chapter, I use the term ‘civil society’ and ‘civil society organisations’ to refer to different 
forms of civil activism between the family and the state, including faith-based organisations 
(Heidel 2006).
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witness to the wrong done to victims. There are also, however, broader 
and more complex forms of justice that are also promoted by civil society 
organisations. The statements from local organisations, particularly 
religious organisations and women’s groups, have linked the conflict in 
Kachin State and elsewhere to the economic exploitation of the people, 
and they have demanded a form of justice that includes constitutional 
reform, genuine federalism and protection of minority rights. As well as 
retributive justice in individual cases, many civil society organisations call 
for the return of traditional ownership of land, measures to safeguard the 
environment, the protection of language, culture and religion, and an 
end to discrimination against ethnic minorities: the demand is for a form 
of justice that is both specific (addressing individual cases such as those 
of Ra and Tsin) and broad (addressing structural social and economic 
inequalities). In the early years of Myanmar’s transition, the government 
was deficient in addressing both forms of justice.
As several scholars have pointed out, narrow definitions of ‘civil society 
organisations’ and ‘community-based organisations’ are not useful in 
the Burmese context, because they impede a full understanding of social 
organising and social change in the country (Kramer 2011; Prasse-
Freeman 2012; see also Lidauer 2012). From 1962, under the rule of 
General Ne Win, three main types of civil society organisation were 
permitted to exist: (1) organisations affiliated with the government, whose 
activities were restricted largely to the promotion of literature and culture; 
(2) the Buddhist monkhood (sangha); and (3) Christian churches. It was 
not until the early 1990s that United Nations agencies and international 
NGOs began sponsoring the activities of local NGOs, focusing mainly 
on healthcare and health education services, HIV/AIDS prevention, child 
protection and microfinance (South 2008). In the late 1990s, as economic 
difficulties and the crushing sanctions policies of the United States and 
the European Union undermined the livelihood of millions of Burmese 
(Renshaw 2017), independent local charitable organisations emerged. 
In 2008, in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, local community organisations 
carried out the work of rescue and repair in large parts of the country 
(Renshaw 2014). Turnell argues that even before transition began, civil 
society organisations were indispensable parts of the Burmese political 
economy, providing social goods and essential services that the military was 
incapable of delivering (Turnell 2008; Prasse-Freeman 2012). Following 
the 2010 election and the liberalisation of laws relating to freedom of 
association, the space for civil society organisations dramatically increased 
CIVIL SOCIETy AND TRANSITIONAL JuSTICE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
130
across the country, and since then they have played a powerful and 
shifting role in Myanmar’s transition to democracy. In this chapter, I use 
the expression ‘civil society organisations’ (CSOs) to refer to voluntary, 
autonomous associations and networks of organised civil activism existing 
between the family and the state (Hann 2011; South 2008) including 
faith-based groups but not private economic actors or political parties. 
On this definition, on one count, Myanmar has more than 200,000 civil 
society organisations (Heidel 2006, 43).
South, in his study of civil society organisations in Myanmar, distinguishes 
between NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs). CBOs 
are locally managed grassroots organisations where members are the 
main beneficiaries. NGOs, in contrast, are not necessarily from the 
community – though they work for community members – and they may 
be local, national or international. One of my purposes in this chapter 
is to demonstrate this difference and to highlight the way in which the 
nature and characteristics of different civil society organisations shape 
the way they respond to questions of transitional justice. I focus on one 
of Myanmar’s ethnic minority states, Kachin, to explore the transitional 
justice work being undertaken by CSOs and NGOs in that state. In Kachin, 
both NGOs and CBOs have been active in progressing debate about 
transitional justice – but in notably different ways. From the perspective of 
a community-based organisation, I consider the transitional justice work 
of the Kachin Baptist Convention, which is the most influential church 
in a state in which more than 90 per cent of the Kachin population is 
Christian (two-thirds Baptist and one-third Roman Catholic) (Jacquet 
2015). I also consider the work of a prominent NGO with international 
links, ND-Burma, and its efforts to record and collate evidence of historic 
and ongoing human rights abuses carried out by the military.
This chapter begins by analysing the dynamics of Myanmar’s transition to 
democracy, and explains why in the early years of the transition the major 
political actors had no appetite for questions of transitional justice. It then 
discusses the ‘peace before justice’ argument in the context of Myanmar. 
It then charts the rise and significance of civil society organisations within 
Kachin State and explains why organisations such as the KBC carry such 
legitimacy within local communities. Finally, the chapter outlines the 
singular contribution of community-based organisations in advocating 
for justice during the early years of Myanmar’s transition to democracy.
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The nature of Myanmar’s transition 
to democracy
Myanmar is in the early years of democratic transition. In 2010, after 
22 years of direct rule, Myanmar’s military government withdrew to make 
way for elections and the assumption of power by a nominally civilian 
government. The democratic opposition party, the NLD, boycotted 
the elections, which were won by the military-backed Union Solidarity 
and Development Party (USDP).3 There was deep scepticism, in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2010 elections, about whether the military 
intended to allow genuine democratic reform. But between 2010 and 
2015, under President Thein Sein, the new government undertook 
a program of liberalisation, releasing political prisoners, legalising trade 
unions, allowing public political gatherings, easing press censorship and 
permitting the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools across 
Myanmar (Renshaw 2016). The government also made renewed efforts to 
end decades-long civil conflict with ethnic armies. In 2011, Aung San Suu 
Kyi, leader of the NLD, declared that she trusted President Thein Sein to 
pursue further democratisation and she urged the people to do likewise. 
In 2012, the NLD contested seats in federal by-elections and Aung San 
Suu Kyi herself was elected to parliament. In the general elections of 
2015, the NLD swept to power. Suu Kyi, who was married to a British 
citizen and whose sons hold British passports, was barred from becoming 
president by a special provision in the Constitution that precludes anyone 
whose spouse or children ‘hold allegiance to a foreign power’. In 2016 
Suu Kyi appointed herself Special Counsellor of State, a role that she said 
was ‘above the President’ (Holmes 2016).
Myanmar’s transition is ‘liberation from above’ or ‘regime-initiated 
liberalisation’ (Huntington 1991). It is the result of a decision on the part 
of the military to withdraw from direct rule and affect an orderly transfer 
of power to a civilian government. From the military’s perspective, the 
success of the transition depended on four factors: (i) cooperation from 
the country’s pro-democracy political party, the NLD, and its iconic leader 
Aung San Suu Kyi, in the timing and mode of transition; (ii) guarantees 
about preserving the autonomy of the military and a political role for 
3  Electoral laws required the National League for Demcocracy (NLD) to expel Aung San Suu Kyi, 
because she had a criminal record. The NLD refused to do this, which meant that the party could not 
be registered or stand candidates.
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the military in the life of the state; (iii) a guarantee that there would 
be no prosecution of military officers for crimes committed while the 
military was in power; (iv) achieving peace with the various armed ethnic 
groups that had been in conflict with government military forces since the 
country gained independence from the British at the end of the Second 
World War (Renshaw 2013).
Between 2010 and 2015, transition proceeded in accordance with the 
script laid out by the military. First, Suu Kyi convinced hardliners within 
her party that the NLD should be a junior partner in the military-
led process of gradual democratic reform. The NLD abandoned its 
longstanding demand for the reinstatement of the results of the 1990 
elections, which the NLD won but the military refused to recognise, 
and ended its campaign of civil disobedience and unlawful gatherings. 
The new government’s strongest claim to credibility – both domestically 
and internationally – was Suu Kyi’s endorsement of the government’s plan 
for democratisation (Myers 2011).
Second, the military ensured that reform would take place within the 
framework of the 2008 Constitution of the Union of Myanmar, which 
preserves a central political role for the military. The Constitution 
provides that 25 per cent of members of state and federal parliaments 
must be serving army officers appointed by the commander-in-chief, 
and that the Constitution cannot be amended without the approval 
of more than 75 per cent of parliament. Under the Constitution, the 
commander-in-chief has a decisive say in the appointment of the 
president and two vice-presidents. Certain key cabinet positions (such as 
Home Affairs and Defence) are confined to active military personnel. 
The army is fiscally and administratively autonomous. Article 445 of 
the 2008 Constitution provides immunity for members of the former 
military government in relation to any act done in the execution of duty; 
article 20(b) of the Constitution states that the Defence Service has the 
right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed 
forces; article 343 provides that in the adjudication of military justice, the 
decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services is final and 
conclusive. In 2016, before the NLD assumed power after the November 
2015 elections, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing reminded the people 
at the Armed Forces Day Parade that a political role for the military was 
essential to the stability and prosperity of the state (Reuters 2016b).
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Third, Suu Kyi has constantly reassured the military that she does not 
wish to see the prosecution of military officers for acts committed during 
the years of military rule. Suu Kyi publicly reiterated that she preferred 
processes that lead to healing rather than to opening wounds, that she 
had no desire for retribution and that she does not want to see anyone 
in the military stand trial for the human rights violations of the past. 
When she discussed mechanisms for accountability, which was rarely and 
reluctantly, it was in the form of a truth and reconciliation commission, 
similar to the South African commission. But in Suu Kyi’s view, there was 
no urgency for the creation of such an institution (Naing 2012). Conscious 
of the need to placate the military during the period of transition, Suu Kyi 
embraced Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, as ‘her father’s army’ and 
declared that she was ‘very fond’ of the army (BBC 2013).
Finally, the government intensified efforts to sign ceasefire agreements 
with ethnic minority armies. An official ceasefire with the Shan State 
Army-South (SSA-South) was signed at the end of 2011 (Oo 2011). 
On  12  January 2012, the government signed a ceasefire with the 
19-member Karen National Union, to end hostilities between the military 
and the Karen National Liberation Army. The government also continued 
negotiations with the Chin National Front. In 2015, the government 
signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with eight armed ethnic 
organisations. Negotiations were complicated by decades of mistrust and 
by continuing uncertainty about whether the military was actually under 
the control of the government. In Kachin State, for example, a 14-year-
long ceasefire came to an end in 2011, when the Kachin Independence 
Army refused to accede to a request that it transform its military forces 
into a Border Guard force under the control of the Tatmadaw. President 
Thein Sein’s orders that the army not launch attacks on ethnic armed 
groups in northern Kachin State were defied (Burma Partnership 2012).
For the Kachin, the NLD’s victory in the elections of November 2015 
changed little. Even as preparations got underway for another nationwide 
peace conference in August 2016, and at the same time that Aung San 
Suu Kyi was making a pledge to the nation that peace with ethnic groups 
was her first priority, the Tatmadaw was intensifying attacks on KIA 
positions. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced. Government 
forces were accused of committing grave human rights violations. These 
include firing on unarmed civilians, including those sheltering in refugee 
camps; desecrating churches; the abduction and disappearance of villagers 
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suspected of belonging to the KIA; razing homes, pillaging properties; 
using antipersonnel mines; conscripting forced labour; enlisting children 
to serve as army porters; torture; and rape (Human Rights Watch 2017).
From the perspective of the military, the NLD and leaders of armed 
ethnic organisations, the success of Myanmar’s transition to democracy 
depended on the exclusion of the institutions and processes of transitional 
justice. The military’s interest in defraying justice is comprehensible. 
Myanmar’s transition was not the result of a change of guard among 
the top military leadership: prosecuting those ultimately responsible for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity would mean prosecuting the 
people who were driving transition. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD 
understood that focusing on retribution – or even calling for recognition 
of the crimes committed by the former military regime through the 
establishment of a  truth commission – could destabilise the political 
situation and undermine prospects for further democratisation and peace. 
For leaders of ethnic armies, the primary demand was not for retribution 
or acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past – it was for a strong form 
of federalism that would preserve the autonomy and rights of ethnic states 
to manage their own governance and resources. The Nationwide Ceasefire 
Agreement did not include provisions for the establishment of criminal 
proceedings in relation to crimes committed by the military (or crimes 
committed by ethnic armies), nor did it refer to the establishment of truth 
commissions, nor did it refer to reparations. It did, however, refer to the 
pursuit of social and economic goals (protection of the environment, 
improvements to health and education, and addressing the chronic drug 
problem that exists in many ethnic states).
The ‘political stability before justice’ 
argument in the context of Myanmar
In 1991, Samuel Huntington set out the considerations that new 
democratic regimes must take into account in deciding how to address 
crimes committed by officials of the predecessor regime (Huntington 
1991). In Huntington’s view, the decision to prosecute and punish, 
or forgive and forget, did not turn on moral or legal arguments about 
societal obligations to truth, justice and the rule of law. Instead, the 
decision was determined by the nature of the democratisation process 
and the distribution of political power during and after transition. 
In Huntington’s view, in circumstances where democratic transformations 
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were initiated and guided by leaders of the existing authoritarian regime, 
assurances regarding non-prosecution – amnesties – were essential to 
prospects of democratic consolidation. Put simply, no authoritarian leader 
would enable transition if they anticipated being prosecuted as a result. 
Amnesty was the price of peaceful transformation. The question of 
whether prosecuting perpetrators of crimes in former regimes undermines 
prospects for democratic consolidation became one of the key debates in 
the scholarship on transitional justice (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; 
Huntington 1991; D’Amato 1994; Akhavan 2009; Snyder and Vinjamuri 
2004; Kim and Sikkink 2010).
Recent scholarship has moved the debate about peaceful democratic 
transition versus pursuit of justice in different directions. First, via historical 
analysis of the different circumstances in which trials, amnesties or truth 
commissions contribute to stabilising new democracies, scholars have 
drawn attention to institutional combinations that appear to be effective 
in promoting democratic consolidation (for example, trials and truth 
commissions; amnesties and truth commissions) (Salehi and Williams 
2016). Second, scholars have been attentive to temporal and sequencing 
issues in the establishment of transitional justice institutions and policies. 
Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, for example, in their study of transitions 
in Latin America, conclude that amnesties followed by trials, or trials 
followed by amnesties, are both sufficient conditions for democratic 
consolidation (Dancy and Wieblhaus-Brahm 2015). Third, the concept 
of transitional justice itself has been interrogated. Scholars have unpacked 
assumptions about the form that transitional justice should take and paid 
attention to local experiences, priorities and practices (Shaw and Waldorf 
2010; Jeffrey and Kim 2014).
In Myanmar, the ‘political stability versus justice’ debate did not feature 
in public discourse during the early years of Myanmar’s transition 
to democracy. This is because the military, which under the 2008 
Constitution is not subject to civilian control, remained central to the 
transition, central to the governance of the state and central to the peace 
process with ethnic armies. It was clear to all primary political actors 
that retribution – and even truth-seeking, if implemented too early – 
would undermine prospects for transition. This understanding shaped 
Myanmar’s transition in two key ways.
First, for the military, a broad amnesty was a precondition for withdrawal 
from power. The constitutional immunity from prosecution for 
Myanmar’s former military rulers, and their agents and personnel, and 
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the Defence Service’s right to independently administer and adjudicate all 
affairs of the armed force, was a non-negotiable condition of the bargain 
between the  key actors in the transition. Immunity from prosecution 
for the military was one of the terms on which transition took place. 
Suu Kyi and her party understood that to challenge this would be to 
risk a resumption of power by the military and unravel the democratic 
advances that had been made (which included a relatively fair and free 
election in 2010, and a parliament dominated by a democratic political 
party after the 2015 election).
Myanmar’s political history was instructive for Suu Kyi and Myanmar’s 
pro-democracy leaders. In general elections held in 1990, the NLD, 
led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a sweeping victory, securing more than 
50 per cent of the popular vote. The military, however, refused to transfer 
power to the NLD. The reason for this – in popular legend at least – was 
an offhand comment from U Kyi Maung, chairman of the NLD, who in 
a post-election press conference referred to ‘Nuremberg-style tribunals’ 
while explaining to a foreign journalist that the NLD did not intend to 
seek accountability for what the army had done to the people during its 
period of rule. ‘Here in Myanmar’, said Kyi Maung, ‘we do not need 
any Nuremberg-style tribunals’ (Jones 2014). Many people in Myanmar 
believe that one of the primary reasons why the Burmese military refused 
to relinquish power after the 1990 elections was because the generals 
feared they would be tried for crimes committed during the period of 
dictatorship (Kaung 2011; Jones 2014). The NLD was determined to 
ensure that history would not repeat itself and that in the 2012–2015 
elections, the generals would not be frightened once again into retreating 
from reform. For Suu Kyi and the NLD, the high-level prosecution of 
members of the military was not a political possibility.
There are civil society organisations in Kachin State, and among the Kachin 
diaspora in Thailand, the United States and elsewhere, who still call for 
the establishment of the traditional mechanisms of transitional justice: 
in the first place, a UN-backed independent Commission of Inquiry on 
the human rights abuses being committed against the Kachin and other 
peoples, to put an end to impunity. But in the early years of transition 
even the United Nations seemed prepared to defer accountability and 
give democracy a chance to take root. In 2010, for example, the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar reported that 
the people of Myanmar had endured gross and systematic human rights 
violations that possibly amounted to crimes against humanity or war crimes 
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under the terms of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
The Rapporteur suggested the possible establishment of a Commission 
of Inquiry (United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council 
2010, 2014). The United States and several other countries supported this 
suggestion. But after 2012, when Suu Kyi entered parliament, calls from 
within the UN for the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry abated. 
In 2013, the Special Rapporteur recommended merely the consideration 
of the establishment of a truth commission, to ‘inform continuing 
democratic reform and national reconciliation’ (United Nations General 
Assembly 2013).
Second, Myanmar’s transition to democracy was complicated by the 
ongoing civil conflict with ethnic armed organisations. Civil war stood 
as a grave threat to democratic consolidation because while there was 
a prospect that conflict could lead to the secession of some ethnic states, 
the military would preserve its political independence and power to ensure 
the country remained unified. Myanmar’s Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, His Excellency U Khin Maung Win wrote in 2004:
Myanmar is a Union composed of more than one hundred different 
national races, each with its own culture and traditions. Politically, 
there cannot be lasting peace and stability in the country without 
national unity. Unfortunately, the divide and rule policy practiced 
by the British colonialists resulted in suspicion and discord among 
the national races. This subsequently led to armed insurgency that 
spread to various parts of the country for decades. The question 
of achieving national unity and bringing to an end the armed 
insurgency are vital issues for any government, past, present and 
future (Win 2004).
Again, the history is instructive. The 1962 military coup in Burma 
took place amid uprisings in ethnic states, because the military feared 
that unless they assumed control of the country the Union would 
disintegrate. Farrelly notes that ‘anxiety about the potential for territorial 
fragmentation is the principle motivation for those who consider the 
military’s role essential to national survival’ (Farrelly 2014, 313). In 2010, 
the military’s historical priority of preserving national unity was overlaid 
with the substantial economic interests of the military and their cronies, 
and of the Burmese and Chinese businesses who sought to preserve their 
investments (Renshaw 2017).
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The moral argument for deferring justice, made by the primary actors in 
the transition, was that the preservation and consolidation of democracy, 
within a united Myanmar, and all the goods that flow from democracy, 
requires peace and stability. Development, to improve the health, education 
and living standards of the people, also requires peace. Therefore, ran the 
argument, those who were genuinely interested in protecting human 
rights must support peace and political stability at all costs and if justice 
(by which they meant policies that sought accountability for past acts of 
the military) stood in the way of peace then justice should be deferred 
or sacrificed.
Transition without justice: Leaving truth 
until tomorrow and leaving today to the 
rule of law
What was offered to the people of Myanmar after the 2015 elections, 
instead of historical justice, were two things: (1) attention to the rule of 
law as a means for ensuring that abuses do not continue; and (2) a promise 
from Suu Kyi that, at some point in the future, there would come a time 
for seeking and telling the truth about Myanmar’s past.
Over the past quarter of a century the precise nature and substance of 
‘the rule of law’ has been the subject of vigorous debate (Krygier 2010). 
For Suu Kyi, throughout the long years of dictatorship, ‘the rule of 
law’ stood in opposition to the arbitrary exercise of state power by the 
military. The rule of law meant the enforcement of just laws, enacted 
with the authority of a democratically elected legislature, interpreted by 
an independent judiciary and enforced by an impartial police service.4 
Under any commonly accepted understanding of the rule of law, these 
features are a centerpiece (Fuller 1964). In Myanmar, since 2012, the 
rule of law has been championed by both the military and Suu Kyi as 
a panacea for the ongoing abuses of power that accompanied military 
action in ethnic conflict zones. In 2016, for example, when the United 
Nations reported that military action in Rakhine State could amount to 
4  See Nick Cheesman, Opposing the Rule of Law: How Myanmar’s Courts Make Law and Order 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) for an illuminating study of the conflation of the 
rule of law with law and order in Myanmar. Cheesman’s argument is that law and order is neither 
consonant with the rule of law, nor a negative of the rule-of-law ideal; it is, in fact, what he calls 
‘asymmetrically opposed’ to the rule of law.
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ethnic cleansing, Suu Kyi said: ‘The Myanmar government is responding 
to the issue of Rakhine state based on the principles of the rule of law’ 
(Funakoshi 2016).
For civil society organisations, an early test case of the potential for ‘the rule 
of law’ to bring justice was the government’s response to public protests 
against the Letpadaung copper mine. In 2010, a company owned by the 
military, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd, confiscated 
1,356 hectares of farmland in order to develop a copper mine in partnership 
with a Chinese industrial and arms manufacturer. On 29 November 
2012, security forces violently dispersed a peaceful protest organised by 
Buddhist monks and local farmers whose land had been confiscated. Tear 
gas, smoke bombs and fire were used against the protesters as they slept in 
the early morning. The international media reported that the police used 
white phosphorous against protesters (Lwin 2013). The raid was justified 
by Myanmar’s authorities on the grounds that permission had not been 
sought for the public protest. Suu Kyi visited the protest site immediately 
following the incident and told protesters that she would seek to negotiate 
a solution between mine operators and local communities.
In the wake of the incident, President Thein Sein formed a Parliamentary 
Commission to establish the facts and inquire whether mining should 
continue at Letpadaung. Aung San Suu Kyi was asked to chair the 
commission. In March 2013, the commission handed down its report. 
The report acknowledged that the mine had environmental consequences 
and that farmers were forcibly evicted from their land to make way for 
the project (Weng and Aye 2013a). But the report did not recommend 
the closure of the copper mine. Nor did it expose the perpetrators of 
the violence carried out on 29 November. Instead, the report advised the 
protesters to desist and the company to do three things: (1) provide jobs 
for people in local communities; (2) maintain a healthy environment; and 
(3) provide educational and healthcare benefits for local people. Aung San 
Suu Kyi told farmers that Myanmar could not afford to shut down the 
mine and risk turning away foreign investors, and that their protest was 
illegal: ‘you all have to ask permission from the government if you protest 
as our country has the rule of law now. Those who do not respect the rule 
of law, they could get punished’ (Weng and Aye 2013b).
Since her ascension to power, Suu Kyi has invoked the rule of law without 
necessarily being attentive to the legitimacy of laws themselves. The NLD, 
like the military, has used section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law, 
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introduced in 2015, to stifle criticism on social media (Free Expression 
Myanmar 2017). Section 66(d) provides for up to three years in prison for 
‘extorting, coercing, restraining wrongfully, defaming, disturbing, causing 
undue influence or threatening any person using a telecommunications 
network’. Provisions of the State Secrecy Act and the Unlawful 
Associations Act have also been used numerous times against citizens 
and members of community-based organisations. In July 2015, interfaith 
activists U Zaw Zaw Latt and Daw Pwint Phyu Latt were sentenced to 
four years imprisonment each – two under the Unlawful Associations 
Act and two under the 1947 Immigration Emergency Provisions Act – 
for participating in an interfaith peace trip to territory controlled by the 
Kachin Independence Army (Lwin 2016).
In the case of the 2015 murder and rape of the two young Kachin 
schoolteachers, described at the beginning of this chapter, the military 
published a statement shortly after the incident, denying military 
involvement and stating that the Tatmadaw would take action based on 
the rule of law against anyone who alleged soldiers were involved in the 
crimes (Weng 2015). The President’s Office supported the Tatmadaw’s 
position, claiming that an accusation against an individual solider was an 
accusation against the Tatmadaw as an institution, and warning that the 
Tatmadaw had a right to defend itself by prosecuting those who make 
unfounded accusations (Weng 2015). The threat was not an idle one. 
In 2014, a team of journalists reported that chemical weapons were being 
produced in a secretive army installation in Pakokku Township. The three 
reporters, the journal’s editor and its chief executive officer were charged 
under the State Secrets Act and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment with 
hard labour (Mann 2014). In another case, 25-year-old Chaw Sandi Tun 
posted a comment on Facebook likening the colour of Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s dress to the colour of the military’s uniform. She was charged with 
defamation under article 34(d) of the Electronic Transactions Law, which 
carries a penalty of up to five years in prison (Zin 2015). During the early 
years of Myanmar’s transition, the ‘rule of law’ was invoked not to serve 
the people but to constrain their freedom.
The limited conception of the rule of law, as invoked by both the military 
and by Aung San Suu Kyi, suggests a political morality that may be out of 
kilter with the needs of a society that has been subjected to authoritarian 
rule and massive violations of human rights. In the aftermath of transitions 
from dictatorship and oppressive rule, the capacity of citizens (and their 
leaders) to distinguish between right and wrong, just and unjust, can 
141
6 . MyANMAR’S TRANSITION WITHOuT JuSTICE
be severely diminished (Minow 1998; Dyzenhaus 2000). One of the 
primary purposes of transitional justice is to assist societies to reconstruct 
the moral foundations necessary for a future stable democracy. Unless 
this is achieved, liberal values proclaimed by the new democratic regime 
risk sliding into what Dimitrijević describes as ‘ritual facades without any 
legitimising and practical authority’ (Dimitrijević 2006, 374).
One example serves to illustrate the profoundly negative consequences 
of the decision made by Myanmar’s leaders to adopt silence as a response 
to systemic human rights abuses that took place under military rule. 
In October 2016, the government announced that the military was 
commencing what it called a ‘clearance operation’ in northern Rakhine 
State, home to Myanmar’s population of Rohingya Muslims, in response 
to an attack by armed insurgents on three border guard posts (Reuters 
2016a). The area was sealed off, movement within the area was restricted 
and humanitarian agencies were denied access. The operation lasted 
from 9 October 2016 until 9 February 2017 (Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar, President’s Office 2017). During that period, according to 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, government forces carried 
out a series of atrocities against local Muslim populations (OHCHR 
2017). These included the burning and looting of Rohingya villages; the 
murder of Rohingya men, women and children; summary execution of 
imams, religious scholars and community leaders; rape and torture. The 
military used helicopters to fire bullets and drop grenades on villagers as 
they were working on their farms, shopping in markets or fishing. Tens 
of thousands of villagers fled across the border to Bangladesh. ‘Now is the 
worst it has ever been’, said one Rohingya villager. ‘We have heard from 
our grandparents that there were bad things happening in the past too, 
but never like this’ (OHCHR 2017, 43).
What baffled observers of Myanmar’s transition was the almost universal 
failure of Myanmar’s leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and large 
sections of Myanmar’s public, to recognise the nature of the military’s 
actions and the fact that the persecution of the Rohingya was of the same 
order as the persecution that they and their families had endured at the 
hands of the Tatmadaw during the decades of military rule. The response 
of much of the public to the Rohingya crisis, which was captured in print, 
social media and in large rallies held in support of the Tatmadaw’s actions, 
speaks to an urgent need to transform the political culture of Myanmar. 
There is an argument that providing processes that permit people to 
acknowledge and understand the atrocities that mark a country’s past, 
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and uncover the systematic nature of violations and the motivational 
patterns that led to violations, helps both political leaders and citizens 
rebuild the moral foundations of their society (Minow 2002). Put simply, 
it must be publicly stated that there was no justification for the murder, 
rape, torture and disappearance of tens of thousands of people during 
the decades of military rule. Truth commissions, in other parts of the 
world, have contributed to this task; though the evidence of their impact 
is still debated (Crocker 1999; Brahm 2007). In Myanmar’s case, the 
atrocities perpetrated over so many years across the entire country might 
tend to suggest a need for multiple commissions, or multiple strands to 
a commission’s mandate. For example, there have been demands for the 
investigation of crimes committed in ethnic states in order to terrorise 
local populations and suppress insurgencies; acknowledgement of crimes 
of torture, extrajudicial killing, disappearance and false imprisonment 
to contain political opponents of the regime; and acknowledgement, 
apologies and reparation for gender-based crimes against women. 
Myanmar’s leaders, however, argued that there were other national 
priorities that outweighed the need to recognise and repair past violence. 
There are no immediate prospects for the establishment of an official truth 
commission in Myanmar.
The contribution of civil society organisations 
to transitional justice in Myanmar
In the immediate aftermath of the murders of Ra and Tsin, the KBC 
organised a procession to accompany the two-day journey of the coffins 
from Shan State to the Kachin State capital Myitkyina. As the coffins 
processed through the countryside, large crowds stood by the side 
of the road to watch and pray. When the coffins reached Myitkyina, 
enormous crowds gathered for multifaith prayer services in honour 
of the two teachers.  Since then, each year, on the anniversary of their 
deaths, the KBC has held prayer services across the Kachin region and 
in Kachin communities around the world, to remember the women 
and affirm the need for justice in relation to their deaths (Nyein 2018). 
The significance of these actions can only be understood if one appreciates 
the scale of abuse that took place in Myanmar during military rule: the 
routine brutality of the military in its treatment of villagers; the 
uncounted numbers of men, women and children who were killed and 
whose bodies were buried without markers; the fear of arbitrary torture, 
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rape and imprisonment with which ordinary people lived their everyday 
lives (KWAT 2011). The military presence within the village where the 
two girls were staying and the grossly inadequate police investigation 
mirrored thousands of other cases that had taken place during the years of 
military rule. Ra and Tsin came to stand for all of them. By memorialising 
the deaths of two individuals such as Ra and Tsin, the KBC was making 
a statement that the truth of wrongs must be told and that each individual 
life is of value. The deep grief and outrage that marked the community’s 
response to the death of the two schoolteachers was a deeply authentic 
and powerful response. People from across Kachin State, Shan State and 
throughout Myanmar, recognising the innocence of the victims, their 
youth, their vocation as teachers and the brutality of their murders, 
identified with the tragedy and, under the leadership of the KBC, shaped 
their response as a political one.
In Kachin, from the mid-1990s, the leadership of religious and 
community-based organisations became more pronounced in the wake of 
disillusionment with the political leadership of armed ethnic organisations. 
A peace deal signed between the military and the Kachin Independence 
Organisation (KIO) in 1994 brought with it the potential for local 
Kachin political leaders to make large amounts of money. Local Kachin 
strongmen exploited the natural resources of the state in collaboration 
with the Tatmadaw and Chinese companies. The business methods of 
the KIO were often indistinguishable from those of the Tatmadaw, and 
included cronyism, land-grabbing, exploitation and tactics of terror 
against local populations. There was little consultation between KIO 
leaders and the people about economic decisions that affected their lives 
(Woods 2011). Community leadership during this period came from the 
local churches, schools and community-based organisations. During the 
period of the ceasefire, the KBC was a major provider of healthcare and 
education services to the Kachin people. The KBC, with other religious 
leadership groups such as the Kachin Catholic Bishops Conference, has 
through the KBC Committee for Peace and Reconciliation led demands 
for the political rights of the Kachin. The demands are principally for 
political autonomy for Kachin through a federal political structure. 
The  KBC has also pressed for accountability in relation to specific 
human rights violations such as the murders of Ra and Tsin. In the wake 
of the murders, the KBC announced that it had created a 15-member 
committee, composed of leaders of the KBC, other religious leaders, 
civil society representatives and lawyers, to independently investigate the 
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crime. The military cooperated, to an extent, with the KBC investigators, 
although it did not permit the KBC Committee to ask questions directly 
to Burmese military officers (Gam 2017). The KBC investigation into the 
deaths of Ra and Tsin is ongoing.
The KBC is not the only CSO focused on the issue of transitional 
justice. The work of ND-Burma is particularly notable. ND-Burma 
was founded in 2004 with the objective of training local organisations 
in the collection and management of human rights documentation. 
ND-Burma coordinates members’ input into a common database and 
engages in advocacy campaigns, seeking accountability in individual 
cases and broader justice (government recognition, redress and guarantees 
of non-recurrence for victims of human rights violations). Its vision is 
explicitly political – ‘a peaceful, democratic and federal Burma that has 
acknowledged past human rights violations and has implemented measures 
to uphold the dignity of victims and guard against recurrence’ (ND-Burma 
2018). It  membership includes both local organisations (Assistance 
Association for Political Prisoners – Burma; Kachin Development 
Networking Group; Human Rights Foundation of Monland; Kachin 
Women’s Association Thailand; Palaung Women’s Organization; Ta’ang 
Students and Youth Organization; Tavoyan Women’s Union) and affiliate 
members based outside Myanmar with strong international connections 
(such as EarthRights International and the International Center for 
Transitional Justice).
In relation to the murder of Ra and Tsin, ND-Burma (through its member 
organisation the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand), like the KBC, 
made inquiries and investigations into the incident and aimed to produce 
its own report of what had taken place. There are significant differences, 
however, in the approach and purpose of the work of CBOs such as the 
KBC and ND-Burma, even when both are focused on the same issue.
ND-Burma self-consciously refers to itself as an ‘Unofficial Truth Project’ 
(ND-Burma 2015). Several of ND-Burma’s various reports, including 
the milestone ‘To Recognize and Repair: Unofficial Truth Projects and 
the Need for Justice in Burma’ (ND-Burma 2015) were funded by Open 
Society Foundations. To provide a framework for collaboration among 
members, ND-Burma has developed a ‘controlled vocabulary’ of the 
categories of human rights violations on which the network focuses. 
Its aim is to collate the data that will one day be used by an official truth 
commission. The group recognises that while many parts of the country are 
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still in conflict and the military still retains a significant degree of power, 
a state-led initiative is unlikely to be established and, even if it were, there 
would be serious and justifiable questions about its neutrality. In these 
circumstances, ND-Burma’s approach is to engage local communities as 
active participants in the first stage of what they hope will eventually be 
a government-supported process (Holliday 2014).
ND-Burma operates with funding from international NGOs, with input 
from international donors, using a controlled vocabulary of wrongs, with 
a long-term vision of presenting evidence before an officially sanctioned 
Commission. Bickford (2007) notes that there is something potentially 
troubling about the similarities among Unofficial Truth Projects across 
the world, as it suggests ‘an overly scientific approach to truth-telling, 
as if there is one way to do it, and all these efforts are converging on the 
formula’. Yet the point of grassroots measures is that there should be no 
formula – efforts should be context-driven and capture the specificity of 
local circumstances. With efforts to formalise data collection and record-
keeping comes not just the problem of categorisation and formula – 
which arguably distances the victim from the truth of their story – but 
also an implicit promise that the story, so told, will eventually be officially 
recognised and form part of an official narrative. There is the potential for 
disillusionment if this promise to victims is not fulfilled.
The Kachin Baptist Convention and ND-Burma, together with other civil 
society organisations, advocate for redress of both current and historical 
wrongs committed by both the Tatmadaw and by ethnic armies. Unless 
there is an end to impunity, they argue, crimes such as those committed 
against Ra and Tsin will continue to be committed. From one perspective, 
this demand has been registered and responded to by both the military 
and the government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Both acknowledge the need 
for military accountability and both champion the rule of law as a tool 
for addressing human rights violations. The Kachin Baptist Convention 
requested, and was officially given, an active role in the investigation 
into the murder of Ra and Tsin. Yet in relation to calls for justice for 
historical wrongs, there is little appetite on the part of the military or 
Suu Kyi to institute any of the formal mechanisms of transitional justice. 
Nonetheless, by memorialising the death of victims such as Ra and Tsin, 
the KBC makes a profoundly significant contribution to transitional 
justice in Myanmar.
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Both ND-Burma and the KBC form a discordant note in Suu Kyi’s 
narrative that the military, ethnic leaders and the National League for 
Democracy must walk forward ‘hand in hand’ towards a new future, 
without looking back at the past. Both ND-Burma and the KBC draw 
a clear line between the failure to prosecute members of the military for 
crimes carried out in the past, and the continuing commission of crimes. 
There appears to be, from the outpouring of grief that marked the death 
of Tsin and Ra, and in the testimonies collected by ND-Burma, an urge to 
confront the past that is not in accord with Suu Kyi’s emphasis on ‘moving 
on’ and ‘healing not retribution’.
Conclusion
To date, there has been little justice, in any form, in Myanmar’s transition 
to democracy. The explanation for this is threefold. First, Myanmar’s 
transition to democracy is the result of indigenous top-down change, and 
not the result of revolution, or an unopposable groundswell of popular 
opposition or the efforts of the political opposition. The military remains 
a major player in the transition to democracy, and retains a  significant 
degree of political power. The interests of the National League for 
Democracy are primarily to affect a peaceful and stable transition, 
and this goal is not seen as consistent with the establishment of strong 
accountability mechanisms. For this reason, unofficial truth projects and 
memorialisations are taking place in parts of Myanmar, but national-level 
justice projects are not on the agenda of any of the main political actors.
Second, justice as conceived by many people in Myanmar is broadly 
imagined, encompassing political reform (a federal structure with highly 
autonomous ethnic states) and economic reform (land redistribution 
and control of natural resources by the states). This is precisely the 
kind of justice that the country’s new leaders, the National League for 
Democracy, will struggle to deliver in a context where the military must 
be appeased and the economic interests of powerful investors in Myanmar 
and China protected.
Third, armed conflict resumed in Kachin State at precisely the same time 
as the transition to democracy got underway. Questions of timing are 
crucial in matters of transitional justice. There are perceptions in states 
such as Kachin State and outside it that pressing too hard for historical 
justice might undermine prospects for peace.
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The difficulty is that Myanmar’s modern history is marked by political 
betrayal and the broken promises of the military: the failure to create 
a genuinely federal state in 1947 after independence; the failure to hand 
power to the NLD after the elections of 1990; and myriad other betrayals 
from land-grabbing to unfair trials. Many ethnic groups, such as the 
Kachin in the far north of Myanmar, have attempted in the past to follow 
the path of democracy and peace before justice. The dividends have been 
difficult to discern. Why, ask many, should they now trust the promise, 
made by both the Tatmadaw and Aung San Suu Kyi, that justice will 
follow peace and democracy? They argue that unless there is justice, peace 
will be impossible. There is a sense that transition is yet another elite 
pact, and that their suffering has no recognition. Furthermore, as military 
action in conflict zones increases, as evidence of current human rights 
abuses by the military grow, and as the foreign media and independent 
observers are prevented from witnessing what is occurring in conflict 
zones, the price of the pact between Suu Kyi and the Tatmadaw seems by 
some to be too high.
In relation to human rights abuses committed by the military during the 
decades of dictatorship, neither the military nor Aung San Suu Kyi have 
indicated that they will countenance retribution. Truth is a possibility, but 
it is a long way off. The focus of the military and Suu Kyi is on pursuing 
a path towards an imperfect but achievable form of constitutional 
democracy. They demand that victims of human rights violations forgo 
their right to revisit the past and seek a truthful accounting of, and justice 
for, the crimes of the past. What Suu Kyi and the military offer instead 
is piecemeal justice administered by the new government according to 
a narrow interpretation of the rule of law; and hopefully peace, so that 
a larger justice might be negotiated at some later point. What is clear 
is that, in this context, civil society organisations are critical actors in 
recording and articulating alternative expressions of what justice requires; 
and beginning the long process of recalibrating the political morality of 
post-transition society.
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The role played by reconciliation 
in social reconstruction 
in Bougainville
Joanne Wallis
In his final editorial in The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 
Harvey Weinstein lamented that, as a field, ‘we have not been successful 
at promoting a research agenda that values the study of effectiveness’ 
(Weinstein 2011, 1). Instead, much of the literature has assumed that 
transitional justice plays a positive role in the social reconstruction of 
conflict-affected societies. Much of the literature also assumes (either 
explicitly or implicitly) that this social reconstruction should be guided 
by liberalism, grounded in individual human rights protected by the rule 
of law. A nascent literature has evaluated the effect of truth commissions 
and criminal trials, particularly on efforts to establish respect for human 
rights. There has been little similar research to evaluate the effectiveness of 
local reconciliation practices, rather than prosecutions, and little research 
that challenges the assumption that social reconstruction should be guided 
by liberalism. My chapter evaluates the role played by local reconciliation 
practices in social reconstruction in Bougainville, including an analysis 
of what social reconstruction means in the Bougainville context. Local 
reconciliation practices are taken to mean local sociopolitical practices 
aimed at building and healing relationships so that formerly conflictual 
parties can live together peacefully. 
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Bougainville is an autonomous region of Papua New Guinea that endured 
a conflict between 1989 and 1997. Bougainville experienced only ‘light’ 
international intervention to end the war; near neighbours Australia 
and New Zealand provided small, unarmed truce and peace monitoring 
teams and the United Nations a minute observer mission (Regan 2010a). 
Bougainvillean political leaders opted to achieve peace by prioritising 
local reconciliation practices and by offering amnesties from prosecution, 
and pardons for those already prosecuted, for crimes (including human 
rights abuses) committed during the conflict as an incentive to former 
combatants to participate in reconciliation and weapons disposal. In the 
short term this approach appears to have worked; the conflict ended in 
1997 and in 2001 a comprehensive political settlement, outlined in the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement, granted Bougainville extensive political 
autonomy and the right to vote on its political future (with the option of 
independence) between 2015 and 2020. A constitution-making process 
was undertaken between 2002 and 2004, and by 2005 Bougainvilleans 
had established the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) 
(Wallis 2014). There has not been a major outbreak of violence since. 
In this chapter, I consider some of the possible long-term consequences of the 
approach to reconciliation adopted in Bougainville for social reconstruction. 
As I focus on what social reconstruction means in Bougainville, I am 
particularly interested in the potential gap between, on the one hand, the 
liberal assumptions upon which much of the transitional justice literature 
is based and, on the other hand, the local context. 
Internationally, civil society has been at the forefront of debates about 
how transitional justice should be conducted and the ends it should 
pursue. Encouraged by this international discourse, in Bougainville more 
formalised civil society organisations (CSOs) have tended to favour liberal 
approaches. For example, the Bougainville Human Rights Committee 
has argued that the lack of a formal transitional justice mechanism has 
created the impression that ‘anyone can choose to perpetrate a crime with 
impunity’ (Bougainville Human Rights Committee 2011). Consequently, 
these CSOs have called for a formal transitional justice mechanism, 
constituting either a truth and reconciliation commission or criminal 
trials, or combination of the two, to help address this growing culture 
of impunity and to establish the liberal principles of the rule of law and 
respect for human rights. In contrast, grassroots CSOs have tended to 
favour reconciliation grounded in local sociopolitical practices, not 
necessarily underpinned by liberal assumptions.
159
7 . THE ROLE PLAyED By RECONCILIATION IN SOCIAL RECONSTRuCTION IN BOuGAINVILLE
I begin by considering the literature relating to evaluating the impact of 
transitional justice, including local reconciliation practices. Building on 
that literature, I identify two criteria to evaluate the impact of reconciliation 
on the social reconstruction of a conflict-affected society: governance and 
justice. I then describe the conflict in Bougainville and the reconciliation 
that occurred. I then evaluate the role that reconciliation has played in 
social reconstruction in Bougainville against the two criteria and conclude 
that, while it has helped to create an environment in which relatively 
legitimate and effective institutions of governance have been created, it 
has undermined attempts to achieve justice by cultivating a culture of 
impunity. My analysis also highlights how attempts to evaluate the effect 
of reconciliation in Bougainville need to extend beyond an analysis of 
liberal principles and practices to incorporate the local sociopolitical 
principles and practices that continue to determine the nature of everyday 
life for many Bougainvilleans.
Evaluating the impact of transitional justice 
and reconciliation
Some form of transitional justice is now included in most peace 
processes, and has ‘come to dominate debates on the intersection between 
democratization, human rights protections, and state reconstruction after 
conflict’ (McEvoy 2007, 412). Transitional justice refers to the ‘practices, 
mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, 
civil strife, or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting past 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law’ (Roht-Arriaza 2006, 2). 
The most prominent mechanisms are truth commissions and criminal 
trials, but transitional justice can also include local reconciliation practices, 
reparations, memorialisation, and transitional legal and institutional 
reforms such as vetting and lustration (Thoms, Ron and Paris 2010). 
Truth commissions are temporary, usually state-sanctioned, bodies that 
investigate ‘a pattern of abuses over a period of time, rather than a specific 
event’ (Hayner 2001, 14) in order to ‘supply narrative, rather than forensic, 
accounts of the past’ (Thoms, Ron and Paris 2010, 334). Criminal trials aim 
to achieve ‘truth, deterrence, punishment, reconciliation and promotion of 
the rule of law’ (Thoms, Ron and Paris 2010, 333). They are premised on 
the belief that criminal punishment serves victims’ needs by offering a sense 
of justice, catharsis and that ‘their grievances have been addressed and can 
hopefully be put to rest’ (Kritz 1996, 128).
CIVIL SOCIETy AND TRANSITIONAL JuSTICE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
160
I focus on reconciliation guided by local sociopolitical practices, which 
involves achieving ‘negative peace’ – that is, the cessation of violence 
and the (re)establishment of relationships that permit the coexistence of 
formerly hostile individuals or groups (Galtung 1990). It also aims to 
achieve ‘positive peace’, whereby it addresses ‘conflictual and fractured 
relationships’ in order to build and heal relationships (Hamber and 
Kelly 2004, 3; Lederach 1997). Reconciliation may take place at the 
interpersonal level, whereby relationships are restored between individual 
perpetrators and victims. It may also occur at the political level, to address 
wrongs committed by agents of the state, members of the opposition, 
separatist movements, militias or warring factions in the name of the 
organisation or cause with which they are affiliated, to establish societal 
and political processes that prevent a reversion to conflict (Philpott 2006). 
It is possible to achieve interpersonal reconciliation without political 
reconciliation, and vice versa, and the two may happen at the expense 
of each other. However, the two are interconnected, as rebuilding 
interpersonal relationships is often the key to facilitating broader political 
reconciliation between opposing individuals and groups. As unresolved 
resentments, underlying tensions and simmering hostilities have the 
potential to generate further conflict (Biggar 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 
2004), it is claimed that reconciliation can be perceived as a panacea for 
past wrongs and as a form of social inoculation against a future return to 
violence (Long and Brecke 2003, 13). As noted, reconciliation is usually 
guided by local sociopolitical practices, which often prioritise ‘restorative’ 
over ‘retributive’ justice (Braithwaite 2003).
Thoms, Ron and Paris find that ‘reliable empirical knowledge on the 
state-level impact of TJ [transitional justice] is still limited’ (Thoms, Ron 
and Paris 2010, 331). Weinstein argues that the literature appears to have 
been reluctant to evaluate the impact of transitional justice because ‘“it is 
too soon” to look at what transitional justice actually accomplishes in the 
social reconstruction of a country’ (Weinstein 2011, 1). This reluctance 
also reflects the implicit liberal assumption that criminal accountability is 
common sense and therefore does not need to be questioned. 
There is also little agreement regarding what criteria should be used to 
evaluate the outcomes of transitional justice (Brahm 2007). While most 
scholars would agree that these outcomes should be peace and justice, 
there is no consensus regarding what these terms mean. Brahm has 
suggested two ways to evaluate the impacts of truth commissions: first, 
their effect on ‘subsequent human rights practices’; and second, their 
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effect on ‘democratic development’. Thoms, Ron and Paris have suggested 
six criteria for evaluating the effects of trials and truth commissions: 
‘(1) state respect for personal integrity rights … ; (2) levels of political 
violence; (3) adherence to the rule of law; (4) democratization; (5) popular 
perceptions of regime legitimacy; and (6) a political culture of human 
rights and diversity’ (Thoms, Ron and Paris 2010, 331). Therefore, these 
scholars implicitly assume that the outcomes of transitional justice should 
be grounded in liberalism.
The liberal assumptions that have guided much of the transitional justice 
literature reflect the fact that much of the literature has its roots in liberal 
human rights discourse, with transitional justice mechanisms such as 
criminal trials and truth commissions seen as a way to combat impunity 
for human rights abuses. However, as illustrated below, universalist 
assumptions regarding the desirability or appropriateness of liberalism, 
particularly liberal human rights protections, do not necessarily hold in all 
conflict-affected contexts, nor do the highly technocratic, decontextualised 
and depoliticising approaches to transitional justice (such as truth 
commissions and trials) that they tend to generate.
With these caveats in mind, I identify two criteria as critical to evaluating 
the impact of reconciliation on the social reconstruction of a conflict-
affected society: the establishment of effective and legitimate governance 
mechanisms, that is, mechanisms to manage the exercise of political 
power and provide opportunities for the people to influence the way that 
power is exercised; and the achievement of justice, that is, mechanisms 
aimed at eliminating arbitrary distinctions and establishing ‘the structure 
of a practice of a proper balance between competing claims’ (Rawls 1958, 
165). Although these definitions are drawn from liberal theory, they are 
intended to be sufficiently broad to capture differing understandings, 
including those grounded in local sociopolitical practices, of what these 
governance mechanisms should look like and what a proper balance 
between competing claims involves.
While liberalism holds that governance should be democratic, to 
recognise the ‘intrinsic equality’ and ‘personal autonomy’ of individuals 
(Dahl  1989, 86), the critical peacebuilding literature has increasingly 
recognised that, to be effective and legitimate, governance mechanisms 
may need to combine both liberal and local sociopolitical principles in 
a process described as ‘hybridity’ (Richmond 2009). Similarly, liberalism 
holds that justice should be guided by the principle of the ‘rule of law’, 
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which is based on the idea that the law must be universally and consistently 
applied – including to the government – by a formal regulatory system in 
which there is a clear hierarchy of law (Tamanaha 2004). The protection 
of human rights is linked to the rule of law, since human rights protections 
seek to ensure that the freedom and equality of individuals is protected 
against untrammelled majority rule and are usually enumerated in law 
and enforced via the courts. However, critical peacebuilding scholars are 
increasingly arguing that to be perceived as both effective and legitimate, 
justice may involve a range of both liberal and local mechanisms, and 
human rights protections may need to protect both group and individual 
rights (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009).
As noted, there is a nascent literature that has evaluated the effects of truth 
commissions and criminal trials, used individually or in conjunction 
with each other, on the social reconstruction of conflict-affected societies 
(Pham and Vinck 2007; Thoms, Ron and Paris 2010). Reflecting their 
basis in liberalism, one study that focused on criminal trials concluded that 
prosecutions for human rights violations led to subsequent improvements 
in human rights protections, and had a deterrent effect both in the 
society in question and beyond (Kim and Sikkink 2010). Another study 
concluded that claims that criminal trials ‘threaten democracy, increase 
human rights violations, and exacerbate conflict’ were not supported by 
empirical evidence from Latin America (Sikkink and Booth Walling 2007). 
Another found there is a ‘justice balance’, whereby truth commissions 
are unable to promote stability and accountability on their own, but 
can contribute to improvements in human rights protections when they 
complement and enhance amnesties and prosecutions (Olsen et al. 2010). 
Other studies have concluded that a failure to conduct criminal trials 
can generate a culture of impunity. A study of Guatemala found that 
a failure to prosecute violent crimes committed against women during the 
conflict, when the army was trained in the rape and torture of women, has 
contributed to subsequent impunity for these crimes and consequently to 
rising levels of murder of women in post-conflict Guatemala (Sanford and 
Lincoln 2011).
Studies of truth commissions on their own have reached more measured 
conclusions. One found that truth commissions can have a ‘direct political 
impact’ through the implementation of their recommendations, an ‘indirect 
political impact’ through their role in mobilising civil society, a ‘positive 
judicial impact’ by contributing to human rights accountability, and a 
‘negative judicial impact’ by promoting impunity (Bakiner 2014, 26, 27). 
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A study of Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that 
it has contributed to a perception of impunity because political elites, 
many of whom perpetrated human rights abuses during the conflict, 
have undermined its implementation, including its recommendations for 
criminal trials (Weah 2012).
There has been little substantive effort to evaluate the effect of local 
reconciliation practices on the social reconstruction of conflict-affected 
societies. As reconciliation is often presented as a locally driven alternative 
to the formal transitional justice models of truth commissions and 
criminal trials, the literature has tended to overlook the causal relationship 
between reconciliation and the social reconstruction of conflict-affected 
societies. One of the challenges of conducting a comparative evaluation 
of the effect of reconciliation across cases is that, while there are common 
understandings of what constitutes truth commissions and criminal trials, 
reconciliation is usually guided by local sociopolitical practices and therefore 
varies across societies. In addition, it is usually more straightforward to 
identify when truth commissions and criminal trials have concluded, and 
what their outcomes are, at least in terms of what ‘truth’ they uncover 
and prosecutions they achieve. In contrast, it is questionable whether 
reconciliation has an end date or a final outcome; it may be more accurate 
to see reconciliation as an open, ongoing process. Weinstein has asked 
whether ‘closure [is] a valid concept and is the idea relevant across culture? 
Is resolution possible as an end-state?’ (2011, 5). Opotow has similarly 
argued that ‘labelling a conflict – particularly a violent, protracted, and 
deadly conflict – as reconciled can be dangerous’ as it can ‘raise hopes 
and expectations of victims, blunt bystander vigilance, and allow impunity 
to flourish’ (Opotow 2001, 166). Moreover, if a more nuanced, context-
specific approach to evaluating social reconstruction is adopted this is also 
likely to vary across cases, making comparison difficult.
One emerging consensus in the transitional justice literature informed by 
liberalism is that the increasing use of amnesties to facilitate reconciliation 
may have enhanced the risk of creating a culture of impunity. Indeed, 
one study that evaluated the consequences of reconciliation for social 
justice concluded that using amnesties to promote reconciliation can 
‘be particularly disheartening when it institutionalizes and legitimizes 
impunity’ (Opotow 2001, 161). A culture of impunity – that is, 
‘exemption from accountability, penalty, punishment, or legal sanction for 
perpetrators of illegal acts’ (Opotow 2001, 149; Afflito 2000; McSherry 
and Molina Mejia 1992; Penrose 1999) – is seen to undermine efforts to 
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establish the rule of law and respect for human rights. While much of the 
literature is implicitly guided by the liberal assumption that transitional 
justice should pursue criminal accountability, and consequently that 
impunity refers to avoiding criminal sanction, a culture of impunity can 
also emerge when perpetrators are perceived to have avoided participating 
(or participating meaningfully) in reconciliation or sanctions dictated 
by local justice practices. Indeed, because local justice practices remain 
influential in Bougainville, many people who committed crimes or 
human rights abuses during the conflict have been subject to customary 
sanctions even though they have avoided criminal sanction. 
Amnesties can go to the heart of the peace versus justice dilemma: on the 
one hand, amnesties are seen by some as a necessary sacrifice to achieve 
peace, by encouraging antagonistic groups to surrender their weapons 
and participate in reconciliation; on the other hand, others argue that 
meaningful peace cannot be achieved without justice (Mallinder 2007). 
In some cases, democratic governments have overcome amnesty laws 
to allow for criminal trials for past human rights violations (Lessa et al. 
2014). When this does not occur, studies have concluded that impunity 
can be conferred on perpetrators ‘under the guise of “reconciliation”’, 
as occurred in Guatemala (Molina Mejia 1999, 61), or that ‘impunity 
was called reconciliation’ in Chile (Paz 1999, 25). While amnesties and 
other provisions that facilitate impunity might be seen as necessary to 
end conflict, reconciliation predicated on impunity may be short-sighted 
and trade ‘short-term potential gains for a long-term continuation 
of impunity’ (Roht-Arriaza 1996, 99). Despite this, advocates have 
argued that amnesties ‘accompanied by traditional community-based 
justice mechanisms can co-exist with international prosecutions for 
those who are  “most responsible”’ for crimes. Amnesties can also be 
used ‘in  conjunction with restorative justice mechanisms to encourage 
perpetrators to participate without inculpating themselves’, as occurred 
in South Africa (Mallinder 2007, 221). In these cases, amnesties could 
be granted on the condition that perpetrators comply with the penalties 
imposed by the restorative justice mechanism, such as public identification 
and apology, community service or financial compensation.
Since the late 1990s, the United Nations has maintained that amnesties 
that  prevent prosecutions for war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity and other gross violations of human rights are ‘inconsistent’ 
with states’ obligations under the international human rights treaties, 
United Nations Policy and emerging principles of customary law 
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(OHCHR 2006). The  United Nations’ Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Remedy holds that victims have the right to ‘equal and 
effective justice’, ‘adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm 
suffered’ and ‘access to relevant information concerning violations and 
reparation mechanisms’ (United Nations General Assembly 2005). 
Indeed, the International Criminal Court and ad hoc criminal tribunals 
established by the United Nations for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia 
could disregard domestic amnesty laws and prosecute perpetrators of 
human rights abuses. States may also be legally obliged to prosecute 
under the Genocide Convention, Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Geneva 
Conventions (Orentlicher 1991).
Therefore, it has been argued that a ‘justice cascade has emerged, along 
with global human rights and accountability norms, the institutionalization 
and enforcement of those norms and the demand for the implementation of 
those norms by domestic and international human rights advocates’ (Lessa 
et al. 2014, 83). That is, at the international level transitional justice has 
been legalised and judicialised, and consequently accountability achieved 
via criminal trials is seen as the most legitimate means of achieving justice 
after conflict. Reflecting this justice cascade, there is increasing demand 
by international CSOs for criminal trials to overcome perceived impunity 
(Becker 2003; Loveman 1998). This demand has trickled down to CSOs 
in conflict-affected societies, in part because international CSOs have 
promoted these ideas, including via their funding. These interventions can 
have a distorting effect on CSOs in conflict-affected societies, as they can 
empower organisations willing (or able) to speak in the internationalised 
language of transitional justice and human rights, which usually consist 
of urban elites, while marginalising groups that are more focused on local 
sociopolitical practices, which usually operate at the grassroots level. 
As noted, conceptions of transitional justice guided by liberalism can also 
become highly technocratic and depoliticising, and with their relatively 
narrow focus on human rights obscure wider conversations about power, 
governance and justice. By arguing for criminal trials, which are usually 
conducted by the state against individual perpetrators in relation to 
individual victims, these conceptions can also reinforce both the state and 
the liberal emphasis on individualism.
In much of the transitional justice literature, ‘civil society’ is taken to 
include ‘nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), individual activists 
and other social groups, including human rights, victim, student, 
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neighbourhood and trade union organizations, that play an active role 
in generating conditions necessary to push governments to reckon with 
past atrocities’ (Lessa et al. 2014, 76). This characterisation is also shaped 
by liberalism and focuses on the public sphere – that is, an arena of 
association that is concerned with state affairs, but which is not part of the 
formal state structure (Habermas 1996). The focus on the public sphere 
raises questions over its adequacy in contexts where there is an unclear line 
between the public and private spheres, and where CSOs are not formally 
part of the state structure, yet cannot be easily separated from the state, or 
from the private sphere. Moreover, while much of the transitional justice 
literature (and indeed the broader literature on civil society) assumes that 
CSOs are secular, this definition raises questions regarding its relevance 
in contexts where much of what would be classified as civil society is 
faith based. These questions grow louder in contexts, such as the Pacific 
Islands, where states themselves are only shallowly rooted in society and 
many people do not have a strong understanding of themselves as citizens 
of a state. This highlights how much of the transitional justice literature 
perpetuates liberal assumptions regarding the relevance and legitimacy of 
states as actors capable of facilitating or complying with formal transitional 
justice mechanisms.
Conflict and reconciliation in Bougainville
The Bougainville conflict was complex; while it is often described as 
a  struggle between secessionist Bougainvilleans and the Papua New 
Guinea Government, it was also an internal conflict between – and within 
– pro- and anti-secessionist Bougainvillean elements, often based on 
localised concerns or criminal activity (Regan 2001; Boege 2009). Both 
Bougainvillean and international CSOs documented the many human 
rights abuses committed during the crisis.1 
Civil society, broadly defined, in Bougainville is dominated by faith-based 
and women’s organisations, although there is significant overlap between 
the two. The most prominent CSOs are centred on the three main churches 
(Catholic, Methodist and Seventh Day Adventist). Both during and since 
the conflict, Bougainvillean political leaders have sought counsel from 
1  During the crisis, women’s leader Marilyn Havini kept a record of human rights abuses that had 
been committed. Amnesty International also recorded abuses that occurred during the early stages 
of the crisis (Havini 1995, 1996; Amnesty International 1990). 
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the heads of the churches, and the current Bougainville president, John 
Momis, is a former Catholic priest who retains strong ties to the church. 
Church leaders play an important role in shaping public opinion via their 
sermons and, increasingly, via their ties to (or at least endorsements of ) 
political candidates (interview with an ABG official, 22 January 2011). 
The fact that many schools and health facilities are run by churches, and 
some are jointly funded by the church and the autonomous government, 
also provides the churches with considerable political weight (interview 
with an international academic, 8 January 2010; Masono 2006). Indeed, 
one public servant noted that the churches are ‘traditionally seen as the 
right hand of government in terms of development’ and consequently 
the autonomous government pays them ‘tithes’ (interview with an ABG 
official, 22 January 2011). Their weight has been enhanced by the fact 
that they have begun to engage in commercial projects such as real 
estate, hotels, shipping, agriculture and plantations. The influence of 
the churches at the local level has also been enhanced by the fact that 
they have syncretised or ‘interwoven’ their beliefs and practices with 
Bougainvillean culture ‘so that they combine custom and Christianity’ 
(Boege and Garasu 2004, 573).
Women’s CSOs are also active, including the secular Leitana Nehan 
Women’s Development Agency, Bougainville Women for Peace and 
Freedom, and Bougainville Women’s Federation and the faith-based 
Bougainville Inter-Church Women’s Forum (Hakena, Nines and Jenkins 
2006; Sirivi and Havini 2004). While some women’s groups are nominally 
secular, the women involved are often church leaders and their platforms 
are influenced by faith-based norms. Many of these groups date back to 
the conflict, when they were formed to promote reconciliation (interview 
with a women’s leader, 25 January 2011; interview with a women’s leader, 
2 February 2010). They then played an important role in promoting 
awareness of the peace process, and since autonomy have campaigned 
aggressively to promote women’s rights and development. 
According to local Bougainvillean sociopolitical practices, dispute 
resolution and societal cohesion follow a restorative justice approach guided 
by the principle of ‘balanced reciprocity’, which requires reconciliation 
– that is, truth-telling and forgiveness – and compensation to restore 
balance within the community (Regan 2005, 420). Consequently, local 
reconciliation practices have been prioritised, as they are seen as offering 
a way to ‘reunite us to be one people again’ and of ensuring that ‘whatever 
happened during the war is not passed on to the next generation’ 
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(Sister  Lorraine Garrasu speaking in Thompson 2002). Utilising local 
customary practices to effect reconciliation means that it is ‘irrevocable. 
Whatever we decide by these traditional means, will be guaranteed by 
society’ (Jon Boboso speaking in Thompson 2002). Under the influence 
of faith-based CSOs, reconciliation ceremonies have combined local 
practices with Christian principles (Boege 2012). This combination has 
enhanced their legitimacy, and these reconciliation efforts ‘have done 
more to consolidate popular commitment to peace than any other aspect 
of the process’ (Regan 2001, 15).
Pragmatic decisions made during the peace process have limited the scope 
for Bougainvillean CSOs to advocate for a formal transitional justice 
mechanism. In order for the Bougainville parties to the conflict to agree 
to a common position on which to negotiate peace with the Papua New 
Guinea Government, the Australian and New Zealand governments 
facilitated a number of peace talks, which first resulted in an interim 
ceasefire. To make that ceasefire permanent, the Bougainville parties and 
Papua New Guinea Government agreed to offer amnesties and pardons to 
persons involved in offences related to the conflict. This offer was legally 
enshrined in the Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001, and subsequently 
in the Papua New Guinea Constitution. Granting amnesties and pardons 
was seen as necessary in order to encourage combatants to participate in 
the weapons disposal process created by the peace agreement, particularly 
as the agreement had left the political status of Bougainville open, with the 
region granted extensive autonomy and the possibility of independence 
determined by a later referendum. 
To prepare Bougainville for the referendum, in 2008 the autonomous 
government developed a taskforce to support local reconciliation practices. 
Local-level reconciliation ceremonies had been ongoing throughout the 
conflict, had flourished during the peace process and have continued in 
the period since. Although they were not formally linked to the weapons 
disposal process, they helped to create an environment in which the process 
was deemed sufficiently advanced that the United Nations Observer 
Mission declared it completed in May 2005. However, many weapons 
remained in the community after autonomy. Consequently, in 2009 the 
autonomous government created a Ministry of Peace, Reconciliation and 
Weapons Disposal (later replaced by the Department of Bougainville Peace 
Agreement Implementation) and in 2012 it adopted a Peace, Security 
and Weapons Disposal Strategy. In 2013, Australia also began to fund 
the Bougainville Peace Building Strategy to encourage reconciliation and 
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weapons disposal. In 2017, the autonomous government and Papua New 
Guinea Government created an independent Bougainville Referendum 
Commission to conduct the referendum.
Evaluating the effects of reconciliation 
in Bougainville
As described, I use two criteria to evaluate the effects of reconciliation on 
social reconstruction in Bougainville: governance and justice.
Governance
Reconciliation conducted before, during and since the peace  process 
created  space for a highly participatory constitution-making 
process  during which Bougainvilleans negotiated the design of their 
governance institutions (Wallis 2014). They agreed that the Bougainville 
autonomous government would be a liberal institution, which includes 
a democratically elected legislature (the House of Representatives) and 
executive (the Bougainville President and Executive Council). 
Bougainvilleans appear to have embraced liberal democracy at the 
regional level, indicated by high levels of electoral participation 
(Regan  2009; Commonwealth Secretariat and PIF 2005). The voting 
strategies utilised by Bougainvilleans also illustrate the growing influence 
of liberal democracy, as there is evidence that voters have developed 
political sophistication by gradually shifting their focus away from the 
issues of the conflict and towards the performance of the autonomous 
government, appearing to prioritise immediate concerns of local conflict, 
progress in the implementation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement and 
improvements in Bougainville’s development (Regan 2010b). Evidence of 
growing acceptance of liberal democracy as a method of governance at the 
regional level is also provided by the fact that there has been no significant 
violence during, or after, autonomous government elections. Independent 
electoral observers have concluded that the elections were ‘democratic, 
transparent, inclusive and credible’ (Commonwealth Secretariat and 
PIFS 2010). One member of the autonomous government argued that 
this demonstrates the ‘maturity’ of Bougainvilleans in accepting the 
democratic process and moving away from conflict (Nisira 2010).
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However, to look only at formal governance institutions presents an 
incomplete picture of social reconstruction in Bougainville. During the 
constitution-making process, Bougainvilleans agreed that at the village 
level  local sociopolitical institutions should continue to perform much 
everyday governance. These local institutions consist of Village Assemblies 
at the level of the census village (of which there are approximately 600), 
which feed up into Councils of Elders (of  which there are 
approximately 90). The councils have been the ‘most effective governance 
institutions’ below the autonomous government (Boege  2008,  28), as 
they connect the ‘modern, formal’ autonomous government with the 
traditional Village Assemblies (interview with a former member of the 
ABG, 2 November 2010) that continue to regulate the lives of the over 
90 per cent of Bougainvilleans who live in rural areas (Finnroad 2008). 
The term ‘Village Assembly’ is used to describe these traditional systems 
of government, which are the (often loosely organised) methods by which 
traditional chiefs consult their people and perform their traditional 
administrative and dispute resolution role (Council of Elders Act, sections 
9–10; interview with an ABG official, 22 January 2011). The Village 
Assemblies are also said to provide a ‘pivotal link between the Council of 
Elders and the communities – and vice versa’ (Sasa 2013, 53).
Wider acceptance of the role of liberal democracy in governance among 
ordinary Bougainvilleans is more limited. The Councils of Elders are only 
nominally democratic: to achieve balance between the liberal emphasis 
on democratic elections and local emphasis on customary authority, 
councils are ‘mainly elective’, but must also ‘recognize the traditional 
role in governance of traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders’ 
(ABG Constitution, section 49). In practice, these elections are more 
like ‘selections’, as there is no competition of candidates, with council 
members chosen in a consensual manner, reflecting local practices 
(Boege 2013, 19).
Therefore, to evaluate the role that reconciliation has played in social 
reconstruction in Bougainville it is necessary to examine both the role of 
liberal democratic and of local sociopolitical governance institutions. This 
highlights how a study of Bougainville guided solely by the transitional 
justice literature focused on the importance of liberal democracy 
would miss the important role that local sociopolitical practices play in 
governance. Applying a more nuanced analysis to Bougainville suggests 
that reconciliation has helped to establish both effective and legitimate 
liberal and local governance institutions, as it has created an environment 
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in which Bougainvilleans have been able to negotiate and agree to the 
design of those institutions, and in which they have been able to peacefully 
work through them to govern Bougainville.
Justice
As with governance, there is a combination of both liberal and local 
sociopolitical justice mechanisms in Bougainville. At the regional level, 
the Bougainville Police Service seeks to enforce law and order, and the 
courts seek to uphold the rule of law. As a significant amount of court 
infrastructure was lost and many court files were destroyed during the 
conflict, during the early years of autonomy this challenged the ability of 
existing courts to function and the ability of the autonomous government 
to establish courts. As new court infrastructure has developed, the courts 
have been circuiting more regularly and they have made progress in 
clearing the backlog, particularly of serious criminal cases. The Office of 
the Public Solicitor also opened a new office in Bougainville in 2012 to 
provide legal advice to Bougainvilleans. Illustrating increasing awareness 
of the courts, there has been a rise in people seeking Interim Protection 
Orders in cases of violence against women and children. 
However, looking only at the police service and courts presents a partial 
view of the way justice is achieved in Bougainville. During public 
consultations on the draft constitution, many Bougainvilleans stated that 
they ‘want[ed] to see kastom [custom] built into, and recognised as part of, 
the justice system’ (Bougainville Constitutional Commission 2004, 55). 
Consequently, the Bougainville police are mandated to strengthen 
customary authority, respect human rights and develop ‘rehabilitatory 
and reconciliatory concepts of policing’. They are also required to ‘work 
in harmony and partnership’ with Councils of Elders, Village Assemblies 
and other traditional leaders ‘to resolve disputes and maintain law and 
order in communities’ (ABG Constitution, section 148(2)). Accordingly, 
the Bougainville Police Service incorporates the Bougainville Community 
Auxiliary Police Service, which is involved in ‘community dispute 
resolution and peace building practices’ as well as ‘law and order and 
conflict prevention’ (McGovern and Taga 2009; Dinnen and Peake 
2013). The auxiliary police also utilise a ‘community-based approach’ 
to policing and work closely with the Council of Elders and traditional 
leaders to mediate local disputes, encourage reconciliation and prevent 
the escalation of conflict (interview with an international adviser to the 
ABG, 31 August 2010; Dinnen and Peake 2013).
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The rule of law is also upheld by a combination of liberal and local justice 
mechanisms. The most established courts are the Village Courts created by 
Papua New Guinea law, which operate in most areas and have jurisdiction 
over any civil dispute arising in that area and over specified criminal matters 
(Village Courts Act 1973, sections 15, 23 and 25).2 While Village Courts 
are formal institutions, since magistrates are untrained and lawyers do not 
appear in Village Courts, it is usual for magistrates to utilise a ‘creative’ 
mix of formal and customary law (Goddard 2000, 242; Boege 2008; 
interview with a former member of the ABG, 2 November 2010). Village 
Courts are said to perform a valuable role, as they are ‘readily accessible’, 
‘relatively unbiased’ and offer a forum in which the local community ‘can 
witness the righting of wrongs and the reasonable settlement of disputes’ 
(Goddard 2000, 243). Village Courts are also able to provide outcomes 
that are ‘highly contextualised and consequently of considerable local 
credibility and legitimacy’ (Hegarty 2009, 3). However, Village Courts 
are said to be overworked and under-resourced,3 as until the formal justice 
system becomes well established the Village Courts are being asked to deal 
with cases that extend well beyond their powers (Bougainville Human 
Rights Committee 2011).
While these multiple layers of liberal and local mechanisms seek to impose 
law and order and uphold the rule of law, there is evidence that the 
provision of amnesties and pardons for crimes that occurred during the 
conflict has cultivated a culture of impunity as it has ‘given the impression 
to the general population that there is [sic] no consequences for abusing 
the rights of others’ (Bougainville Human Rights Committee 2011), 
particularly as perpetrators are perceived to have avoided participating 
(or participating meaningfully) in local reconciliation practices. During 
public consultations on the new constitution, Bougainvilleans were 
‘generally supportive’ of the amnesty and pardon provisions of the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement, but there was no consensus on how to 
otherwise deal with crimes that occurred during the conflict (Bougainville 
Constitutional Commission 2004, 251). Many Bougainvillean CSOs 
called for these amnesties to be conditional on a truth and reconciliation 
process involving ‘public recognition of wrong done and forgiveness’ (Sister 
Lorraine Garasu quoted in Howley 2002, 282), which reflects elements 
of local reconciliation practices. Ordinary Bougainvilleans expressed 
2  Including motor vehicle offences, minor assaults, drinking, property damage and disturbing 
the peace.
3  In 2011, Village Court magistrates were paid K2 per week (less than US$1).
173
7 . THE ROLE PLAyED By RECONCILIATION IN SOCIAL RECONSTRuCTION IN BOuGAINVILLE
mixed views on this proposal; some called for a truth and reconciliation 
commission to tell ‘the story of what happened’, others favoured 
customary reconciliation initiatives that are seen as ‘truly grounded in 
Bougainvillean culture’ (Bougainville Constitutional Commission 2004, 
252). Bougainvillean constitution-makers expressed less support, with 
some claiming that it would be ‘contrary to custom’ and could inhibit 
the weapons disposal process (Bougainville Constitutional Commission 
2004, 114–115). Consequently, the Constitution reiterates the amnesty 
and pardon provisions of the Bougainville Peace Agreement (ABG 
Constitution 2004, section 187 and Schedules 6.1 and 6.2), recognises 
that human rights ‘issues’ occurred during the crisis and requires the 
autonomous government to formulate a policy for dealing with them, 
and for effecting reconciliation that utilises Bougainville ‘customs and 
practices … so far as is possible’ (ABG Constitution 2004, section 187).
Bougainvillean political elites have continued to favour reconciliation 
guided by local sociopolitical practices in relation to the conflict. However, 
there are questions over the conduct of many customary reconciliations. 
While many reconciliations have been ‘inclusive affairs’ that have ‘brought 
entire communities together’, they have often ‘failed … to address the 
need for truth telling and justice for deeper healing’, instead encouraging 
a ‘forgive and forget’ approach to past wrongs either because perpetrators 
were perceived to lack sincerity or because the compensation offered 
or sanctions imposed were inadequate (Bougainville Human Rights 
Committee 2011).
Reconciliations have also become increasingly commercialised, with 
monetary compensation, along with financial support for travel to the 
reconciliation ceremony and food to conduct the ceremony, often seen as 
more important than the act of reconciliation itself. Indeed, there is an 
emerging culture of former combatants seeking compensation from the 
autonomous government or international donors before they participate 
in reconciliation ceremonies, which has raised questions about their 
sincerity and undermined the perceived legitimacy of those ceremonies. 
There has also been ‘no mechanism to ensure compliance’ with reparation 
agreements and other reciprocal arrangements agreed during reconciliation 
ceremonies (Bougainville Human Rights Committee 2011). When this is 
combined with the fact that there has been no formal transitional justice 
mechanism to deal with crimes committed during the crisis, there is some 
evidence that a culture of impunity has developed with respect to crimes 
committed since autonomy. As a result, Bougainvilleans are said to be 
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‘confused as to their rights to pursue justice in individual cases of severe 
abuse’ (Bougainville Human Rights Committee 2011). In the face of this 
perceived impunity, some families of victims are engaging in increasingly 
violent forms of ‘local justice’, including ‘horrific tortures and executions’ 
as ‘payback’, which is also having a detrimental effect on the rule of law 
(Bougainville Human Rights Committee 2011).
Conclusion
Therefore, it appears that reconciliation coupled with amnesties and 
pardons has played a mixed role in the social reconstruction of Bougainville. 
Governance mechanisms have been established that combine liberal 
and local sociopolitical practices and appear to be viewed as relatively 
legitimate, albeit with varying levels of effectiveness. The pursuit of justice 
has been more mixed, as the pragmatic decision by Bougainvillean elites 
to favour reconciliation over a formal transitional justice mechanism has 
contributed to the emergence of a culture of impunity.
As described, some Bougainvillean CSOs have led a push to create 
a truth and reconciliation commission (interview with a Bougainvillean 
women’s leader, 25 January 2011), noting that crimes and other human 
rights have been ‘hardly talked about and hardly discussed’ during the 
existing reconciliation process (Garasu in Howley 2002, 282). Yet the fact 
that the amnesty and pardon were enshrined in the Papua New Guinea 
and Bougainville constitutions means that they are ‘obstinate amnesties’ 
(Lessa et al. 2014, 85), which are difficult to wind back, although other 
cases have illustrated that sufficient momentum can lead to the repeal 
of such laws.4
However, questions have been raised about both these CSOs and  their 
proposals. The increased influence of international CSOs, and 
their  tendency to engage with and fund elite, Bougainvillean CSOs 
that speak in internationalised language of transitional justice and human 
rights, may be creating incentives for local CSOs to focus on such proposals. 
Only a small proportion of Bougainvilleans, mostly from educated, urban 
backgrounds, belong to such CSOs. Moreover, the individuals involved 
are often traditional or church leaders, or members of the autonomous 
government and local-level sociopolitical institutions. Therefore, it is 
4  Such as in Argentina.
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unclear whether these CSOs attract support because of this or because 
of the legitimacy of their proposals (Regan 2003). In addition, proposals 
to establish a formal transitional justice mechanism have largely failed to 
gain traction among ordinary Bougainvilleans, and consequently these 
CSOs have struggled to gain momentum for their proposals. Instead, 
a distinction may need to be drawn between the views of the primarily 
urban elites who are involved in CSOs, for whom international donors 
have created political space to advocate for such a commission, and 
those of people who are embedded within communities, who have more 
immediate developmental needs. Indeed, the Bougainville case highlights 
that, while international CSOs may advocate criminal trials as crucial to 
social reconstruction, many ordinary people in conflict-affected societies 
favour mechanisms that allow them to ‘reconcile in order to survive’ 
(interview with an international adviser to the ABG, 31 August 2010).
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Between kastom, church 
and commercialisation: 
Reconciliations on 
Bougainville as a form 
of ‘transitional justice’?
Volker Boege
Peacebuilding on Bougainville is entering a decisive phase. A referendum 
on  the future political status of the island, which is currently an 
autonomous  region within Papua New Guinea (PNG), is scheduled 
for November 2019. According to the Bougainville Peace Agreement 
(BPA) of August 2001, the referendum has to include independence 
as one option. It can be argued that only with the referendum and the 
peaceful implementation of its result will peacebuilding have reached 
a satisfactory conclusion.
Reconciliations are seen by Bougainvilleans as an indispensable 
ingredient  of peacebuilding. Countless reconciliations have been 
carried out already, and there are more to come. Efforts to speed up and 
complete  reconciliations are currently increasing, because unfinished 
reconciliations are seen as a major obstacle to the conduct of a free and 
fair referendum.
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While reconciliations are usually presented as the ‘traditional’ Bougainville 
approach to conflict resolution and justice, there are now many different 
types of reconciliations: reconciliations within and between families, 
clans and villages; between former conflict parties; at the political level 
in Bougainville; and in national and international politics. Concerns are 
growing about reconciliations losing their ‘traditional’ meaning, becoming 
superficial, tokenistic and commercialised, and thus less effective and 
legitimate. This could have serious negative impacts on peacebuilding, 
especially since more formal transitional justice mechanisms are of only 
minor significance. The BPA granted amnesty and pardon for offences 
arising out of the violent conflict. In marked contrast to other post-
conflict political settlements, no provisions for a truth and reconciliation 
commission (TRC) were put in place. Moreover, the formal court system 
is underdeveloped in post-conflict Bougainville.
Without a realistic option to take cases to the courts, without a TRC, 
and with immunity provisions in place, kastom reconciliation became 
the main avenue for transitional justice. Secular civil society actors, who 
elsewhere are prominent agents in the transitional justice discourse, are 
still quite weak in Bougainville. Moreover, they decided to also focus 
on reconciliations. Finally, the churches, which are by far the most 
influential civil society institutions on the ground, are deeply involved 
in reconciliation processes – in fact, kastom reconciliation usually entails 
Christian principles and practices.
In the following, I will explore the understanding(s) of reconciliation(s) in 
the local Bougainville context, the current state of reconciliations and their 
significance as an indigenous means of transitional justice. It will become 
clear that reconciliations in Bougainville are a long way from the Western 
transitional justice discourse. There is a tension between Bougainville-
style reconciliation(s) and the concept of reconciliation as promoted at 
the international level and pursued in peace interventions that follow the 
Western liberal peace and transitional justice approach.
Reconciliation(s) Bougainville-style
The ideal type of Bougainville reconciliation aims at the restoration of social 
harmony within and between communities and of social relationships 
between conflict parties (Boege and Garasu 2004; 2011). Reconciliation 
Bougainville-style is a concept that includes both Christian and kastom 
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elements (Garasu 2002; Howley 2002); it is a term deeply rooted in the 
Christian faith, and at the same time it captures the Bougainville kastom 
approach to conflict resolution.1
Reconciliation is a long-term, complex and complicated multifaceted 
process in which the wrongs of the past are acknowledged, responsibility 
is accepted and shared, and the basis for a common future is created. 
Reconciliation breaks the cycle of pay-back (retribution), reconstructing 
relations and trust.
It basically comprises the following stages:
first of all, an agreement between the two sides to reconcile, 
followed by a meeting with an exchange of gifts to show that peace 
has been restored and a first public reconciliation has taken place. 
Later, there will be further reconciliations and, finally much later, 
the offenders will very likely meet face to face with the victims 
and/or their relatives, admit their guilt, express sorrow and will be 
forgiven. (Howley 2002, 109)2
Often there is no clear-cut boundary between victims and perpetrators. 
The victims of today might have been the perpetrators in the past, and 
vice versa. In a war like the one fought in Bougainville, the phenomenon 
of victims-turned-perpetrators and perpetrators-turned-victims is quite 
common. And these victim-perpetrators have to live together again and 
to build a shared future in closely knit communities.
The conflict parties striving for reconciliation usually invite a neutral third 
party to steer the process, mostly respected community leaders who are 
highly esteemed for their knowledge of kastom, the history of communities 
and relationships of the parties in conflict, of kinship ties and of social 
circumstances prevailing in the conflict setting. As Bougainville has an 
oral culture, their knowledge of stories and their skills in storytelling are 
1  Kastom, a Pidgin derivative of the English ‘custom’, is referred to by both politicians and grassroots 
people in Melanesia today in order to stress their cultural heritage and the difference between their 
own ways and foreign ways of governance, often depicting kastom as rooted in ancient pre-colonial 
traditions, a set of rules developed by the ancestors (Keesing 1993, 589). Kastom governance is thus 
presented as the other of, or even alternative to, introduced state-based institutions and forms of 
governance. At the same time, kastom is different from the customs of the pre-contact past. It has 
developed since the times of first contact and colonisation in the course of interaction and exchange 
of pre-contact custom and various external influences – Christian missions, colonial administrations, 
institutions of the nation state and the market economy. Hence kastom is not anachronistic, fixed and 
static, it continually changes in the course of dealing with new challenges.
2  For an ideal typical traditional reconciliation process, see Tanis (2002).
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important for the process. Their rich experience, their skills in setting 
(and interpreting) signs of reconciliation enable them to reach a resolution 
that is acceptable to all sides.
In the process, a common understanding of the causes and the history 
of the  conflict has to be developed. Conflict parties have to negotiate 
a consensus regarding the interpretation of the past. Only once such 
a  consensus has been achieved can reconciliation take its course. 
Perpetrators are helped to see their roles in the conflict more clearly, retrace 
their steps, acknowledge that they have disrupted social networks and even 
caused violence. This is the foundation for taking responsibility for their 
wrongdoings and for admitting guilt. Perpetrators then have to apologise 
to the ones they wronged and ask for forgiveness. Victims must develop 
a willingness to accept the apologies and forgive. Heartfelt repentance and 
confession on the part of the offenders and heartfelt forgiveness on the part 
of the victims are the building blocks of reconciliation. Reconciliation is 
not ‘forgive and forget’, but to remember without feelings of hatred and 
desire for revenge.
This kind of reconciliation is not a one-off event or a quick fix. It needs time. 
Slowness, breaks and ‘time outs’ are deliberately built into reconciliation 
processes to give parties time to calm down, assess the state of the process 
so far, reformulate their position and to prepare themselves spiritually and 
emotionally for a resolution.
Once solutions are found, they are ratified in highly ritual forms. 
Ceremonies mark the culminating points of the reconciliation process. 
Usually there is not one reconciliation ceremony, but a series of 
ceremonies, according to the progress of reconciliation. The ceremonies 
vary from area to area,3 but generally they encompass rituals such as 
breaking spears and arrows, drinking and eating together from the same 
dish, singing and dancing together or chewing betelnut together. These 
symbolic activities are expressions of commitment and trust and are more 
powerful than mere spoken or written words. Finally, gifts are exchanged 
(pigs, shell money, food, cash or a combination of all these  items). 
3  In some places, for instance, people bury large stones. ‘The significance of the stone is that it is 
heavy and it does not move and it gives a sign of strong and unchanging reconciliation between the 
people’ (Howley 2002, 111). In other places the parties ‘would plant tangget plants on stone. This 
symbolised their promise to forget the past and remain as silent as stone. Anyone who violated 
this agreement would be cursed by the stone and any talebearer would be punished by its strength’ 
(Tanis 2002, 59).
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The  whole community participates. Church services and prayers are 
usually an integral part of these activities, as ‘Christian principles of 
reconciliation have conveniently found their place in the culture and 
have, indeed, added a great deal to the process, through the incorporation 
of prayers and public acknowledgements by priests and church ministers’ 
(Tanis 2002, 60).4 Church leaders were and are particularly active in 
initiating and stabilising reconciliation processes. There are reconciliations 
that are carried out in the church context only. They are  cheaper 
(no compensation has to be paid), but often also lack legitimacy because 
the kastom dimension is missing. They tend to be seen as a kind of 
‘second class’ reconciliation, although for strong Christian believers they 
can be the ‘real’ reconciliations. The involvement of the churches is the 
most significant and visible expression of ‘civil society’ participation in 
reconciliation processes, although the people who participate in these 
reconciliations hardly think of the churches as civil society actors in the 
Western liberal sense of the term.
Reconciliation ceremonies are loaded with spiritual meaning. Ceremony 
is an important vehicle for cleansing and purification. Mental healing 
is an important aspect of reconciliation. Reconciliation is not only an 
issue of reason and the intellect. It is a deeply emotional and spiritual 
experience. Reconciliation is about deeply felt remorse, shame and the 
desire for forgiveness. It is about deeply felt grief, anger and sorrow and 
the desire to forgive. It is about mending hearts.5 It is about repairing 
broken relationships and restoring harmony so that people can live in 
peace not only with each other, but also with God and the spirits of the 
dead. God is present in reconciliation, and so are the spirits of the dead.6 
Social relations are guarded by the spirit world. Whenever social relations 
break down, the spirit world is affected. The worlds of the living and 
the dead are closely interconnected. Conflicts also play out in the spirit 
world. This is why cleansing rituals that appease the spirits are linked 
to reconciliation. If such cleansing rituals are not performed, the spirits 
of the fallen will not rest but come back and haunt the living. If the 
spirits of the dead cannot be appeased, all kinds of misfortune will befall 
4  This is very similar to the relationship between kastom and Christianity in the Solomon Islands, 
see Jeffery (2013, 213).
5  See the title of Pat Howley’s highly informative and moving book: Breaking Spears and Mending 
Hearts (Howley 2002).
6  Most Bougainvilleans are devout Christians, but this does not replace belief in the spirit world. 
Rather, this goes together; there is mixing and blending.
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the communities – illness, accidents, madness, death. So in the course of 
a reconciliation process the spirits will be called on to remove any illness 
that has befallen the community because of the conflict and bring back 
healing to the sick and the community at large.
Proper burials of the dead are highly important. In fact, one major problem 
for reconciliation after the war was, and still is today, that many people 
who were killed have not been buried in a culturally appropriate manner. 
Relatives do not know where the remains of their kin are, or there are 
graves with bones that have not been identified. In order to find peace 
and to reconcile, the dead have to be given a proper burial (UNDP 2014, 
12, 32). The unburied dead have an influence on the lives of the living, 
both the perpetrators and the relatives of the victims. Therefore, finding 
and bringing home the bodies, burying them properly and grieving 
at their graves is an indispensable dimension of reconciliation. This is 
why the topic of ‘missing persons’ looms large in the current stage of 
peacebuilding on Bougainville.7
With reconciliation at the heart of peacebuilding, justice is restorative 
rather than punitive (although punitive/retributive elements can be part 
of kastom conflict settlements). On Bougainville today there is much 
talk about restorative justice. This modern term mirrors the approaches 
to justice that were and are an integral part of Bougainville customary 
conflict resolution (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy and Dunn 2010, 
122–124). As a Bougainville chief states: ‘Restorative justice is not a new 
method in our societies. It is what our ancestors used for thousands of years 
to resolve minor and major disputes, up until colonial times’ (Tombot 
2003: 259). It is grounded in a fundamentally relational understanding 
of people and society – an understanding that necessitates and enables 
justice to be pursued as a way of restoring relationships that were severed, 
7  Similar beliefs can be found in other post-conflict societies in the Global South. For East 
Timor, for example, Robins reports that a central need of victims ‘was the performance of rituals 
that would permit the spirits of the dead to rest in peace, and this was emphasized in Timor where 
the consequences of not performing rituals for the dead were believed to be the potential sickness 
and death of family members’ (Robins 2013, 53). ‘For Timorese families a malign spirit is the most 
negative potential impact of a missing relative; addressing the issue of those who died in the conflict 
means not only addressing the needs of their families but also the demands of the spirits … the peace 
of the nation is dependent upon this, with recent violence perceived as arising from the many spirits 
of the conflict dead still not at rest’ (Robins 2013, 54; see also Grenfell, Chapter 2, this volume).
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disrupted or destroyed by violence and wrongdoing.8 Priority is given 
not to the punishment of individual offenders, but to the restoration of 
social harmony within and between communities and the restoration 
of relationships between the communities of offenders and victims. 
In Bougainville, reconciliation and restorative justice are ‘twin frameworks 
for peacebuilding’ (Llewellyn and Philpott 2014, 14).
For restorative justice and reconciliation, the exchange of gifts plays 
an important role. Gifts to compensate for damage done and wrongs 
committed serve to cement reconciliation. Reconciliations thus do not 
only aim at spiritual and emotional healing, but they also have a material 
side. Reparations are signs for and part of restoring relationships. 
Traditionally, gifts were items held precious by the communities such 
as shell money, pigs, mats and food. Nowadays cash and modern goods 
are also exchanged. Gifts are exchanged as a symbol of the restoration 
of relationships. The exchange is an outward sign of reconciliation. 
Its purpose is to ‘wash away the tears’. A Bougainville elder explains:
When we make peace, it is not the food and it is not the pigs and 
it is not the speeches. It is the people saying ‘I forgive you. You 
forgive me. Let us get on with our lives’. All the rest – the pigs, 
and the food and the speeches – are just the outwards signs of 
our peace making. The shell-money is something that people see 
and they can put their mind on as the sign of our making peace. 
(Peter Mekea, quoted from Howley 2002, 103)
Pat Howley makes a clear distinction between such an exchange of gifts 
and compensation, and he explains the difference as follows:
Gifts – yes, restitution for damages such as burned houses – yes, 
but no compensation. A gift is to wash away the tears; it in no 
way is a payment for the loss incurred. Compensation is for gain 
and is equivalent to setting a value on the life of a loved one. 
With a gift, one asks for forgiveness; with compensation, there is 
no forgiveness and the person is attempting something which 
is impossible, that is putting a value on something that cannot be 
bought or paid for. (Howley 2002, 126)
8  On restorative justice and reconciliation as relational conceptions of justice as opposed 
to a  liberal  individualist notion with its focus on individual offenders and their punishment, 
see Llewellyn and Philpott (2014).
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In reality, however, this distinction, with the giving of gifts as an integral 
part of kastom reconciliation, and compensation (meaning in particular 
the payment of cash) as a deviation from kastom, is becoming more and 
more blurred. People complain that the ‘true’ customary meaning of the 
exchange of material goods in the context of reconciliation processes 
is being lost. There are indeed people who try to instrumentalise 
reconciliation, including those who use reconciliation and accompanying 
compensation to make money (see below).
So let us have a closer look at the realities of reconciliation(s) on 
Bougainville today.
Reconciliations today – between kastom 
and commercialisation
Part of the post-conflict political settlement on Bougainville was the 
constitutional guarantee of immunity from prosecution in respect of 
offences arising from crisis-related activities. The Lincoln Agreement of 
January 1998, which terminated violent conflict, declaring a ‘permanent 
and irrevocable ceasefire’, as well as the BPA-granted amnesty and 
pardon ‘for all persons involved in crisis related activities or convicted 
of offences arising out of crisis related activities’ (BPA, clause 33).9 
Immunity regulations were incorporated into the PNG and Bougainville 
constitutions. They covered a broad range of issues and in general 
applied to the time period between 1 October 1988 and 30 August 2001 
(signing of the BPA).10
The amnesty and pardon regulations were complemented by the decision 
to deal with human rights abuses and other wrongs committed during 
the war through kastom reconciliation. The Bougainville Constitutional 
Commission (BCC) in its final 2004 report recommended that ‘as far 
as possible … Bougainville kastom’ should be used ‘when dealing with 
human rights abuses and pursuing reconciliation’ (BCC 2004, 199); and 
9  The BPA states that ‘the arrangements for pardon and amnesty are intended to reduce 
tensions and divisions that could continue to flow from the conflict’ (BPA, clause 341(d)). See also 
clause 10 (Amnesty and Pardon) of the ‘Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on 
Bougainville’, 23 January 1998. 
10  See Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Schedule 6.1 and 6.2. Declaration 
in respect of immunity (pp. 159–160). There are exceptions for which other dates were set, in particular 
with regard to the possession, ownership and control of firearms.
191
8. BETWEEN KASTOM, CHURCH AND COMMERCIALISATION
in cases where the courts would become involved, they would have to ‘take 
any customary settlements of matters before them into account’ (ibid.).11 
Clause 185 in the Bougainville Constitution allows for the establishment 
of ‘a special human rights enforcement body’ with powers to ‘encourage 
reconciliation among parties involved in abuses or infringement of human 
rights (including all parties in the Bougainville conflict)’, and clause 186 
stipulates that ‘customary methods of dealing with such abuses [of human 
rights] should be utilized wherever possible’. Such a ‘special human rights 
enforcement body’ has not been set up. No  truce and reconciliation 
commission was established. Whether to have one or not was discussed, 
but no consensus could be reached (Wallis 2014, 294), and the debate 
about pros and cons of a TRC is ongoing even today.12
With the immunity provisions in place, without a realistic option to 
take cases to the courts and without a TRC, kastom reconciliation in fact 
became the main avenue for transitional justice. And in general it has 
worked well.
There is no doubt about the importance of kastom reconciliation for 
peacebuilding on Bougainville (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy 
and Dunn 2010, 67–76). As the war was not only waged between the 
government of PNG and its Bougainvillean allies on the one hand 
and the secessionist Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) on the 
other, but a complex mixture of this ‘big’ war and a host of ‘mini wars’ 
that were fought under the umbrella of the ‘big’ war in various local 
contexts, it was not sufficient to merely end the war of secession by 
political negotiations, it was also necessary to terminate the ‘mini wars’ 
and build peace at the local level. The parties fighting each other were 
not anonymous mass armies but mostly people who knew each other – 
they were ‘intimate enemies’ (Theidon 2006). Building peace between 
them was done by drawing on kastom ways of conflict resolution and 
reconciliation. This happened in many places all over Bougainville over 
the last two decades, and it continues today. These ‘local reconciliation 
efforts have done more to consolidate popular commitment to peace than 
any other aspect of the process’ (Regan 2001, 15). They were the means 
to restore social networks and relations that had broken down during 
the war, and to restore social trust and a sense of moral order. Secular 
11  See Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, clauses 185 and 186.
12  In neighbouring Solomon Islands a different path was taken, with mixed results. See Jeffery 
2013; Cronin, Chapter 10, this volume. 
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civil society organisations were involved to a certain extent. Oftentimes 
supported by international partners like Care Australia, Save the Children 
or the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, local 
NGOs (for example, the Nazareth Centre for Rehabilitation, Nasioi 
Peacebuilding Association, Bougainville Indigenous Dialogue or the 
Bougainville Healthy Communities Program) carried out specific peace 
projects that initiated or contributed to reconciliations. Even more 
important, however, were the churches, given their local embeddedness in 
each and every place in Bougainville.
The processes at the grassroots level were of decisive importance for 
the stabilisation of the overall peace and the success of peacebuilding 
at the ‘higher’ political levels. While in conventional Western academic 
and political thinking ‘the top-down story is the master narrative and 
the bottom-up reconciliations are subsidiary’, in the Bougainville case 
‘in important ways the bottom-up micro narratives subsume and infuse 
the top-down peace’ (Braithwaite 2011, 140). While secular civil society 
organisations have only played minor roles, the churches, embedded as 
they are in the local context, have managed to substantially influence and 
shape these ‘micro narratives’.
There are problems, however. Some reconciliation processes have been 
dragging on for a long time, and others have not yet started. Particularly in 
light of the November 2019 referendum there is a growing sense of urgency 
with regard to outstanding or unfinished reconciliations, and efforts to 
speed up reconciliations are intensifying. In recent times, so-called ‘mass 
reconciliations’ have gained prominence. In these ‘mass reconciliations’ 
a number of diverse cases in one region are lumped together and dealt 
with in one process. The last phase before the referendum, from mid-2018 
onwards, saw a marked increase in the numbers of mass reconciliations 
dealing with crisis-related issues. They often were organised by District 
Peace and Security Committees (formal governance institutions). They 
have taken place in various regions of Bougainville, even in areas where 
current non-crisis-related divisions run deep (e.g. in the Panguna mine 
area). Mass reconciliations draw wide public attention, and they are 
propagated by the political elite as the means to finally wrap up the 
reconciliation business. It is not clear how effective and legitimate these 
mass reconciliations will be in the longer term. They clearly represent 
a deviation from what so far has been seen as kastom reconciliation. 
Such mass reconciliations serve a political purpose, which is important 
but can leave wounds open at the interpersonal level. In general, people 
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approve of mass reconciliations because they see the need to speed up 
reconciliation processes in view of the upcoming referendum, but they 
also insist on the significance of more intimate clan-, family- and group-
based reconciliations. Often these ‘small’ reconciliations are perceived 
as stepping stones towards mass reconciliations. One view is that the 
small ‘clan’ or ‘ward’ reconciliations have to come first, and the bigger 
‘community’ or ‘mass’ reconciliations later. Others, however, hold the 
view that initial more symbolic mass reconciliations can serve as the 
starting point for more meaningful and effective ‘small’ reconciliations.
Then there is the issue of money. Reconciliations are costly, and they 
can be used as a money-making device. Bringing people together for 
reconciliation ceremonies and feeding them, and providing the gifts/
compensation items, often costs a lot of money. This is why parties who 
want to reconcile increasingly ask for outside assistance, mainly in the 
form of cash. Such outside assistance started in the times of the Peace 
Monitoring Group (PMG) and the United Nations Observer Mission on 
Bougainville (UNOMB) immediately after the war. Over time it became 
more and more normal that outsiders would provide the resources that 
make reconciliations possible, and for conflict parties to demand such 
outside support (UNDP 2014, 12). Today, for example, the Australian-
funded Bougainville Peacebuilding Program pays for reconciliations. 
Sometimes this even goes as far as parties demanding the money they 
have to pay as compensation from outside sources. In fact, compensation 
is increasingly in the form of cash – in addition to or instead of traditional 
items such as pigs or shell money. Reconciliations today can be a means to 
make money. Moreover, many reconciliations today are not crisis-related 
any more, but deal with post-crisis or current issues, and sometimes one 
gets the impression that conflicts are incited in order to make money out 
of the ensuing reconciliations.
Bougainvilleans have a tendency to blame outsiders for the 
commercialisation/monetisation/commodification of reconciliations – 
these outsiders brought the money in and thus distorted the true meaning 
of Bougainville customary reconciliation, undermining its legitimacy. 
Over and over again you can hear the complaint that ‘it is all about 
money’. But at the same time, many Bougainvilleans also complain about 
the cost of reconciliations and say that they therefore need the money 
from outside sources.
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Despite this trend, many of today’s reconciliations are not 
commercialised,  with conflict parties deliberately abstaining from 
compensation in the form of money (or with money only as a minor 
element in the mix of gifts exchanged), and the parties themselves 
providing the food, covering the costs of transport and so on. People are 
very proud of these – as they see them – ‘true’ reconciliations, contrasting 
them with what they call phoney reconciliations. Phoney reconciliation is 
superficial, hollow tokenism or a way to make money. A report about such 
a phoney reconciliation says that it ‘meant nothing because the organisers 
used government money and the preparation and the discussion essential 
to any genuine reconciliation did not take place’ (Howley 2002, 17). This 
kind of phoney reconciliation is in itself a cause of conflict, because people 
‘are angry because the value of the traditional form has been debased by 
people in high places’ (Howley 2002, 117) who make ‘reconciliation’ 
‘a sham’ (ibid., 118).
This criticism often is applied to reconciliation efforts in the political 
realm. When it comes to reconciliation in the context of politics, things 
become difficult indeed. Reconciliation at the interpersonal level is 
a  painful and complicated emotional and spiritual process, and these 
dimensions are usually excluded from the political sphere. Nonetheless, 
people expect that their leaders who deal with the high-level political 
processes also pay due attention to the necessities of reconciliation, 
but then often criticise as hollow tokenism the inclusion of gestures of 
reconciliation into political negotiations and agreements. Nevertheless, 
paying tribute to customary and Christian symbols of reconciliation 
in the high-level political context has contributed to peacebuilding. 
It is of importance for the people to see their leaders adhere to kastom 
reconciliation, even if political reconciliations are of another quality than 
the interpersonal customary community reconciliations described above 
(Tanis 2002).13
There is a lot of talk about the need to reconcile with ‘Papua New 
Guinea’, or with ‘Australia’, or with the ‘Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force’ (PNGDF). On the other hand, there is a lot of uncertainty 
about what this could look like. National or international reconciliation 
is obviously different from reconciliation in the local interpersonal 
context. Attempts for reconciliations with the PNG Government and the 
13  On the relation between ‘bottom-up interpersonal reconciliation’ and ‘top-down political 
reconciliation on the grand scale’ see Bloomfield (2006, 27–28).
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PNGDF that so far have been made are generally seen as unsatisfactory, 
and political leaders are blamed for that. Almost the same difficulty 
arises with regard to reconciliations between the political leaders of 
various Bougainville factions – for example, between the Autonomous 
Bougainville Government (ABG) and the Meekamui movement, or 
between the various factions of Meekamui.14 The big question is how 
to upscale or transfer an approach that works in the local community 
context to other contexts, without that approach being instrumentalised 
and thus losing legitimacy and effectiveness.
This is a fundamental question, which points to the limits of customary 
reconciliation. From what has been said so far, it should have become clear 
that customary reconciliation hinges on the existence of a community 
of relationships and values that are rooted in a common view of the 
world and a shared acknowledgement of customary institutions. It works 
within and between relatively small communities in the local context. 
Conflicts among the members of the ‘we-group’ of the community can 
be addressed and solved this way. Conflicts between neighbouring local 
communities pose relatively small problems, because some overarching 
customary principles can usually be developed and applied that allow for 
the creation of common ground. In other words: kastom reconciliation 
works for ‘intimate enemies’ (Theidon 2006), people who are bound by 
some kind of relationships, a shared worldview and shared norms. Dealing 
with outsiders is much more difficult. Conflicts between ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
who do not share our culture, are much more difficult to tackle. If ‘they’ 
do not understand, do not respect, or are unwilling to be included in ‘our’ 
ways of conflict resolution, reconciliation becomes very difficult or even 
impossible (Boege 2006).
14  The Meekamui movement emerged from the BRA. It comprises those ex-BRAs who have not 
joined the peace process officially, but also do not disrupt it. Meekamui is still in control of the area 
around the Panguna mine in central Bougainville and pockets of territory in South Bougainville. 
The  Meekamuis have their own structures of governance, but also cooperate with the ABG. The 
‘border’ between the Meekamui-controlled areas and the rest of Bougainville is rather porous, and 
there is considerable exchange. Over the years, the Meekamui movement has split into several factions. 
At present, complicated processes of rapprochement between the ABG and Meekamui, between the 
different Meekamui factions, and between the Meekamuis and their former comrades from the BRA, 
are underway, which might lead to some kind of ‘reunification’ in the future. In light of the upcoming 
referendum on independence, there is general agreement that ‘unity’ of all Bougainville political 
factions is urgently needed, and efforts have intensified to achieve that unity. In 2016 and 2017 
several important reconciliations between these political factions have taken place. 
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This problem became obvious in the attempts to reconcile with Rio 
Tinto/Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), the company that operated 
the Panguna mine and that by many Bougainvilleans is seen as the main 
culprit in the Bougainville saga.15 There is general acknowledgement 
that there has to be reconciliation with Rio Tinto/BCL and, over the last 
years, BCL had indicated that it was willing to come in for reconciliation. 
A  lot of thought and effort from various sides was put into making 
‘bel kol ’ possible (McKenna 2015). Bel kol (cooling of the heart) is the 
very first symbolic step in a longer reconciliation process, a gesture of 
willingness to start reconciliation. Various dates for a bel kol ceremony 
were announced, but the ceremony had to be postponed again and 
again. Stakeholders could not agree on the content, form and meaning 
of bel kol, and some stakeholders remained opposed to it. The consensus 
necessary for reconciliation could not be reached. There were some who 
said that bel kol, as planned, would not be  genuine reconciliation, but 
only about money. And there were others who obviously were interested 
in just that: money, who wanted to make more money out of bel kol. 
Now that the BCL majority shareholder Rio Tinto has walked away from 
BCL and the Panguna mine, most probably there will be no bel kol in the 
forseeable future.
Another fundamental question concerns the relationship between kastom 
reconciliation and human rights, and women’s rights in particular.16 
Whether serious human rights violations and crimes such as torture 
or pack rape that were committed during the war can appropriately be 
dealt with in the frame of kastom reconciliation is questionable. There 
was considerable sexual violence against women during the Bougainville 
war, which is difficult to discuss in public.17 Here the question arises as 
to whether ‘traditional’ kastom reconciliation is adequate to deal with 
‘modern’ forms of violence that had not been part of traditional societal 
life and conflict. In other words, kastom reconciliation is not a panacea 
for all ills. Joanne Wallis rightly makes the point that ‘the decision to 
prioritise local customary reconciliation over prosecution in formal justice 
institutions for crimes committed during the crisis, and the resulting 
15  Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) was majority owned by Rio Tinto (previously Conzinc 
Riotinto of Australia (CRA)). In 2016, Rio Tinto withdrew from BCL and transferred its shares in 
the company to the ABG and the PNG Government.
16  See Wallis, Chapter 7, this volume; George 2016.
17  This is similar to Solomon Islands or East Timor. For those cases, see Guthrey (2016) and 
Vella (2014a, 2014b). On the ‘perceived incompatibility between cultural norms and publicly airing 
sensitive stories’ (Guthrey 2015, 5), see Guthrey (2015, 161–162).
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developing culture of impunity, highlights the challenge of achieving 
a  balance between liberal and local customary practices’ (Wallis 2014, 
296; see also Wallis, Jeffery and Kent 2016, 174).
Finally, there is the question of power relations. Power is not absent 
from reconciliation. Who is in a position to determine the need for 
reconciliation in a specific case? Whose interests are served, and whose 
not? How do power imbalances play out in reconciliation processes?
Imbalances with regard to age, kinship networks or resourcefulness play 
a role, but the most prominent imbalance is gender related; with regard 
to ‘asymmetries in power structures, gender relations and gender-specific 
experiences of violence need to be considered’ (Fischer 2011, 423). 
Although it would be misleading to think of women in Bougainville 
as generally powerless or less powerful than men,18 in certain contexts 
gendered power relations are significant, and this can affect the position 
of women in reconciliations. Furthermore, young people generally have 
a lesser status in communities than older people. The very old, old widows 
in particular can also be powerless (if they lack family support), and there 
are clans or extended families that are more powerful than others. These 
power asymmetries can all affect reconciliations.19
Conclusions
Reconciliations in Bougainville have not much to do with the Western 
reconciliation and transitional justice discourse. That discourse does not 
pay much attention to historical, social and cultural contexts. In fact, as 
‘a highly normative formula with universalist claims, the reconciliation 
discourse tends to make context a blind spot’ (Eastmond 2010, 5). Or, as 
Erin Baines put it: ‘International and national policy makers have imposed 
a uniform approach on justice after conflict, ignoring the complex local 
dynamics that are most relevant to people’s lives’ (Baines 2010, 415).
18  Most communities in Bougainville are matrilineal, with a relatively strong position of women 
in the customary social context. Bougainville women were highly influential actors in peacebuilding 
(Havini and Sirivi 2004; King 2009).
19  For a critique of ‘ethnojustice’, including customary reconciliation, see Branch (2014), who 
argues that this type of justice consolidates ‘a patriarchal, gerontocratic order’ (p. 616) and ‘empowers 
older men at the expense of youth and women’ (p. 619).
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Reconciliations in Bougainville are indeed highly context-specific, and 
the term has to be understood in this specific context. Bougainville 
reconciliations serve communities for which the maintenance of social 
relationships is essential to their members’ material and spiritual wellbeing 
and security. They are geared towards the restoration of relationships 
between ‘intimate enemies’ after violent conflict, including the restoration 
of relationships with the spirit world and God. They do not necessarily 
lead from point A – violence, conflict – to point B – conflict resolution, 
harmony – in a linear way. They are complex and open-ended; ‘final 
settlements’ are not ‘final’ at all, but are open to renegotiation at some 
time in the future. The past is not past: it can resurface (or be made to 
resurface) at any time; ‘resolutions’ therefore are not really ‘resolutions’. 
Accordingly, reconciliation ‘describes a process rather than an end 
state or outcome’ (Fischer 2011, 415). This does not fit well with the 
conventional mainstream understanding of transitional justice in the 
Western-dominated international discourse.
Reconciliations are embedded in the everyday life of communities 
as merely one aspect. People want to get on with their ‘normal lives’, 
and reconciliations matter only inasmuch as they (hold the promise 
to) make this possible. This pragmatic approach to reconciliation pays 
attention to restorative justice and material reparation, at the same time 
though it is not in contrast to the emotional and spiritual importance 
of reconciliation; rather, the material and the spiritual elements go 
hand in hand, given that everyday life is imbued with spirituality and 
emotions. Reconciliations that are motivated by pragmatic considerations 
do not pay much attention to legal concerns. They are definitely not 
the functional equivalent of legal procedures.20 Legal, normative and 
institutional questions are of little relevance to these reconciliations, 
which are embedded in specific worldviews and cosmologies, from which 
they draw their meaning and moral might. Furthermore, Bougainville 
reconciliations connect reason and emotion. While in Western concepts, 
peacebuilding is (or is presented as being) very much an issue of reason, 
rational procedures and rational politics, for Bougainville reconciliations, 
feelings and spirituality are crucial. Rational elements play a role, but 
peace cannot be built, and justice cannot be restored, without addressing 
people’s emotions and spirituality. This is why the churches have 
20  It is a common misunderstanding that ‘customary law’, ‘traditional courts’ and ‘customary 
conflict resolution’ are functional equivalents of, and can operate like, statutory law, state courts and 
alternative dispute resolution, filling the gaps if the latter are absent.
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a prominent place in Bougainville reconciliations, in contrast to secular 
civil society organisations that are bound to Western understandings of 
transitional justice.
Finally, one significant advantage of reconciliations of the Bougainville 
type is that people can implement them themselves: they have agency, 
they are in control, they have voice. Reconciliations are sociocultural 
mechanisms at people’s immediate disposal, they are familiar with the 
process and they know what outcomes can be expected. This marks an 
important difference to TRCs, trials and other mechanisms of transitional 
justice; these are not at the disposal of and under the control of ordinary 
community members, they lack clarity of process and outcomes for the 
community, and in them victims and perpetrators are largely objects 
of external mechanisms (Guthrey 2015, 2016). This is not to say that 
TRCs and so forth cannot be valuable and necessary. What I tried to 
say in this chapter is that context-specific, locally grounded reconciliation 
can make a decisive contribution to peacebuilding. This, at least, is the 
case in Bougainville, and perhaps this type of reconciliation is actually 
transitional justice.
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Vernacularising ‘child rights’ 
in Melanesian secondary 
schools: Implications for 
transitional justice
David Oakeshott1
As the linkages between education and transitional justice have become 
more explicit in the last decade (Cole 2007; Ramírez-Barat and Duthie 
2015), attention has centred overwhelmingly on the role of the state 
in those linkages. Cole and Murphy (2009, 3) have framed education 
as a justice institution where ‘students first come into contact with 
official structures of their society’. Paulson (2009, 10) has argued that 
post-conflict investment in education could signal to citizens their 
government’s commitment to peace. And Cole (2007, 123) argues that 
for transitional justice, education can ‘potentially function as a secondary 
phase (after trials and truth commissions) that reflects the  state’s 
commitment to institutionalising transitional justice’. Even at the school 
level, King (2014), McCully (2012) and Quaynor (2012) have argued 
that pedagogical reform to promote critical thinking and open dialogue 
among students models democratic politics far better than the rote 
memorisation of curricular content.
1  The author’s research is supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program 
(RTP) Scholarship. Dr John Cox, La Trobe University, and the editors of this volume deserve special 
thanks for their commentary on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Human rights education is one way to model democratic politics. It has 
itself been a recent addition to thinking about the role of education in 
transitional justice (Bellino 2014b; Davies 2017a, 2017b), and has been 
included in the recommendations of several truth commissions (Paulson 
and Bellino 2017, 351). It is tied closely to the topic of pedagogical 
reform, given that such changes, it is argued, should take place within 
a broader school culture of non-violence and respect for the rights of 
children (Davies 2017a, 339–340). In this way, teaching human rights 
consciousness could be the conduit through which teachers and students 
from all parties to a conflict learn to live together again; it will teach 
them to see each other as equals in rights (Davies 2017b, 11). However, 
non-violent school cultures can be hard to find in post-conflict societies. 
Davies’s own evidence from Sri Lanka found that, despite government 
efforts at pedagogical reform, school violence was rising in areas where 
violence was particularly prevalent in life outside school (Davies 2017a, 
343). Likewise, Bellino (2014b) showed that young Guatemalans’ rights 
consciousness was shaped by both school and their lives outside it.
The role of civil society in scholarship on education and transitional 
justice has been understood within state-centric frameworks of analysis. 
In  circumstances where transitional justice mechanisms have been 
disbanded but the state is unable or refuses to commit to transitional 
justice, civil society can step in to fill the void (Bellino 2014a, 142; 
Cole 2017, 16–18; Ramírez-Barat and Duthie 2015, 25–27).
In this context, I consider the ‘Child Rights Network’ at two Catholic 
secondary boarding schools, St Joseph’s College, Mabiri (in Bougainville), 
and St Joseph’s National Secondary School, Tenaru (in Solomon Islands).2 
The Child Rights Network was designed by the Marist Brothers District 
of Melanesia to introduce the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (UNCRC) into the daily lives of teachers and students at its 
schools. Critically also, the Marist Brothers ran the schools themselves. 
Churches are highly regarded and influential throughout Melanesia 
(Monson 2013; Tomlinson and McDougall 2013, 2). Moreover, they 
have historically performed governance functions that a classical Weberian 
understanding of the state (as distinct from civil society) would view as 
state prerogatives (Eriksen 2013; McDougall 2008). They have dominated 
2  This paper is based on findings from 10 months of PhD field research using semi-structured 
interviews and ethnographic observations in Solomon Islands and Bougainville from mid-2015 to 
mid-2016. 
205
9 . VERNACuLARISING ‘CHILD RIGHTS’ IN MELANESIAN SECONDARy SCHOOLS
in the provision of education, for example (Laracy 1976, 22; Oakeshott 
and Allen 2015, 6; Palmer 1980, 40). This intensified in the wake of 
the civil conflicts in Bougainville and Solomon Islands as policymakers 
and donors looked increasingly to churches to provide governance in 
the absence of functioning states (McDougall 2008, 1). Nevertheless, 
although their functions overlap with the state’s, churches are still touted 
as the most active and persuasive components of civil society in Melanesia 
(Richmond 2011, 128; Dinnen 2001, 100).
In this chapter, I critically discuss the ‘vernacularisation’ (Merry 2006a) 
of human rights at Mabiri and Tenaru, and argue that it addresses some 
conflict legacies without fundamentally altering the nature of everyday 
life at school. In the first section, I show that although Merry’s concept 
of vernacularisation helps us move our analyses beyond simply perceived 
incompatibilities between rights and indigenous culture, vernacularisation 
in Bougainville and Solomon Islands is complicated by legacies of their 
respective civil conflicts, such as the further entrenchment of corporal 
punishment and breakdown of customary authority. In the second section, 
I establish that resistance from teachers to the Child Rights Network 
did indeed revolve around the issue of corporal punishment (as  well 
as students’ manual labour). Third, I demonstrate that even though 
participants vernacularised rights in different ways, little about the ideal 
citizen into which the schools hoped to form their students was changed. 
Finally, I explain how those who engaged critically with the concept and 
vocabulary of rights also learned how to identify and respond to justice 
issues at school.
Vernacularisation in Melanesia and 
post-conflict schooling
Pacific Island countries have been slow to incorporate human rights 
treaties into their domestic legal systems and regularly fail to meet the 
reporting requirements in those conventions (Farran 2012, 200). Papua 
New Guinea ratified the UNCRC in 1993 but only provided its first 
report in 2000, for example (ibid., note 5). In Solomon Islands, where 
corporal punishment and physical violence against children are common 
(Evans 2016, 73–74), the rights discourse is not widely tolerated by large 
segments of the adult population either (ibid., 81).
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Popular resistance to human rights in Melanesia is often based on 
a perceived incompatibility with indigenous kastom (Evans 2016; Soaki 
2017). However, while this resistance might suggest that kastom is a fixed 
set of traditional practices, recognising the contemporary influences on, 
and uses of, kastom shows that it and human rights need not be viewed 
as irreconcilable opposites. Kastom has always been changing and thus 
has become infused with elements of indigenous cultures, colonialism, 
Christianity and modern-day politics (Akin 2013). Contemporary kastom 
ideology among people from the island of Malaita, for example, was born 
in their resistance to British colonial rule (Akin 2013). Malaitan kastom has 
become a marker of contemporary island/provincial identity for Malaitans 
and also an ‘other’ from which Solomon Islanders from other provinces 
form their own provincial/island identities (Cox 2017, 81). As kastom is 
continuously reinterpreted when it is used to respond to new ideas and 
institutions, it is little wonder that Cox found a kindergarten principal in 
a conservative village of Western Province who had abandoned corporal 
punishment in favour of a human rights–centred approach to discipline. 
The principal now favours dialogue between teachers, students and 
parents. Kastom and human rights were not ‘two incompatible cultural 
domains’ for this principal (Cox 2017, 84).
Nevertheless, overall, human rights remains an uncomfortable fit in the 
Pacific, which Sally Engle Merry’s (2006a) concept of ‘vernacularisation’ 
helps us understand. The concept describes the ways local cultural 
concepts are appropriated by civil society to spread the human rights 
regime. In  using vernacularisation to analyse gender violence in the 
Pacific, Biersack and Macintyre (2016, 4) have shown that human 
rights is itself an ideology that merely ‘alleges universality’ and one that 
‘views any doctrine that deviates from it as merely “local” and aberrant’ 
(ibid., 5). Indeed, Taylor (2008, 166) argues that the image of the ‘human’ 
in the human rights regime actually originates in forms of individual 
personhood more common in the West, which is often contrasted with 
more collectivist understandings of personhood in non-Western contexts 
(Jolly 2016, 345). The ‘intermediaries’ (Merry 2006b, 39) who champion 
(vernacularise) human rights for local populations are members of civil 
society because, as the local elites of their societies, they can speak the 
international language of human rights to people in their local context 
(Biersack and Macintyre 2016, 13).
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Although flows of cultural change brought by human rights are 
typically directed from the Western human rights discourse at the top, 
down to the recipient context below, in some instances the meaning of 
‘rights’ changes considerably when they are rendered in ways that make 
sense locally (Biersack and Macintyre 2016, 11–12; Jolly 2016, 355). 
Hermkens’s (2013) thought-provoking ethnographic research with the 
Mbirau people of Marau Sound, on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, 
is a noteworthy example. She found that when foreign organisations 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) deliver human rights, 
they construe local social realities and cultures simply as problems to 
be overcome in the empowerment of women (see also Cox 2017, 69). 
But Hermkens shows that the Mbirau women with whom she worked 
‘translate rights as duties towards one’s family, or as bringing awareness 
of Women’s responsibility to get involved in local politics in order to 
improve their tribe’s future’ (Hermkens 2013, para. 36). Importantly, the 
responsibility her participants described was not a result of their claim to 
a universal, and individual, right as defined by the international human 
rights regime, but was rather understood relationally, in terms of ‘the 
moral framework in which relationships are embedded’ (ibid., para. 37). 
Hermkens’s ethnography showed how human rights can be vernacularised 
as responsibilities in a way that reinforces the duties women have towards 
the men in their lives.
Vernacularisation at the Mabiri and Tenaru schools has been directed 
through the Child Rights Network, which the Marist Brothers District 
of Melanesia established at all their schools in Melanesia in the mid-
2000s. Then District Leader Br Ken McDonald recalled that the district’s 
engagement with rights began when it assisted with Vanuatu’s ‘universal 
periodic review’ of the UNCRC (interview with Br Ken McDonald, 
26 April 2017). The district’s commitment to child protection through 
a  rights-based framework deepened thereafter and eventually saw it 
employ a Child Advocacy Officer, Chris Beatus, who began implementing 
the Child Rights Network through biannual workshops at all Marist 
schools in the district (ibid.). The workshops I observed at Mabiri 
in 2016 connected the principles of the Marist charism to the rights 
provisions in the UNCRC and Papua New Guinea’s Lukautim Pikinini 
Act passed in 2009.
However, conflict legacies have made the task for the Child Rights Network 
more difficult at Mabiri and Tenaru. One legacy has been the further 
legitimisation of corporal punishment. Participant A, in Bougainville, 
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told me how after the Bougainville ‘Crisis’, one of her close relatives could 
never overcome his anger when he returned to teaching. He became 
physically abusive towards his students, particularly to the children of the 
combatants who killed his father. In the end the pain was too much. 
He left teaching, and formal employment entirely (confidential interview, 
17 September 2015). Several members of the Catholic education system 
also acknowledged that the Crisis further normalised physical abuse of 
students (confidential interview with Participant B, 7 February 2016; 
interview with Chris Beatus, 13 September 2015).
Another conflict legacy in Bougainville arises from the damage done 
to customary forms of authority during the Crisis. The Crisis started 
in mid-1988, and was chiefly a war between the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force and Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) until armed 
(Bougainvillean) opposition to the BRA formed in 1990 (Regan 1998, 
279). Beneath the anti-PNG dimensions were atrocities committed within 
cultural, language and even family groups that broke down mechanisms 
of customary authority. In the end, violence gained considerable popular 
legitimacy as a means to solve disputes (ibid.). Young people now grow 
up in this environment (Kent and Barnett 2012), and the continued 
antisocial behaviour of boys in particular, which older Bougainvilleans 
describe as ‘acting BRA’, has become a particular challenge for educators. 
Ultimately, because of the Crisis, students are more likely to challenge 
authority figures and misbehave and teachers are less likely to show 
restraint in disciplining their students harshly.
Corporal punishment occurs in Solomon Islands schools too (Cox 2017), 
and its civil conflict, known as the ‘Tension’ or ‘Ethnic Tension’, 
certainly called into question Solomon Islanders’ capacity to live together 
peacefully. The Tension began in 1998 when local militia on Guadalcanal 
began violently evicting settlers (predominantly from the neighbouring 
island of Malaita) from the rural and peri-urban areas around the capital, 
Honiara.3 A rival militia then formed to protect the Malaitan evictees who 
had taken refuge in Honiara. The town became a Malaitan enclave and 
violent confrontations between the Malaitan and Guadalcanal militias 
intensified on the outskirts (Dinnen 2002, 287). The rest of the country 
was relatively free of widespread violence, but was directly affected by the 
near total collapse of the Solomon Islands state. Although the signing 
3  The underlying causes of the Tension have been discussed in depth elsewhere (Fraenkel 2004; 
Moore 2004; Allen 2013).
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of the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) in October 2000 effectively 
ended the warfare between the two groups (McDougall 2016, 18), the 
Tension continued until 2003. Just as localised fighting was common in 
Bougainville, so too was violence common not only between, but also 
within, Malaitan and Guadalcanal groups post-2000.
In these contexts, and because the formal instruction of the Child Rights 
Network is largely limited to biannual workshops, teachers and students at 
Mabiri and Tenaru largely perform the roles of intermediaries themselves. 
Much of the vernacularisation, therefore, happens on playgrounds, 
in dormitories and dining halls, and in other extracurricular activities in 
which students spend most of their time. In these spaces outside the 
classroom, ‘child rights’ – which is the term participants use to describe 
human rights discourses, practices and their Child Rights Network – 
pervade debates about the structures of schooling that shape their daily 
lives and address legacies of the Crisis and the Tension.
Rights discourse and the structures 
of schooling
Child rights were part of a challenge to two structures of schooling – 
discipline protocols and manual labour – that upset the authority of 
teachers over their students. This authority was based on a strict power 
imbalance between teachers and students, which Teacher B, at Mabiri, 
summarised:
I know that there are still teachers who are not very comfortable 
with child rights. And I know that there are teachers who still 
would prefer to give students a smack or two for not doing 
homework or something. To them they think that is the way to do 
it, just because [they say] ‘that’s the way my teachers taught me in 
the past’ (confidential interview, 18 February 2016).
And Teacher S at Tenaru explained that students learn from this 
teacher–student relationship that they should follow the orders of 
authority figures unquestioningly rather than form opinions themselves 
(confidential  interview, 13 August 2015). She said teachers were 
struggling with the notion that students should be ‘saying what they 
think’ (confidential interview, 13 August 2015).
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The scale of the challenge that the rights discourse posed became clear 
when  teachers at both schools considered their discipline protocols. 
Teacher V and several of his colleagues at Tenaru have observed a shift 
towards ‘pastoral care’ in the last five years, which is informed by child rights 
and the Marist charism described below. Rather than strict enforcement 
of the rules, the school’s pastoral care process aims to develop students’ 
decision-making capacities by showing them leniency when they make 
mistakes (confidential interview with Teacher Y, 29 November 2015). 
In this reformulation of discipline practices, recidivist students should be 
counselled long before any serious disciplinary measures are taken, and 
the language of ‘punishment’ has been replaced with that of ‘community 
service’. However, this change has left several teachers uncertain of how 
to react to students they catch breaking the rules. Teacher V confessed 
he could see no basis in the school rules for the new discipline decisions 
the administration was making and wondered aloud if he was supposed 
to follow the discipline procedures set out in the rules, or if human 
rights had become a hidden rule (confidential interview, 10 September 
2015). Teacher U also blamed child rights specifically for the rights/rules 
confusion (confidential interview, 1 December 2015).
Teachers would often measure these changes to discipline and child 
rights against their compatibility with kastom, which included showing 
deference to authority.4 At Tenaru, Teacher S noted that students’ focus 
on the rules and on rights language only confuses them:
[B]ecause that is how the society is; authority and rules speaks [sic] 
for the authority. And um responsibility, when we were growing 
up, responsibility, you do what your mother and father tells you or 
what the tribe expects out of you and not so much of thinking for 
yourself (confidential interview, 1 December 2015).
This apparent rights/rules clash in both teachers’ and students’ images of 
Melanesian culture also emerged in discussions of the manual labour that 
both schools make students undertake. Most schools in Solomon Islands 
and Bougainville rely on student labour to grow food and maintain 
school  infrastructure, although the actual time spent working varies 
4  Melanesia is famed for its cultural diversity. Understandings of the role of children in society 
and the socialisation of young people thus vary widely and are constantly changing (Herdt and 
Leavitt 1998). Nevertheless, at school, and certainly in conversations with me, teachers and students 
would often refer to an image of a Bougainvillean, Solomon Islander or pan-Melanesian kastom when 
discussing the Child Rights Network.
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from school to school. Teacher B, at Mabiri, outlined the argument the 
child rights sceptics often make: they emphasise that in Bougainvillean 
society young people must work hard to survive. Child rights discourse 
clashes with this articulation of social order because it limits the work 
students can do if too much is considered abuse (confidential interview, 
16 February 2016). Another teacher at Mabiri, Teacher C, added that 
child rights were also a challenge to one of the tenets of Marist education, 
‘love of work’, which could be seen as abuse even though it is intended 
to teach youth that diligent effort breeds success (confidential interview 
with Teacher C, 21 February 2016; Institute of the Marist Brothers of the 
Schools 1988, 36).
In sum, at first glance the Child Rights Network clashed with some 
well-established structures of schooling, including the strict power 
imbalance of the teacher–student relationship that, as we saw above, the 
Crisis and the Tension had intensified. However, resistance to change was 
not the position for all teachers and students by any means. The next 
section shows that productive engagement with rights was achieved 
through its incorporation into the structures of schooling, but not in 
a way that changed how participants understood the fundamental purpose 
of Catholic education.
Vernacularising rights within Marist charism
Despite the scepticism noted above, advocates typically framed the child 
rights approach as a complement to local cultures and Christianity to 
convince sceptical teachers to adopt them. In respect of discipline and 
pastoral care, for instance, child rights provided a vocabulary used to 
support the Marist charism, and that charism was itself a way to enact 
child rights principles. At Mabiri, Teacher B noted that the school cannot 
afford to employ a counsellor, nor does the administration have anywhere 
they can refer students in need of support. They are faced with a choice 
between expelling a problematic student or counselling that student 
themselves. Several students were in this position in the first semester 
of 2016, either through violent behaviour or drug offences. While most 
teachers were sceptical and favoured expelling students, the administration 
argued that Marist schools are supposed to work with young people, 
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in Br McDonald’s terms, ‘on the edge’ (interview, 26 April 2017). Thus, 
abandoning the students would contradict their core principles. Teacher 
B explained it to his colleagues in precisely these terms:
[W]hat I used was this idea of this is a Marist school and it’s 
supposed to help the young people. And if I decide to terminate 
the child from the beginning because the school rules say so, 
then I live with the fact that I sent someone who is very young 
home and now he is living at home [and] he hasn’t completed his 
schooling. So to me, that’s not very, I think I have failed morally 
or something, my moral responsibility over the child (confidential 
interview, 6 June 2016).
There was thus a tension between the application of the school rules, 
which impose the strict power imbalance between teachers and students 
and leave several teachers confused (as we saw above), and Teacher B’s 
moral duties to the students in his care. In similar vein, Teacher X pointed 
out that the Marist charism emphasises constant ‘presence’ with students, 
just as child rights have encouraged teachers to be approachable and 
available to students to support their learning (confidential interview, 
6 December 15).
An incident at Tenaru demonstrates that the moral obligation Teacher B 
described is tied directly to child rights and extends beyond immediate 
teacher–student relationships. A few years ago the school administration 
transferred to another school a teacher who was persistently drunk and 
physically abusive towards his family. When I asked Teacher B what he 
would have done, he replied:
I think with the establishment of the, what, child rights and those 
kind of things … before you send them away make sure you at 
least you should have tried something to help the teacher before 
he goes to the new school. Otherwise you send [away] someone 
who is going to repeat the same problems and you don’t want that, 
to send someone to a community and then he’ll just become the 
same person again (confidential interview, 18 February 2016).
And this is exactly what the administration at Tenaru had done. 
The  troubled teacher was counselled by the Marist Brothers and the 
school’s headmaster (formal counselling services were not accessible) before 
being transferred. In this instance, the school had deployed child rights 
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principles and the Marist ethos to address conflict-related behaviours in 
exactly the way the district administration had hoped they would when it 
established Child Rights Network.
Interestingly also, Teacher B appeared to hold a similar opinion of human 
rights to the kindergarten teacher who Cox (2017) interviewed; rights 
were distinct from culture, but still compatible. Teacher B had observed 
that in resisting child rights some teachers had themselves forgotten that 
rights do not overrule responsibilities to society:
[O]ne of the misunderstandings that I think people get is that 
people got so involved with rights that they forgot the other aspect 
of rights, and that was the responsibilities that children have in our 
society. And even to the extent that students were actually [saying] 
‘I have a right to this, and I have a right to this’ and that’s because 
they were not being taught that they also have responsibilities to go 
in line with that. So to me that’s probably one reason why people 
didn’t accept it so easily (confidential interview, 18 February 2016).
In this case, Teacher B appeared to keep the concept of rights distinct 
from ‘the moral framework in which relationships are embedded’ 
(Hermkens 2013, para. 37) because those frameworks were located in the 
responsibilities of young people in society. Rights, then, were only useful 
in so much as they could be a tool teachers could deploy when forming 
students into the (relational) citizens they desire them to be.
This was also borne out in the debate noted above about manual labour. 
Learning to love work – one of the pillars of the Marist charism – was 
essential if students were to become good members of their society. 
Indeed, Teacher B became uncharacteristically intolerant of anyone who 
did not love working:
But if you feel that it is not satisfying to you then probably you 
stop doing it and look for somewhere else where you just sit 
down … and just wait for something to come to you … So our 
place is better for people who really work hard in order to survive. 
So for you to stop someone from really working then I don’t think 
it’s probably right (confidential interview, 18 February 2016).
For Teacher B, students must learn to love work because somebody who 
does not love work does not fit in. And Teacher B told his colleagues 
that students would learn to love work through the satisfaction they 
will feel from meeting their responsibilities to the school community. 
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Child rights could be applied to prevent teachers from working students 
too hard, but they were not a justification for halting all manual labour. 
There remained a conceptual distinction between a productive (relational) 
citizen cognisant of their responsibilities to others, on the one hand, and 
a rights-holding individual, on the other.
For other teachers and students, however, rights were vernacularised in 
relational terms in the way Hermkens (2013) described above. Teacher Y 
argued child rights were a vehicle to teach about obligations to the school 
community. Rather than scolding a child for doing the wrong thing, 
she said teachers could talk about how students have the right to make 
decisions, but are personally responsible for their actions (confidential 
interview, 4 December 2015). Similarly, despite admitting it confused 
some students, Teacher S at Tenaru noted how the rights discourse has 
changed the language she uses when disciplining students: ‘when you 
talk the language you use, not so much as rule, but saying it’s your 
responsibility to attend classes, to be on time, to be in the dining hall’ 
(confidential interview, 1 December 2015).
Occasionally also, teachers would say they had seen evidence of students 
who understood child rights properly, meaning relationally. For example, 
Teacher Z remembered asking a male senior student why he never chewed 
betelnut at school. The boy replied that he had considered it, and ultimately 
concluded that although he had the right to chew betelnut he respected 
the school rules (that ban it) first of all (confidential interview, 4 December 
2016). To Teacher Z, this response meant that the boy understood ‘what 
is called respect in the village. Because that respect in the village, in our 
society here, that is the foundation of child rights. He might think he 
[could] do something, but he has to think [about the consequences of ] 
the action’ (ibid.). Thus, Teacher Z argued the boy had understood rights 
properly because he had fitted them into the ‘moral framework in which 
relationships are embedded’ (Hermkens 2013, para. 37).
It is noteworthy here that students and teachers at Tenaru had far more 
opportunity to adopt the discourse and practice of child rights than those 
at Mabiri. Mabiri is an all-boys boarding school that only offers two years 
of schooling (grades 9 and 10 or two years of vocational education), 
whereas Tenaru, a coeducational boarding school, offers grades 7 to 12. 
Additionally, Tenaru’s workshops themselves better facilitate engagement 
with child rights. The students’ child rights workshops I observed at Mabiri 
in 2016 were conducted at night with groups of at least 80 students and 
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were condensed to fit the limited time that the school had electricity in 
the evenings. By contrast, at Tenaru the 24-hour power supply allowed 
Chris Beatus to teach more creatively to smaller groups of students 
(interview with Chris Beatus, 13 September 2015). Moreover, Tenaru’s 
teachers had been at the school several years and were familiar with child 
rights concepts, whereas most of Mabiri’s teaching staff had transferred 
from other non-Marist schools that year and had little prior experience 
with child rights.
Nevertheless, following sustained critical engagement with child rights 
and the Marist ethos, some participants described profound changes to 
their daily lives. Teacher Y, at Tenaru, who had hospitalised a student 
with his violence during the Tension, told me child rights had helped 
him temper his disciplinary actions dramatically and embrace pastoral 
care (confidential interview, 4 December 2015). Teachers S and R were 
even changing their own parenting, preferring to reason and persuade 
rather than scold their children (confidential interviews, 14 November 
and 1 December 2015).
We have seen that this vernacularisation of child rights framed them as 
either distinct from or part of ‘the moral framework in which relationships 
are embedded’ (Hermkens 2013, para. 37). Either way, however, rights 
language was useful only insofar as it reinforced the image of the citizen 
into whom the schools aimed to form their students: a Christian and 
relational person willing to respect authority by showing deference to it. 
The success of this vernacularisation notwithstanding, the process itself 
would seem significant for transitional justice because it directly addressed 
the breakdown of customary authority the Crisis and the Tension 
brought about.
Learning about justice
The Child Rights Network also gave students and teachers a framework 
they could use to articulate and address justice issues at school. For 
example, Teacher R at Tenaru remembered an occasion in which the 
students of one Grade 9 class confronted one of their teachers about that 
teacher’s ongoing absence from class and failure to hold tests at scheduled 
times. After the incident the teacher in question felt disrespected and 
even less committed to teaching, effectively making the situation worse. 
Although Teacher R admitted that this newfound assertiveness from 
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students made most teachers uncomfortable, he had decided the students 
had the right to complain if their right to education had been violated 
(confidential interview, 14 November 2015). Teacher R and this Grade 9 
class recognised an injustice in their school and rights discourse gave them 
a framework in which to respond to it.
Although the students in the example above appeared to make their 
situation worse, such an outcome was not inevitable, which an episode 
during my interview with Teacher X at Tenaru demonstrates. It was just 
before lunchtime on a school day, and we were interrupted by a knock 
on the door of his house. Two girls in Grade 8, who had just finished 
their physical education lesson, asked for a drink of water. Teacher X was 
happy to oblige, and we joined them on the veranda. Technically, the 
students were out of bounds, but nobody cared. Shortly after, two of their 
classmates appeared. One was carrying a plastic bag full of vegetables and, 
once she saw Teacher X, made a false show of hiding it. Everyone laughed, 
and in doing so we all tacitly acknowledged that their rule-breaking would 
have no consequences. The girls let us in on their plan for the afternoon. 
They had left campus to collect the vegetables from a relative of one of the 
girls living in a nearby village. They would take rice from the dining hall at 
lunch, then take everything to the kitchen of another staff member to cook 
there, effectively abstaining from the school’s afternoon program. In an 
effort to dissuade them, Teacher X led a discussion about the decisions 
they were making, but when they left he was sure they would proceed 
with their plan. Far from making their situation worse, rights discourse 
was the framework through which the students were allowed to introduce 
some diversity into their diet.
Indeed, Teacher X understood this episode in the broader context of 
child rights and pastoral care. He talked to them about the decisions they 
were making but did not ultimately enforce the school rules. Moreover, 
Teacher X was a member of the school’s pastoral care committee, which 
evaluates physical, spiritual and academic life at the school (confidential 
interview with Teacher S, 13 August 2015). In 2015, the committee had 
been particularly worried about deficiencies in the students’ diet. Teacher X 
reasoned that if teachers were eating well in their own homes, he had 
no right to deprive students of variation in their own diet (confidential 
interview, 15 October 2016). Therefore Teacher X’s reaction to the girls’ 
plan was not seen through an authoritarian lens, but through child rights 
and the Marist charism, which led him to frame the episode as one about 
the justice of the students’ (dietary) situation.
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In fact, the teacher–student relationship was rendered largely informal 
for the hungry students – they knew they could break some rules with 
impunity. Informal teacher–student relationships were typical of the 
schools I visited, and this was widely attributed to the hospitality of 
Melanesian cultures generally. But Teacher Z also explained that:
They have the right to come and ask me for something that [would] 
help them … if somebody has missed out in dining hall, for the 
dinner, and comes to one of the teachers to help him or her with 
the cooking pot [because] she or he is quite hungry then though 
the school rule is there – it’s late, don’t move or do anything after 
late bell – but we have to make [the exception] because of the 
situation (confidential interview, 4 December 2016).
Teacher Z used rights language in support of the informality that led to 
a just outcome consistent with the hospitality of Melanesian sociality and 
the school’s view of its duty of care.
However, Teacher B also identified new risks to the teachers that could 
arise from the combination of students’ awareness of child rights and 
the informality of teacher–student relationships that allow students to 
visit teachers in their homes (confidential interview, 24 February 2016). 
In these circumstances, he worried that students armed with knowledge 
of rights might allege inappropriate behaviour from a teacher. As a 
compromise he encouraged teachers to only meet with students in public 
outside their houses. In this way, Teacher B found a level of formality in 
the teacher–student relationship that reconciled the rights of students, 
teachers and his image of Melanesian sociality.
Ironically, an unintended outcome of the articulation of justice issues 
at school within the frameworks established by child rights and Marist 
charism may be that it turns teachers away from the formal justice 
mechanisms of the state. In Bougainville in 2013 teachers at a non-Marist 
secondary school caught a student dealing drugs on campus. They turned 
him over to police but the student was murdered while in custody. Chris 
Beatus argued that if the teachers had respected the rights of the child 
and adhered to the ‘Marist way’ they would never have called the police 
(interview, 13 September 2015). Compare the decision to call the police to 
the attitude of Teacher B to his students:
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When students do something that’s a little bit, ah, naughty. 
I’d  rather talk to them about something that they are good at 
rather than talk to them about their negative behaviour … And 
I think to me, it will really save the child because all of a sudden 
he’s going to realise that ‘oh someone is noticing my goodness and 
not noticing my weaknesses all the time’. So to me that’s probably 
the whole change of my outlook on the child too (confidential 
interview, 18 February 2016).
This change to his ‘outlook on the child’ came from the application of 
the Marist ethos which child rights reinforced. He was loath to ever call 
the  police to follow up incidents in the school because he thought it 
would be too dangerous to leave a child in their care.
Conclusion
The Child Rights Network met with resistance from some teachers, in 
particular at Mabiri and Tenaru, for reasons entirely consistent with 
resistance to human rights in Bougainville and Solomon Islands more 
broadly. Protests that child rights fitted awkwardly with some central 
aspects of how Mabiri and Tenaru functioned, such as aspirations for 
strict discipline and the necessity of manual labour, were justified with 
their perceived incompatibilities with kastom. Combined with the more 
rebellious behaviour of young people (particularly in Bougainville) and 
the enhanced popular legitimacy of corporal punishment following the 
Crisis and the Tension, we might have expected that adopting child rights 
would lead to some fundamental changes to teacher–student relationships 
at school. This was true to an extent. Thus, although there was no single 
form of vernacularisation among teachers and students, the initiative 
brought child rights discourse and began a new regime of practice to the 
two schools. Child rights offered a vocabulary through which students 
could see themselves as equals in rights and therefore object to instances 
of everyday violence and abuse without ‘acting BRA’.
Ultimately, however, the vernacularisations of rights at Tenaru and Mabiri 
changed little about the image of the person into whom teachers hoped to 
form students. This image was of a person able to fit comfortably within 
the existing moral frameworks of relationships in society, which implied 
a reassertion of frameworks of authority (requiring deference from young 
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people) that broke down during the Crisis and Tension. Thus, while in 
their daily lives at school people interacted creatively with rights, they did 
so within the established structures of schooling.
Notably, the reassertion of deference to authority through the integration 
of child rights with the Marist charism is quite different from the role 
of human rights education envisioned in transitional justice. Human 
rights education encourages students to model democracy by questioning 
authority figures critically, but the data presented here suggests the 
application of transitional justice to education in Melanesia needs an 
understanding of what modelling democracy looks like locally.
We have also seen that learning to view rights relationally or to use them to 
identify justice issues is a long-term project because the learning happens 
in unplanned moments when incidents occur. We saw that teachers and 
senior students were much more experienced with child rights at Tenaru 
where the teaching staff was stable and students had up to six years to 
learn them. By contrast, Mabiri’s teachers were mostly new to child rights 
and the students would have only two years at most to adopt them. 
Such structural limitations would no doubt limit any transitional justice 
initiative that other church or government schools would employ.
Finally, it is worth noting an inherent limitation of civil society’s 
involvement  in transitional justice through education in Melanesia. 
An  important goal of transitional justice is the rebuilding of trust in 
democratic institutions. In Solomon Islands, for example, Dinnen 
(2012,  71) has noted that ‘longer-term peace-building and nation-
building  agendas will require a much closer focus on strengthening 
the contract between the Solomon Islands state and its citizens’. 
In transitional justice, because education is considered a state institution, 
and one with which it is assumed almost all children and parents have 
contact, improvements in the delivery of education are seen as a way for 
the state to rebuild its reputation. But when in reality the church schools 
analysed here performed the education function widely considered 
a state responsibility, and vernacularisation of rights within their charism 
encouraged teachers to  withdraw from the formal justice system in 
the name of child protection,  civil society would appear to be at odds 
with the  aim of transitional justice to build trust in the state over the 
longer term.
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Mis-selling transitional justice: 
The confused role of faith-
based actors and Christianity 
in Solomon Islands’ Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission
Claire Cronin
In 2008, five years after the arrival of RAMSI (the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands), which ostensibly brought an end to the 
country’s ‘ethnic tensions’, Solomon Islands established its Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The vocabulary and rhetoric of truth 
and reconciliation were first introduced in this post-conflict environment 
by faith-based organisation SICA (the Solomon Islands Christian 
Association) (TRC 2012, 9). The paradigm of transitional justice had been 
notably absent from the country’s post-conflict discourse until this time, 
with previous peacebuilding work either having been informed by RAMSI’s 
narrowly focused state-building agenda,1 or taking the form of small-scale 
reconciliation projects spearheaded by kastom2 and faith leaders.
1  RAMSI’s work was informed by a three-‘pillar’ framework consisting of a focus on law 
and justice, economic governance and growth, and machinery of government. The machinery 
of government pillar focused on strengthening national accountability institutions, bolstering 
parliament and the electoral system and strengthening provincial systems of government. Some 
scholars claim that RAMSI’s focus on policing and state-building came at the expense of delving 
into the underlying structural inequalities in the country that had led to the conflict in the first place 
(for more information, see Braithwaite et al. 2010). 
2  The concept of kastom in Solomon Islands loosely corresponds to the concept of ‘custom’ or 
tradition, but is more nuanced, being closely tied to the country’s complex colonial history. Kastom, as it 
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SICA proposed that a truth and reconciliation commission would provide 
a necessary opportunity for victims of the ethnic tensions to talk about 
their  experiences, would assist in the fulfilment of the government’s 
‘National Unity’ agenda3 and would be accepted as a morally legitimate 
institution, both by the Solomon Islands people and by the international 
community. Influenced by international media attention surrounding 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the organisation 
proposed that the theological overtones of the South African truth 
commission would resonate with the country’s 96 per cent Christian 
population. In this small Pacific Island country, civil society is 
overwhelmingly composed of faith-based actors and as such it is difficult 
to extrapolate faith-based organisations (FBOs) from a hypothetical 
secular civil society base – even a number of the international NGOs 
with bases in the country operate from within a faith-based perspective.4 
Solomon Islands’ civil society, therefore, overwhelmingly grounds its 
understanding of morality and justice in biblical theology, and Christian 
subjectivities are integral to public understandings of both social justice 
and appropriate responses to injustice.
Being a transitional justice initiative, however, the TRC grounded its 
analysis of the violence that occurred during the ethnic tensions in the 
internationally normative, arguably secular,5 framework of international 
human rights law, and the related fields of international humanitarian 
and criminal law. Transitional justice evolved alongside the international 
human rights system as a means of enabling nations to come to terms 
with the aftermath of mass human rights violations, crimes against 
is currently understood, connotes a way of life and set of values distinguishable from that of outsiders, 
and an ideology that governs one’s interactions with each other, God, the land and the ancestral spirits. 
3  The concepts of ‘national unity’ and reconciliation have been pertinent in Solomon Islands’ politics 
since before the ethnic tensions. From 1993 to 1997, for example, Mamaloni led the Group for National 
Unity and Reconciliation (GNUR), forming the leading government political party from 1994 to 1997. 
Following the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) in 2000, the government established the Ministry of 
National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (MNURP) to oversee implementation of the TPA. 
4  For example, World Vision has a main office in Honiara and regional offices through the 
country. As this chapter will describe, Caritas has a notable presence in Solomon Islands, particularly 
with regards to providing training for trauma counsellors. 
5  I say ‘arguably secular’, as many scholars (see, for example, Moyn’s discussion in Christianity and 
Human Rights, 2015) have located the origins of the modern human rights discourse in Christian 
moral traditions. Therefore, whilst the discourse today stands as a secular one, its origins may be 
traced to Christian theology. 
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humanity and genocide (Robertson 2012; Hayner 2010; Teitel 2002).6 
Although the international legal norms underpinning transitional justice 
were blended,  seemingly successfully, with theological notions such as 
forgiveness and interpersonal reconciliation in post-apartheid South 
Africa (Tutu 2000; Shore 2008), from the outset of the Solomon Islands 
experience a disconnect was evident between the ideological framework 
through which the TRC would eventually operate (international, secular), 
and the framework through which the public expected the TRC to 
operate (local, faith-based). During my 16 months of doctoral fieldwork 
in Solomon Islands, I was consistently told that the TRC had failed ‘to 
touch the heart of the people’. I propose that this failure to strike a chord 
with the sentiment of the local population may in part be due to a gulf 
between people’s expectations of, and the realities of, the ideological 
underpinnings of the TRC’s work.
This chapter analyses the way faith-based civil society in Solomon Islands 
‘sold’ the concept of a truth commission to the Solomon Islands public. 
It argues that an overemphasis on the role that Christianity and the church 
might play in a future commission’s work, and an underemphasis on the 
central role that the international human rights framework would play, 
was at least partially responsible for the groundswell in public support 
for the TRC’s establishment. I draw upon Sally Engle Merry’s concept 
of ‘vernacularisation’ to support this argument. The concept refers to 
the translation of transnational justice discourses into local settings, and 
the layering that occurs when the subjectivities associated with these 
discourses (for example, victims and perpetrators of human rights abuses) 
come into contact with local discourses and subjectivities. Merry writes 
that vernacularisation:
… requires … changes in the form and presentation of human 
rights ideas and institutions. First, they need to be framed in 
images, symbols, narratives, and religious or secular language that 
resonate with the local community … Second, they need to be 
tailored to the structural conditions of the place where they are 
deployed, including its economic, political, and kinship systems 
(Merry 2006, 220).
6  Most scholars agree that the original transitional justice project was the Nuremberg Trials of 
war criminals following the Holocaust that gave way to the creation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Genocide Convention. Eventually, these paved the 
way for the International Bill of Rights (the UDHR alongside the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR)) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
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Vernaculisation occurs along a continuum, with replication at one 
end and hybridisation at the other. With replication, ‘[t]he adaptation 
is superficial and primarily decorative’ (Merry 2006, 220), whereas 
hybridisation occurs when there is a greater depth of assimilation between 
the various justice discourses that come together. This chapter asks the 
question: did the Solomon Islands TRC achieve hybridisation between 
human rights and local understandings of morality and justice rooted 
in Christianity and kastom, or was the human rights discourse merely 
‘superficial’ and ‘decorative’?
My analysis is based on the PhD fieldwork I conducted between 2012 
and  2014, and my doctoral thesis that uses a post-colonial and post-
conflict lens to scrutinise the success of the Solomon Islands TRC. 
My fieldwork consisted of ethnographic research spanning 16 months in 
Honiara (the largest city on Guadalcanal and also the nation’s capital), Auki 
(the largest city on Malaita) and the Marau Sounds area on Guadalcanal’s 
rural coastline. During this time, I conducted approximately 75 interviews 
and held countless informal conversations with people regarding the work 
of the TRC.
Faith-based advocacy for a truth and 
reconciliation commission
A transitional justice approach was absent from the peacebuilding agenda 
in Solomon Islands until SICA began to advocate for the establishment 
of a truth and reconciliation commission in the early 2000s – the same 
time that the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
wrapping up its analysis of the human rights abuses committed under 
20 years of apartheid. Some scholars have asserted that previous attempts 
to achieve justice for crimes committed during the conflict – for example, 
the RAMSI-led tension trials7 – fell under the transitional justice umbrella 
(Jeffery 2017, 113–139). However, these prosecutions drew upon 
domestic criminal law only, making no mention of international human 
rights standards. Significantly, the tension trials involved no prosecutions 
7  During the ‘tension trials’, hundreds of ex-combatants were arrested by RAMSI police to await 
trial on charges that included murder, arson, theft, extortion, corruption and embezzlement. Arrests 
and prosecutions were made in accordance with the Solomon Islands Penal Code. For example, ‘big 
fish’ Harold Keke, Ronnie Cawa and Francis Lela were charged with the murder of Fr Augustine Geve 
and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment in accordance with section 202(a) of the Penal Code. 
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for rape – one of the most prevalent human rights violations committed 
during the conflict – demonstrating a lack of concern for prosecuting 
criminals as human rights offenders. As well as lacking a human rights 
focus, previous government-led initiatives overlooked the rehabilitation 
needs of victims, instead focusing on appeasing ex-combatants. For 
example, in 2000/2001 the Solomon Islands Government oversaw a large-
scale compensation scheme with funds from a Taiwanese loan. Those who 
felt that had a legitimate claim to government compensation registered 
to be beneficiaries of the EXIM (Export-Import) loan with the Ministry 
for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (MNURP). Yet  most 
of the successful applicants were ex-combatants rather than victims of 
abuse. The compensation process was widely perceived as corrupt – 
a commercialisation of traditional kastom compensation wherein financial 
gifts would only be token, preceded by acknowledgement of wrongs and 
reconciliation between parties (Braithwaite et al. 2010, 46).8
SICA proposed that victims of violence needed an opportunity to share 
their stories in order to heal and move on from their traumatic pasts. 
In an effort to garner support from other members of Solomon Islands’ 
civil society, SICA was instrumental in forming the Civil Society Network 
– a collaboration of women’s groups, church groups, trade unions, other 
non-governmental organisations and the Chamber of Commerce. In spite 
of SICA and the Civil Society Network’s efforts, a succession of national 
governments overlooked their demands, and although attempts were 
made to garner support from foreign advisers during peacebuilding talks, 
the notion was dismissed on the grounds that ‘you [Solomon Islands] 
don’t have a Mandela’ (interview with Matthew Wale, 5 July 2012).
Influential within SICA were a small group of progressive Christians with 
close connections to international civil society – for example, politician 
and women’s rights campaigner Alice Pollard, and her husband Bob 
Pollard, the head of Transparency International Solomon Islands (TISI). 
Most of this small group were members of the Kukum Campus of the 
South Seas Evangelical Church in Honiara – a parish well known for its 
political activism and commitment to social justice. Although he himself 
asserts that TRC advocacy was very much a joint effort of this group, 
8  After the Solomon Islands Government threatened to switch loyalties to China, Taiwan’s EXIM 
(Export-Import) Bank agreed to a loan of US$25 million, most of which made its way into the 
pockets of politicians and ex-combatants. Allan Kemakeza who was initially the Minister for National 
Unity, Reconciliation and Peace during this time, later prime minister, awarded himself US$164,754 
and was dismissed for embezzlement (Brady 2010, 166; Fraenkel in Dinnen and Firth 2008, 153).
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most people I interviewed during my fieldwork insisted that the TRC 
was the brainchild of Matthew Wale – then director of the SICA Peace 
Office, now MP for the Aoke/Langalanga constituency and briefly deputy 
prime minister in 2015. Wale states that the Peace Office ‘tried to harness 
the immense amount of goodwill that rested with the churches, lots of 
social capital which was not being brought to bear on the conflict; well 
it was being brought to bear but in [an] anecdotal and a not very well 
organised fashion’ (interview, 5 July 2012). Wale, a half-Canadian, half–
Solomon Islander politician, is an example of someone Merry might refer 
to as a ‘translator’. Brought up in Melanesia and educated overseas, he has 
one foot in the ‘local’ arena and one in the ‘global’, fluent in the justice 
vocabularies of both.9 In our interview, Wale’s rationale for proposing a 
TRC was overwhelmingly framed in terms of concern for human rights 
protections in the country. He told me:
[I]n my mind there were … themes that were coming out very 
clearly. One is the general lack of respect for human rights, and 
understanding human rights … two, what I really wanted to see 
was a standing human rights commission, a constitutional human 
rights commission (Interview, 5 July 2012).
In 2002, Wale visited South Africa to consult with the TRC’s principle 
legal counsel and its chair, the Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Tutu had 
famously woven overtly Christian theology and symbolism into the 
truth commission model, overlaying the international human rights 
norms integral to a transitional justice approach with Christian notions 
of confession, forgiveness and interpersonal reconciliation grounded in 
biblical teaching. Although the church had played a role in previous 
truth commissions (for example, the Catholic Church was a key advocate 
for Chile’s truth commission), it was the South African experience that 
truly brought Christian theology to the forefront of the TRC’s moral 
philosophy (Cronin 2017, 41). For Solomon Islands’ civil society, the 
South African commission appeared to be a ready-made hybrid, well 
suited to their pluralistic and strongly Christian society and promising to 
offer something to everybody.
9  This was evident in our initial conversation, which I later noted had tended to flow between the 
vernaculars of kastom and Christianity, and the international human rights lexicon.
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Community-based advocacy
As government-level advocacy was falling on deaf ears, SICA turned their 
attention instead to gathering grassroots support for their cause. Between 
November 2002 and August 2003, the SICA Peace Committee travelled 
around the country to engage in community dialogue and gauge levels of 
public support for a truth and reconciliation commission. With assistance 
from an international non-government organisation, the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), SICA relied on its church networks 
to assist with awareness-raising, the recruitment of participants and 
setting up of focus group meetings. The whole effort was perceived by the 
public to be very much a faith-based initiative; as such, the proposed truth 
commission came to be seen as faith-based as well (interview with Joseph 
Foukona, former SICA Peace Office employee, 2013).
The outcome of the dialogue suggested that the public overwhelmingly 
favoured establishing a South African–style truth commission. However, 
my interviews with both SICA and TRC staff, and with community 
members, suggest that this groundswell of public support may have 
been due to a misrepresentation of the ideologies intrinsic to the TRC 
model. It seems that SICA staff marketed the idea of a truth commission 
to the Solomon Islands public by underplaying the role that the 
international legal framework (international human rights, criminal 
and humanitarian  law)  would play in the workings of a commission. 
They instead overemphasised the role that Christianity, theological 
understandings of and responses to suffering, and the church might play. 
For example, a 2002 pamphlet reads:
For SICA, the importance of truth, justice and reconciliation are 
central themes of scripture, drawing from the very nature of God 
… Christians are being shaken awake to have concern for justice, 
by the evidence of frightening injustice in the world in which we 
live… social justice is at the heart of the gospel, for it reflects the 
heart of God (SICA pamphlet 2002).
I am in no way suggesting that there was a wilful misleading of the 
Solomon Islands public. Rather, at this early stage of advocacy, it was 
envisaged that a truth commission would function as an indigenous 
initiative in which both spiritual and kastom leaders would play central 
roles. This perspective persisted through the early days of the TRC’s 
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implementation, with RAMSI adamantly stating that it would play 
no role in the truth-seeking process, leaving this to Solomon Islanders to 
both own and implement (Braithwaite et al. 2010, 81). It was envisioned 
that a truth-telling process in which both victims and perpetrators were 
able to tell their stories would lead to both interpersonal and interethnic 
reconciliation – ultimately contributing to the broader goal of achieving 
‘national unity’. The concept of reconciliation has particular pertinence in 
Solomon Islands as it forms as an area of key conceptual overlap between 
kastom and Christianity (Allen et al. 2013). For Solomon Islands kastom, 
reconciliation practices have long been used to maintain social stability 
following conflict. With the Christianisation of the country, prayers and 
practices of public confession and forgiveness have been incorporated into 
kastom reconciliation ceremonies in addition to the traditional exchange 
of pigs, shell money and food. Today, these ceremonies are equally likely 
to be overseen by a priest as by a chief, and in many communities this may 
actually be the same person.
Once the TRC was eventually established in 2008, it had a mandate 
to ‘examin[e] the nature, antecedents, root causes, accountability or 
responsibility for and the extent of the impact on human rights violations 
or abuses which occurred between 1st January 1998 and 23rd July 2003’ 
and, vaguely, ‘engag[e] all stakeholders in the reconciliation process’ 
(Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Act 2008, sections 5(b) and 
5(a)). Over a period of five years (the TRC’s work was extended due to 
problems with funding and human resources, as well as the untimely 
passing away of Commissioner George Kejoa in 2011), the TRC 
conducted public and private hearings, took statements from victims and 
perpetrators of rights violations, investigated the location of graves and 
conducted exhumations, and compiled a Final Report that was handed to 
parliament in April 2012.
Mis-selling truth and reconciliation
The key problem with SICA’s representation of the balance of ideologies 
intrinsic to the transitional justice approach lies in the contested nature 
of using the human rights discourse as a means of framing violence 
and injustice in Solomon Islands. Unlike in many other countries, this 
discourse did not develop as a language of political resistance against an 
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oppressive state,10 but, rather, has been promoted post-independence by 
international and intergovernmental agencies such as the United Nations 
and international secular NGOs such as Oxfam and Save the Children.
Indeed, it is only really in the conflict and post-conflict years that the 
human rights vocabulary has begun to flourish. Instead, historically, 
kastom could be argued to have been the primary language of political 
resistance. Both Akin and Keesing have documented how anti-colonial 
movements such as Maasina Rule in Malaita and the Moro Movement 
in Southern Guadalcanal appropriated kastom as a political ideology 
to distinguish the values and norms of Solomons society from those of 
the colonial government (Akin 2013; Keesing 1982). Akin writes that the 
term kastom:
labelled a political ideology and actions founded on Malaitans’ 
determination to pursue change on their own terms, according 
to their own sensibilities … [kastom demarcated] a realm that the 
government was to leave fully to Malaitans and that furthermore 
would include almost everything. Kastom became a voracious 
category, encompassing all things over which Malaitans now 
claimed authority … eventually including people’s refusal of 
European rule … (Akin 2013, 7).
Contemporary faith-based organisations tend to view their mandates as 
morally rather than politically motivated, and today kastom has taken 
a  backseat to theological values in their work. Despite kastom having 
its own moral underpinnings (Stritecky 2002), Christianity is generally 
favoured as the higher authority with regards to questions of morality. 
In addition, the growth in faith-based civil society in Solomon Islands can 
be partially attributed to links with global church networks that provide 
support, ideological motivation for engaging in social justice work, and 
funding from international faith-based NGOs.
Having said this, in forming the Civil Society Network, SICA demonstrated 
its willingness to engage with more secular-minded CSOs and non-profit 
organisations in order to achieve its objectives – which were both moral 
and political in nature. Morgan Wairiu suggests that the formation of the 
Civil Society Network demonstrated the determination of civil society 
10  Skinner, for example, has traced the development of the human rights movement in South 
Africa in resistance to apartheid. Human rights was a popular political resistance discourse at the time 
when South Africa established its Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Skinner 2010). 
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‘to bring about a new political order’ in the face of government inaction 
over the ethnic tensions (Wairiu 2006). My interview with Matthew Wale 
suggests a willingness on the part of faith-based organisations in Solomon 
Islands to adopt a human rights framework where it was expedient 
and convincing to do so. SICA, as ‘intermediaries’ or ‘translators’ of 
transnational justice discourses, ‘danced’11 between justice lexicons 
depending on their advocacy audience, translating human rights ideas 
‘down’, and translating customary and religious ideas ‘up’. As Merry states:
Translators negotiate the middle field of power and opportunity 
… These people translate up and down. They reframe local 
grievances up by portraying them as human rights violations. 
They translate transnational ideas and practices down as ways of 
grappling with particular local problems. In other words, they 
remake transnational ideas in local terms. At the same time, they 
reinterpret local ideas and grievances in the language of national 
and international human rights (Merry 2006, 42).
Human rights activism – a limited trajectory
However, it is important to recognise the fact that in Solomon Islands, 
as in the broader Pacific Islands region more generally, the human rights 
discourse has developed along a very specific trajectory – a limited one, 
concerned on the one hand with the protection of perceived vulnerable 
groups (women, children and, more recently, people with disabilities), 
and on the other hand with the promotion of gender equality, and as such 
it has come to be seen as synonymous with these particular issues. Only a 
limited number of civil society organisations have adopted a  rights-
based approach to advocacy – primarily women’s and children’s rights 
organisations. This trend is also reflected in Solomon Islands’ international 
human rights treaty ratification. The country is a State Party to only 
four of the nine major international human rights treaties, including 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW).
11  The idea of ‘dancing’ between vernaculars depending on the audience you are presenting an 
idea to was given to me by an interview with a World Vision staff member in Honiara. She suggested 
that in advocating for human rights protections, different terminology was thrown back and forth 
between herself and her audience, like a dance, until eventually they found middle ground and 
a common understanding. 
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The tendency to conflate human rights with a limited notion of women’s 
rights or children’s rights, rather than understanding the discourse 
as a universal system of protection that applies equally to the whole 
population, means that for some people I interviewed during my 
fieldwork, particularly men in rural communities, approaching the topic 
was fraught with emotional sensitivities. The concept of human rights 
was described to me as dangerous and subversive: its association with 
individual agency, freedom of choice and the redistribution of power 
between men and women was seen to threaten family and community 
cohesion, and contribute to the dissolution of traditional authority. 
Although rights advocates insist that gender inequality was never intrinsic 
to Solomon Islands kastom; nevertheless, kastom is often invoked as 
a  justification for women’s subordination in the home and public life 
(Cox 2017). One interviewee told me that women’s awareness of human 
rights was the reason for increasing levels of family violence, as men 
found it necessary to try to re-establish the gender hierarchy that was 
being destabilised (interview with anonymous ex-combatant, 2013). For 
many, this challenge to traditional authority was synonymous with the 
‘dark side’ of human rights – children and young people were increasingly 
‘aware of their rights’ and were challenging the traditionally unchallenged 
authority of their chiefs and elders. This new awareness of ‘rights’ and 
alternative ways of living was described as being made visible through 
the clothing young people chose to wear. Older Solomon Islanders in 
particular, when asked about their views on human rights, would often 
describe how young women were starting to wear shorts and trousers, or 
boys were wearing messy clothing. This change in dress and the emphasis 
it expressed on individual choice or an allegiance to an urban or external 
group, as opposed to prescribed traditional authority, was seen as a threat 
to the moral fabric of village life and disrespectful to kastom.12 For some, 
human rights awareness and its individualistic mentality was perceived as 
anarchic, subversive and chaotic.
This anxiety over human rights may be linked to the rapid modernisation 
and urbanisation that the conflict has catalysed. As the country’s young 
population has migrated from rural to urban centres in search of work, 
adventure and the camaraderie of friends, they have experienced greater 
12  In rural areas of Solomon Islands, ‘modern’ or non-traditional clothing is associated with 
Honiara and Auki – urban centres where young people have greater exposure to foreigners and foreign 
influences such as rock and rap music. Band T-shirts, for example, have become increasingly popular 
– demonstrating allegiance with a particular music group or style of music, usually from overseas. 
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exposure to foreigners and new forms of knowledge through affordable 
and accessible communications, as well as access to ‘Western’ ideologies 
such as human rights. This is creating a crisis of authority, as young people 
increasingly use new information to challenge the traditional authority of 
their elders and chiefs (and women challenge the authority of men).
The degree to which the Solomon Islands Government has been willing 
to embrace campaigns that have focused on ending ‘family’ violence, 
while simultaneously resisting calls for increased gender equality in public 
institutions such as parliament, should also be noted. When human 
rights have been promoted in terms of their capacity to protect, they 
have been embraced; however, when rights have been promoted in terms 
of their capacity to empower, they have been resisted. According to an 
understanding of rights as protection, certain groups of people who are 
perceived as less able to defend themselves are offered protection from 
a benevolent state, partner or family, against something that can generally 
(or outwardly) be agreed upon as morally abhorrent – for example, rape 
or domestic violence.13 Alternatively, rights as empowerment is less easy to 
universally accept as this requires a redistribution of power (for example, 
from men to women, from adults to children) and an unsettling of the 
protector/protected dichotomy.
It is within this context that SICA attempted to sell the truth commission 
model to the Solomon Islands public. With the knowledge of how a human 
rights approach might ostracise many and discourage certain members of 
the community from taking part in a truth commission, the language 
of human rights violations was not a key part of SICA’s advocacy to the 
population at large. Just as SICA had carefully switched between justice 
discourses depending on their intended audience, so too did the TRC 
once it was established. A TRC researcher I interviewed told me that he 
could never use rights vocabulary collecting people’s statements because 
‘human rights is a concept you talk about in English, it just wouldn’t 
make any sense to people if I tried to talk about it in my own language’ 
(interview with TRC researcher, 2014).
13  Although most people I have spoken to in Solomon Islands would never outwardly say that 
domestic violence is acceptable, research conducted in the 2007 Family Health and Safety Study 
suggests that both men and women believe that there are circumstances in which a man is justified in 
hitting his wife. 
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Amnesty – bridging human rights 
and theology
As human rights is also widely perceived as a legal justice discourse, its 
use might have discouraged people further, for fear that the truth-telling 
process would lead to arrests. When the TRC was officially launched in 
2008, the shadow of RAMSI’s tension trials, still ongoing at the time, 
meant that very few ex-combatants agreed to take part. The unwillingness 
of ex-combatants to engage with the TRC may also be related to the 
Solomon Islands’ decision not to offer amnesty in exchange for testimony 
regarding politically motivated crimes. The promise of amnesties in South 
Africa’s truth-telling process was at least partially responsible for its success 
in blending the legally based human rights approach with theological 
notions of confession and forgiveness. Like sinners confessing to a priest, 
perpetrators were offered legal absolution by the commission’s lawyers if 
they were able to convince them that their crimes had been politically 
motivated. It was a true mix of judicial and theological approaches to 
establishing and absolving (criminal and personal) responsibility. This 
practice also succeeded in bringing both victims and perpetrators together 
in one, mediated, space allowing the commission to fulfil its mandate of 
promoting interpersonal reconciliation – an area in which the Solomon 
Islands TRC fell short.
Solomon Islands chose not to offer amnesty in exchange for testimony 
partially because of its previous, unsuccessful attempt to offer amnesty 
through the Amnesty Acts of 2000 and 2001. These laws legislated a key 
provision of the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) that specified two 
types of amnesty to be offered to ex-combatants. First, members of the 
two primary militia groups, the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) 
and the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), would be given immunity from 
prosecution for stealing and possessing weapons if those weapons were 
surrendered. Second, a general amnesty offered immunity for all who 
took part in conflict-related crimes (including members of the Solomon 
Islands Police Force and Prison Service). When RAMSI took control of 
law and order in 2003, they paid little heed to these amnesty provisions 
in their arrests and prosecutions. According to Fraenkel, ‘There are only 
two reported cases in which amnesty was granted by the courts Nokia v 
Regina (on appeal it was Regina v Maga and Rv Lusibaea, Bartlett, Kili 
and Fioga). There is no record of the latter in the High Court registry’ 
(Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi and Okole 2014, 4).
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Rather than specifically offering amnesty in exchange for testimony, 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act contained a clause that 
guaranteed that no information provided through TRC testimony would 
be admissible as evidence in a court of law (Solomon Islands Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission Act 2008, Part VI, section 20(f )). The 
spirit of this provision was undermined, however, when RAMSI police 
arrested ex-combatants as they testified. Guthrey documents how RAMSI 
officers arrested a member of the Black Sharks militia group in Western 
Province as they were testifying to the TRC. This arrest undermined any 
attempts made by the Commission to convince ex-combatants of its 
independence from RAMSI, and of their of safety in sharing their stories 
(Guthrey 2015, 36).
The Forgiveness Bill
Many government leaders and ex-combatants were unhappy with 
the TRC’s  unwillingness to offer amnesty and, in 2009, Sam Iduri, 
then Minister for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace, proposed 
a ‘Forgiveness Bill’. With heavily theological overtones, the proposed Bill 
mimicked the amnesty provisions of the South African TRC, offering 
amnesty to ex-combatants including those who were already in prison. 
This Bill was a more overt example of selling a political product to the 
Solomon Islands people through appealing to Christian values. In July 
2009, Iduri told the media that a Forgiveness Bill Steering Committee 
had been established and was in discussion with the churches before 
the conversation would be rolled out to the public through a national 
consultation (Jeffery 2017, 130). TRC commissioners strongly objected 
to the Bill, however, on both human rights and spiritual grounds, and the 
consultation fell flat before it started. On the one hand, commissioners 
felt that offering amnesty to people responsible for human rights abuses 
would not assist the reconciliation process, arguing that the idea would 
amount to ‘some kind of process to remove the responsibility for crimes 
committed during conflict from former militants and perpetrators … 
without conceding justice to the victims. Impunity is not helpful for 
reconciliation’ (TRC 2012, 746). On the other hand, commissioners 
reasoned that forgiveness is a deeply personal process that must remain 
the ‘sole prerogative and domain of the victims’ (TRC  2012, 746). 
This prerogative should not be politicised or legislated for the benefit 
of ex-militia and should not become seen as a necessary prerequisite to 
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reconciliation and healing. Christianity, therefore, and the prerogative to 
forgive associated with a Christian subjectivity, was understood as having 
moral pre-eminence in the personal realm, whereas human rights was to 
take moral pre-eminence in the political realm. One (the political morality 
of human rights) could be legislated, the other (the personal morality of 
Christianity) could and should not be.
Ostracisation of faith-based organisations 
and the church
Despite initial attempts to replicate the theological tone of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, church leaders eventually 
came to feel ostracised by the truth-seeking process. The public face of 
the commission, particularly at its inception, was Christian. For example, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu was invited to Solomon Islands to oversee the 
TRC’s inauguration. Following a grand opening ceremony in Honiara 
on 29 April 2009, Tutu told an interviewer that peace ‘will happen here 
because God wants to give you the gift called peace and secondly prosperity, 
such a beautiful place, it looks like the Garden of Eden’ (Tutu on Radio 
Australia 2009). Following in the footsteps of South Africa, the Chair of 
the Commission was a member of the clergy – Anglican priest Father Sam 
Ata. Public hearings were also regularly held at churches, and church staff 
assisted with the overall logistics of the hearings.
Partially, the feeling of ostracisation that eventuated was a result of 
administrative issues: the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
took on board the financial management of the TRC, and it came to be 
viewed as marred by UN bureaucracy, delays and mismanagement. There 
were disagreements between the MNURP and UNDP over ownership 
and management, including the extent to which the commission should 
remain free from government interference. This was complicated further 
by the fact that many of the TRC staff were seconded from government 
departments, in particular the MNURP, so it was difficult for secondees 
to know where their allegiances should lie. Among the internal politics, 
UNDP took control of the financial and logistical management of the 
commission, further neutralising any ideological influence that the church 
and civil society might have had. An anonymous interviewee told me that 
the TRC never really reached out to the church, which was unfortunate 
considering the influence of faith-based organisations in its establishment. 
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‘It was the TRC’s role, to really bring the church in’, the interviewee told 
me, ‘and they just never really did it effectively’ (anonymous interview, 
2012). The ICTJ attempted to bring the church and the TRC together, 
holding workshops for church leaders in an effort to make them vehicles 
for awareness raising, but they were largely unsuccessful.
However, this ostracisation was also due to the fact that the TRC’s analysis 
of the violence experienced during the tensions was firmly grounded in 
international human rights, international humanitarian and international 
criminal justice norms: Christianity played no official role. For example, 
TRC staff collected statements from individuals based on a list of 
predetermined categories of rights violations grounded in definitions of 
crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. Despite having no legal ramifications (as the TRC had no judicial 
powers and Solomon Islands had not ratified the Rome Statute):
the concern was to have some internationally-recognized 
benchmark as a guide to assessing the violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law which occurred during the 
armed conflict … in present circumstances, it is being referred 
to as a reference point in which to contextualize the violations 
and criminal acts that were committed during the period 
(TRC 2012, 356).
One interviewee described the statement-taking process as ‘majorly 
problematic’, saying ‘there wasn’t a great opportunity for stream of 
thought responses, it was a questionnaire – were you sexually abused, 
yes or no … it was highly problematic’ (anonymous interview, 2013). 
The TRC also failed to incorporate reconciliation in any immediate way 
into its work, as had been originally envisioned. Instead – truth seeking 
through statement taking, interviews and public hearings was portrayed as 
an essential prerequisite to the achievement of national unity – an elusive 
concept that might happen at a much later date.
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Interestingly, following the unofficial release of the report by editor Terry 
Brown,14 Wale expressed disappointment that the TRC would be unlikely 
to lead to the establishment of a war crimes tribunal. As Solomon Islands 
is a signatory, but not yet a full State Party, to the Rome Statute, even if 
it were to ratify the Statute now (as per the TRC’s recommendations), 
its provisions are not retrospectively applicable. The most that can 
be hoped for is that future membership of the ICC (and the threat of 
prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity this brings) 
might deter individuals from committing crimes against international 
law in the future. This demonstrates that international human rights and 
humanitarian standards were extremely important in SICA’s expectations 
of the TRC’s function – even if this was not articulated to the public 
during the initial public consultations.
Spiritual counselling in the TRC process
On an unofficial level, however, Christianity continued to play a subtle yet 
powerful role in the functioning of the TRC, and this was at the coalface 
of interaction between staff and the people who testified. Limited human 
resources in Solomon Islands mean that different sectors of society are 
relatively porous, and skilled individuals tend to move between civil society, 
state and intergovernmental sectors as opportunities present themselves. 
In the case of the TRC, Caritas-trained counsellors were commissioned 
to provide psychological support to victims and perpetrators the evening 
before they provided their testimonies. Psychological and psychiatric 
services in Solomon Islands are extremely limited and most trauma 
counselling in the post-conflict period has been conducted by the church. 
As such, counselling tends to have deeply spiritual overtones, and places 
great emphasis on interpersonal forgiveness and reconciliation.
Counsellors had a very limited amount of time with each person on the 
evening before they gave their testimony, and tried to utilise their time 
in the most efficient way possible. Most people who testified had never 
shared their story in public before, and were extremely nervous about 
14  In 2014, the TRC Report’s editor released the report unofficially via his email networks as 
a result of his frustration with parliament’s refusal to release the report to the public. Despite clauses 
in the TRC Act that obligate parliament to make the report available to the public immediately after 
its receipt, parliament and the Prime Minister’s Office have repeatedly refused to do so. Reasons cited 
for this refusal include the report’s apparent ‘sensitivity’, its likelihood to incite further violence, and 
the cost burden that implementing the TRC’s recommendations will put on the government. 
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what they would say once on stage before a group of TRC commissioners, 
an audience and a television camera. As such, counselling sessions tended 
to evolve into coaching sessions in which people were advised how their 
testimony should be structured and delivered. As a result, although each 
person’s personal story remained unique, the formula of the testimonies 
was surprisingly homogenous. Individuals would thank God for the 
opportunity to speak and potentially reconcile with their enemies, then 
tell their story, before either seeking, or offering, forgiveness for the crimes 
that had been committed (interview with TRC counsellor, 2014).
As a result of this, two distinct narratives became apparent in the final 
TRC Report. On the one hand was a narrative that reflected the voices 
of those who testified – spiritual in tone and reflective of the Christian 
ideologies on which the idea of a truth commission was initially ‘sold’ 
to the Solomon Islands public. On the other, was an official narrative 
grounded in international legal norms that had seemingly little in 
common, ideologically, with the first.
Conclusion
Ultimately, neither of these two narratives, grounded in different justice 
discourses and their related subjectivities, ‘touched the heart’ of the 
Solomon Islands people. True resonance seemed to get swallowed in the 
institutional machinery of the TRC. The counselling process, for example, 
was described to me as impersonal and dehumanising – ‘like a conveyor 
belt’ – as counsellors had such little time with each individual. The spirit 
of people’s individual stories became reduced to cold statistics in the 
quest for big data to scrutinise for patterns of predefined human rights 
violations. Merry and Coutin have described human rights reporting 
with the term ‘technologies of truth’ claiming that ‘[a]ssumptions about 
evidence, categorization, adjudication and measurement privilege certain 
forms of suffering over others, even as they omit phenomena that defy 
categorization’ (Merry and Coutin 2014, 1). The technology of the TRC 
as an institutional truth-telling machine generated a particular kind 
of knowledge, targeted at an international audience fluent in the legal 
discourse of human rights protections.
To return to the question of vernacularisation, it is possible to argue that 
the Solomon Islands TRC achieved neither replication nor hybridisation 
of discourses, but fell somewhere in the middle. Neither the official human 
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rights discourse nor the unofficial theological discourse was ‘merely 
superficial’ – each having a level of meaning to a particular audience. 
However, no substantial attempt was made by TRC staff to address 
inconsistencies between, or amalgamate, the two discourses. Ultimately, 
they weave alongside each other, telling two different but interconnected 
stories throughout the TRC Report.
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